



and Trajectories towards 2030
Africa is a fast-changing continent and an area of rising 
global relevance, where major transformation processes 
are currently underway, from demographic expansion 
to economic development, from social progress to 
environmental challenges, from technological innovation to 
continental integration, from political change to migratory 
pressures. How will these complex transformations shape 
the Africa of tomorrow?
This Report sets out a vision for Africa’s future based on 
five key traits: an archipelago of heterogeneous growth 
trajectories; the revolutionary impact of technological 
leapfrogging; regional integration and the growing role 
of sub-regional processes; the clustering of instability 
mainly around the core of the region; and the migration 
movements that originate from – but also predominantly 
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Exploring Africa’s futures means telling a story of recent and 
ongoing fast-paced transformations. In recent years, econom-
ic, socio-political and technological changes have been thriving 
throughout the continent. This picture of Africa steadily dis-
tanced the continent from images of poverty, conflict, passivity, 
and paved the way for the “Africa rising” narrative. While  the 
challenges impeding development and progress are still many, 
the opportunities the continent offers are greater than ever, for 
locals and foreigners alike. 
African institutions and citizens are assertively taking control 
over such opportunities by increasingly tackling issues pertain-
ing to Africa, from security to development, from innovation 
to governance. Far gone are the days in which the role played 
by African actors on the international stage was non-influential. 
In a global context where the hegemony of traditional powers 
is challenged by emerging ones, Africa’s participation in global 
affairs is finding new spaces for enhancing its bargaining power. 
This applies to trade as well as aid, in sectors as different as ag-
riculture and green technologies, education and infrastructure 
and so forth. 
In this context, traditional foreign actors and emerging ones 
have showed (renewed) interest in Africa, attracted not only by 
the region’s wealth of natural resources, but also by Africa’s one 
billion consumers’ untapped potential. The shift from aid to 
investment – with foreign direct investment currently exceed-
ing aid – is an indicator of how the balance of power between 
Africa and the rest of the world is levelling out, reducing the 
divide in global dynamics. 
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Transformations have involved virtually every field, as 
Giovanni Carbone puts it in the opening chapter of this vol-
ume. From demographic expansion and fast urbanisation to 
economic development, from social progress to environmental 
challenges, from technological innovation to continental inte-
gration, from political change to migratory pressures. And they 
are likely to continue at an even more accelerated pace over the 
next decades. By revealing why they matter for Africa’s futures, 
this volume focuses on seven major trends: Africa’s population, 
urbanisation, growth trajectories, continental economic and 
political integration, technological innovation, political stabil-
ity, and migration. 
Africans quintupled from 229 million in 1950 to 1.2 billion 
today, and are expected to double to 2.5 billion in 2050, mak-
ing up a quarter of the global population. Africa’s young social 
fabric (in 2050 the continent’s median age will still be under 
25, projected to hit 35 only in 2100) will be hungry for energy 
and resources, and will act as one of the drivers of global con-
sumption. It will be increasingly occupying urban areas, which 
have been expanding (and are expected to keep growing) at an 
annual rate of 3% from 2015-2020. This population flow into 
cities will translate into the emergence of megacities with more 
than 10 million citizens and a plethora of medium-sized urban 
centres, with rural areas becoming less central to Africans’ lives. 
However, although urban living correlates positively to devel-
opment, more than half of Africa’s urban population currently 
lives in slums (projected to triple in size by 2050), showing that 
population increase only partially relates to wealth increase.
In the period from 2000 to 2015, as Carbone notes, African 
economies grew at an unprecedented average annual rate of 
around 5%. The positive trend involved many countries: those 
that were already on track toward development, and those that 
weren’t. It also involved a variety of sectors, not only energy and 
mineral commodities but also ICTs, agriculture and more. This 
growth slowed down after 2015 due to the fall of commodi-
ty prices but also climate-induced events such as droughts and 
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reduced agricultural production. Country trajectories started 
to diverge, with some countries continuing to grow fast (i.e. 
non-oil economies such as Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Mali, Rwanda, Senegal and Tanzania), while others have been 
experiencing a slowdown (i.e. regional giants Nigeria, Angola, 
South Africa, but also smaller economies such as Equatorial 
Guinea, Zimbabwe, Burundi). Against this background, Thang 
Nguyen-Quoc, Arthur Minsat and Rodrigo Deiana, challenge 
the belief that Africa as a whole is (still) rising. They argue that 
while in 2017 economic recovery began (at the continental lev-
el), and the next 5 years should see a further slight increase 
in growth, Africa’s development will be unequal across sub-re-
gions, with overall slower continental growth, if compared to 
the previous decade. This, in turn, will make it unlikely for the 
continent as a whole to meet the targets set by Agenda 2063 in 
its first 10-year implementation plan (2013-2023). However, 
ten of the world’s top twenty economies that are expected to 
record the highest growth rates between 2018 and 2022 are in 
sub-Saharan Africa. 
The lack of uniformity in development paths has had an im-
pact on regional and continental efforts to enhance econom-
ic and political integration, such as the creation of Regional 
Economic Communities (RECs) and the African Continental 
Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), resulting in a rather uneven inte-
gration progress across Africa. While African leaders reached a 
consensus on the importance of integration to achieve growth 
and development, Brendan Vickers argues that for integration 
to work, it is not sufficient to make declaratory statements and 
regulate tariffs. It is instead necessary to tackle on-the-ground 
constraints, such as infrastructure shortcomings and govern-
ance obstacles, which impair daily operations as well as Africa’s 
regional and global competitiveness. In addition, effective im-
plementation of regional and continental trade areas may in-
crease intra-African trade by an estimated US$35 billion per 
year by 2022. This would be even more likely to occur if inter-
national development partners, including the EU, supported 
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the continent through trade, investment and aid, especially 
“Aid for Trade”. Other challenges include a lack of political 
goodwill, overlapping trade rules and practices due to multiple 
memberships in different RECs and the absence of adequate 
infrastructure to support trade in goods and services. 
This last deficiency does not merely concern physical trade 
but also the digital, i.e. e-commerce and e-services, thus plac-
ing emphasis on the technology gap between Africa and the 
rest of the world. In his chapter, Michael Minges explains that 
advanced digital technologies, such as the internet, still only 
impact a small percentage of the African population, due to 
limited accessibility and affordability. However, less advanced 
technological innovations (mobile-related rather than smart-
phone-related) have actually acted as game-changers for Africa. 
Thanks to private and foreign investments in telecommunica-
tions – higher than in any other infrastructure sector in the 
region – mobile penetration reached 78% in 2017. This success 
was linked to the fact that mobile phone technology (vis-à-vis 
smartphone technology which requires the internet to exploit 
the devices’ full potential) was not merely used for basic voice 
communications and text messaging, but for service delivery 
in sectors as different as banking and health, electricity and 
agriculture. Mobile money, in particular, is contributing sig-
nificantly to generating innovation and boosting incomes even 
among small traders and farmers. 
Political transformations have also taken place, with mul-
ti-party elections on the rise, at times strategically used by 
non-democratic parties to hold on to power, at others signal-
ling genuine democratic processes. Also growing, however, 
has been political violence. After the progressive stabilisation 
that Africa experienced in the 1990s, since the 2000s and in 
particular since 2010 an increase of political violence was ob-
served. Clionadh Raleigh presents the forms of violence that are 
proliferating on the continent and the factors that led to this 
increase. While interstate wars were the norm in previous dec-
ades, more recently violence is taking the form of protests and 
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riots and violent extremism by terrorist and non-state armed 
groups. Raleigh argues that the vulnerability of domestic po-
litical processes, and the fragility of political elites’ competition 
have been the main underlying causes of violence, in both au-
thoritarian and democratising regimes. The majority of armed 
conflicts increasingly clustered in a T-shaped area stretching 
west-east through Nigeria, Mali, South Sudan and Somalia, 
and north-south through the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
the Central African Republic and Burundi. While the presence 
of external actors to oversee peace and security is large, African 
countries have also reacted to this trend by creating ad hoc mil-
itary coalitions such as the G5 Sahel Force in the Sahel and the 
Multinational Joint Task Force in the Lake Chad basin. 
Political instability, together with the previously mentioned 
demographic expansion, are partly perceived to impact migra-
tory trends. In the sixth chapter, however, Richard Mallett em-
phasises that demographic factors and conflict account for only 
a minor share of cross-border movement. Indeed, population 
pressure (especially from young cohorts) has been proved not 
to rank as a primary driver of migration outside the continent, 
and 86% of international migration in Africa is not related to 
conflict. Similarly, poverty – frequently considered a core driver 
of international migration – matters but not in the way often 
assumed. The poorest countries have very low levels of emigra-
tion rates. These start to increase as they become wealthier, and 
revert back to low rates once they reach a relatively advanced 
stage of development. Instead, crucial drivers known to mat-
ter in the context of African migration trends are the actions 
and behaviours of destination states. Their public and econom-
ic policies, such as access to education and labour market op-
portunities in host countries, outweigh their migration-specific 
regulations.  
Sara de Simone also looks at people’s mobility in her chapter. 
But she does so from the angle of human development, show-
ing how education has an impact on one’s aspirations and capa-
bilities, like the ability to grasp employment opportunities and 
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act on one’s freedom to move. Despite the increase of primary 
education enrolment rates in Africa since the 1990s, secondary 
and tertiary education did not grow. This led the African pop-
ulation to increasingly acquire literacy and numeracy skills, but 
not much else, such as problem-solving and the entrepreneurial 
skills necessary to translate knowledge into productivity and 
economic diversification. Despite this shortcoming, higher lev-
els of primary education enrolment alone did enhance people’s 
freedom of choice, including the choice to move toward better 
life opportunities, i.e. work, education, family.  
Finally, Giovanni Carbone and Tiziana Corda present an 
overview of Italy’s priority areas in its engagement with Africa, 
which mainly revolve around economic growth, peace and 
security, and human development. While for geographic and 
historical reasons North Africa and the Horn have been pref-
erential areas for Italian economic activities, the outreach grew 
significantly in the past decade, as Italy’s total investment value 
doubled, reaching US$40 billion in 2016. Small- and medi-
um-size enterprises, together with large Italian multinational 
corporations are currently tapping into Africa’s transformation 
dynamics. Italy’s security presence on the continent stepped up 
in the past few years, with more troops deployed and specific 
training delivered with the aim of better controlling migration 
and human trafficking routes, via land and sea. A number of 
Italian civil society organisations and governmental agencies are 
contributing to Africa’s human development in areas as differ-
ent as health and space, education and business development. 
While human development has always been a core area of en-
gagement between Italy and African countries, it was re-focused 
more recently to address the drivers of African migration.
The development path that African countries are taking is 
certainly full of challenges but equally full of opportunities. 
African actors and institutions, as well external partners, are 
contributing to laying the foundations for the continent to 
become an integrated, peaceful and prosperous place by 2063 
– as outlined in the African Union’s development blueprint 
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document, “Agenda 2063” – driven by its own citizens and rep-
resenting a dynamic force in the international arena. Whether 
this vision will become true remains to be seen. 
Paolo Magri
ISPI Executive Vice-President and Director

1.  Mapping Change in Africa
Giovanni Carbone
Africa is a large and complex continent made up of fifty-four 
sovereign states, including some island countries, extending 
over a land area one hundred times the size of Italy. Major cities 
such as Rabat in Morocco and Antananarivo in Madagascar, or 
Cape Town in South Africa and Cairo in Egypt are separated 
by 7,000 to 8,000 kilometres and wildly different political, so-
cial and economic histories. Yet there is no lack of aspects that 
different countries – or groups of countries – in the area share. 
Some have to do with their pasts, some with their current tra-
jectories, and others with a foreseeable common future. The lat-
ter include the many opportunities and challenges that multi-
ple processes of fast change are generating across the continent.
This chapter offers an evidence-based overview of the major 
transformation processes presently underway in Africa: from 
demographic expansion and fast urbanisation to economic de-
velopment, from social progress to environmental challenges, 
from technological innovation to continental integration, from 
political change to migratory pressures.
Demographic expansion and fast urbanisation1
Prompted by longer life expectancy and just a marginal decline 
in fertility rates, Africa’s population is set to double in the next 
three decades, accounting for more than ¼ of the world popu-
lation in 2050. This growth will mostly involve urban centres, 
1 All data were retrieved from United Nations Population Division Department 
of  Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision and 
World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision, unless otherwise stated. 
A Vision of Africa’s Future16
whose population will outpace the rural by the late 2030s. 
Africa’s population is increasing sharply. The continent 
has a lower population density (40 people/km2) than the EU 
(125), China (147) or India (445). Yet looking at population 
growth rates, with the highest rate of annual expansion (2.7%) 
Africans quintupled from 229 million in 1950 to 1.2 billion in 
2015, and will drive world population growth in the coming 
decades, contributing to 56% of global population growth in 
the next 35 years. Today’s 1.2 billion inhabitants are expected 
to double to 2.5 in 2050 and close the gap with Asia (4.5) 
by 2100. Today’s demographic powerhouses in the region are 
Nigeria, Ethiopia and Egypt, but by 2030 other African coun-
tries will have grown impressively: Congo-Kinshasa will have 
a population of 125 million, Tanzania 87 million, small-sized 
Burkina Faso 28 million. 
The main drivers behind this trend are manifold. Among 
them, the sharp drop in infant mortality rates (from 180 deaths 
per 1,000 live births in 1990 to 78 in 20162), still stubbornly 
high fertility rates (despite slightly declining, they will remain 
above 3 children per woman until 2050), and longer life expec-
tancy (60 years in 2015, 10 years more than in 19903). With 
an astounding average of 7.6 children per woman – the world’s 
highest fertility rate – Nigeriens will triple to almost 70 million 
in 2050. 
As a result, sub-Saharan Africa’s age structure is young 
and is set to remain so for years to come. Until 2035 the un-
der-20 (today 51.3%) will still account for more than half of 
Africa’s population, whereas until 2050 Africa’s median age will 
remain under 25, and will hit 35 only in 2100, still the lowest 
in the world. 
Africa also leads the world with the highest urban growth 
rate (3.42% in 2015-2020). In 2035 the urban population will 
have caught up with the rural. Moreover, by then Africa will 
2 World Bank, World Development Indicators (accessed 2018).
3 Ibid.
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have six of the world’s top megacities with over 10 million citi-
zens each (Cairo, Lagos, Kinshasa, Luanda, Dar es Salaam, and 
Johannesburg), yet most of the urbanisation process will take 
place in mid-sized urban centres4. Finally, while urbanisation 
can also be viewed as a boon for economic development, it is es-
timated that, in sub-Saharan Africa alone, the urban population 
living in slums (today around 62%) may triple in size by 2050. 
Fig. 1 - Demographic growth by region (1950-2100)
 
Source: UNDESA, 2017
Political change and democratic renewal
Multiparty elections are today the rule across much of Africa. 
While in a number of countries they are strategically used by 
non-democratic parties to hold on to power, in several states 
they have allowed a degree of political renewal and more genu-
ine democratic processes.
4 AfDB, OECD, UNDP, African Economic Outlook 2016: Sustainable Cities and 
Structural Transformation, Paris, OECD Publishing, 2016, p. 148.
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Electoral politics is the new normal in Africa. African 
politics and regimes made significant democratic progress be-
ginning in the early 1990s. After three decades during which 
authoritarian rule was largely coupled with widespread corrup-
tion and economic failures, the continent replaced virtually all 
its military and one-party systems with multiparty regimes. In 
the new millennium, elections have been the new normal in 
Africa. South of the Sahara, Eritrea and Somalia have remained 
exceptions in not allowing their citizens to vote. Some North 
African countries tried to take a similar path more recently, but 
the so-called Arab Spring did not bring about real and stable 
political openings beyond Tunisia.
Military interventions in politics are not yet a thing of 
the past in Africa, as demonstrated by the coups in Egypt, 
Burkina Faso and Zimbabwe in recent years. But the frequency 
of African coups has seen a steep decline. During the 1980s, 17 
coups accounted for about 51% of all leadership turnovers. The 
frequency of coups subsequently shrank, although they certain-
ly did not disappear. In the decade and a half since 2000, sol-
diers seized power on twelve distinct occasions in nine states 
(Guinea-Bissau and Mauritania suffering two coups each). 
Moreover, after every recent takeover, the military hastened to 
promise that they would hold fresh elections within a relatively 
short time and mostly did so within one or two years.
The actual depth and meaning of multiparty politics 
and elections varies wildly across the continent, howev-
er. Unchallenged hegemonic-party rule prevails in the likes of 
Algeria and Ethiopia, Togo and Angola, as well as in many oth-
er places where political and voting processes are controlled by 
ruling parties to make sure they remain in office. Violent repres-
sion of dissenting voices is occasionally part of the picture. Yet 
in other parts of Africa multipartism opened up unprecedented 
avenues for political change. Across the continent, opposition 
parties won office at the ballot box as many as 40 times in 1990-
2015 – more than once in places such as Ghana and Kenya, 
Benin and Senegal – as against just three times over the previous 
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thirty years. Short of opposition victories, constitutional term 
limits often helped ensure a degree of rotation in office by pres-
idents hailing from the same ruling party, a softer kind of suc-
cession in office that occurred on 37 occasions (1990-2015), 
both in countries deemed democratic (South Africa, Namibia 
and Botswana) and in countries that are not (in Mozambique 
and Tanzania, for example, and most recently also in Angola). 
Respect, or lack thereof, for constitutional limits to pres-
idential mandates has become one of the most contentious 
political issues in the new millennium. During their transitions 
to multipartism, many countries introduced a two-term lim-
it to eschew the president-for-life syndrome that had affected 
part of the region in the past. A majority of African leaders did 
subsequently abide by this provision. And when the incumbent 
leaders of Cameroon, Burkina Faso, Uganda, Rwanda, Togo, 
Chad, Burundi and other countries approaching the end of 
their mandates were allowed to stay in office, they had to steer 
through controversial constitutional reform bills that eventual-
ly permitted them to retain power. 
Growth performances and economic 
transformations
After unprecedented economic growth during the first decade 
and a half of the new millennium, Africa as whole was hit by a 
slowdown in 2015-2016 due to changed global economic con-
ditions. In the current scenario, country trajectories are becom-
ing more diversified, with growth prospects remaining strong 
for some nations while other economies struggle to keep pace.
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Fig. 2 - Multiparty elections in Africa (1960-2015)
Source: ALC database
Emerging Africa: a new narrative of the continent’s pros-
pects. African economies grew at an unprecedented average 
annual rate of around 5% in the 2000-2014 period (5.5% for 
sub-Saharan countries). Rooted in the political and econom-
ic reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, as well as in a favourable 
commodities super-cycle, growth was not only sustained over 
a significant period of time, but also largely cut across coun-
tries and sectors. It was not just Angola or Ethiopia, but also 
Chad, Rwanda or Sierra Leone; not just energy and mineral 
commodities, but ICTs, agriculture and other sectors too. The 
impressive growth rates fed into a new “Africa rising” narrative 
and image emphasising dynamism and opportunities.
Less favourable international economic conditions in 
2015-2016 led to the emergence of a new multi-speed growth 
scenario. A partial slowdown and rebalancing in China caused 
a fall in the demand and price for a number of commodities. 
Africa’s exports to China decreased by about 40% in 2015, a de-
cline that continued through 2016. In 2015 Africa’s oil exports 
dropped by some 41% from the previous year, the major such 
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contraction since 20005. Hard-hit countries included regional 
giants Nigeria, South Africa and Angola as well as much smaller 
economies such as Equatorial Guinea, Zimbabwe or Burundi. 
Meanwhile, average public debt in sub-Saharan Africa went 
up ten percentage points to 42% of GDP between 2014 and 
2016, becoming an issue in places such as Ghana, Zambia or 
Mozambique. At the same time, other countries – particularly 
non-oil economies such as Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, 
Rwanda, Senegal and Tanzania – showed impressive resilience, 
displaying good growth performance and prospects6. This result-
ed in a situation in which growth paths are less homogeneous 
than they had been in the recent past. A situation variously de-
scribed as “two-speed growth” or “multispeed growth”7: Africa’s 
economic trajectories are becoming increasingly diversified.
Economic recovery will stabilise at more moderate growth 
levels, the result of heterogeneous growth performances. 
After hitting the lowest point of economic growth in 2016 
(1.3% for sub-Saharan Africa), 2017 was a year of economic re-
covery (2.8% for sub-Saharan Africa). Nigeria, the largest mar-
ket on the continent, was in full recession at -1.5% in 2016, 
with a modest rebound to 0.8% in 2017. Slower continental 
growth is the result of increased heterogeneity in growth per-
formances. Some countries will continue struggling to achieve 
high growth rates, others will head onward at full speed. Ten of 
the twenty economies that are expected to record the highest 
growth rates over the five years 2018 to 2022 are in Africa (all 
of them south of the Sahara). Many are small markets, but they 
also include Ethiopia, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Tanzania, Senegal 
and Uganda8.
5 AfDB, OECD, UNDP, African Economic Outlook 2017: Entrepeneurship and indus-
trialisation, Paris, OECD Publishing, 2017, p. 77.
6 World Bank, Africa’s Pulse, vol. 15, Washington D.C., World Bank Group, April 
2017, p. 21. 
7 “The Great Growth Divide”, Africa Confidential, vol. 58, no. 12, June 2017; and 
Ernst & Young, Connectivity redefined, 2017.
8 IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2017.
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Technological innovation 
Despite lagging behind advanced and other emerging countries, 
Africa is finding its own ways of benefitting from the technol-
ogy revolution, and this is increasingly happening by skipping 
inefficient or costly solutions and directly adopting the more 
technologically advanced.
The digital-divide challenge for Africa. The revolution of 
connectivity and the digital transformations that swept through 
advanced economies sparked early fears of a widening digital 
divide, with developing countries struggling to keep pace with 
fast technological innovations. Poorer individuals, peoples and 
societies did not simply risk being left behind, they risked be-
ing left out altogether. The “digital divide” duly became real. 
As the fourth industrial revolution blurred boundaries between 
Fig. 3 - Africa’s heterogeneous growth trajectories
 
Source: World Bank, Africa’s Pulse, 2017
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manufacturing and services, even the notion that rising wages 
in emerging economies would lead to a relocation of manufac-
turing towards Africa was questioned. As global value chains 
are transformed, jobs may be transferred to robots rather than 
to Africans.
Africa is taking part in the technology revolution. 
Alongside the many challenges, the new technological trans-
formations are also showing unforeseen and massive potential 
as positive game changers for Africa’s economic and social de-
velopment. The disruption brought about by “successive waves 
of the ICT revolution (PC, online, mobile, social) have democ-
ratised data, empowered consumers and citizens and spawned 
scores of new industries. The impact of this disruption has been 
felt nowhere more than across Africa”9. If part of the continent 
was indeed left out, another part joined the revolution, and 
on occasion even plays a leading role. The African Union, for 
example, has adopted Rwanda’s rapid digitalisation strategy as a 
model for the whole continent10.
Africa’s leapfrogging opportunity. As the rapid spread of 
mobile phones demonstrated an unanticipated capacity for 
bypassing old and dysfunctional landlines, giving hundreds of 
millions of Africans their first access to communication net-
works, the potential for new technologies to help leapfrog inef-
ficient solutions became apparent. Mobile penetration rose by 
more than forty-three times between 2000 and 2016, from 1.7 
to 74 subscriptions every 100 people, with peaks in countries 
such as Egypt, Tunisia, Nigeria, Kenya, Senegal and Ghana11. It 
offered immense opportunities for virtually every activity and 
situation, from businesses to migrants, from rural farmers to 
urban services. In a similar way, the introduction of “mobile 
money” allowed Africans to perform financial transactions and 
9 Ernst & Young (2017), p. 21.
10 Infrastructure Consortium for Africa, Infrastructure Financing Trends in Africa 
2016, Abidjan, 2017, p. 21.
11 J. Pushter, Smartphone ownership and internet usage continues to climb in emerging econo-
mies, Pew Research Center, 22 February 2016.
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services without waiting for the development of physical bank-
ing infrastructures. 
The multiplication of creative, innovative and diverse de-
velopment initiatives. Opportunities for applying innovative, 
technology-based strategies to solving development problems 
are multiplying and becoming ever more creative. Africa’s costly 
and unreliable provision of electricity through traditional pow-
er grids, for example, is being gradually challenged by mini- or 
micro-grids. Cheaper solar panels make the technology increas-
ingly affordable for poor rural households. Other experiments 
seem to point up how innovation can help bypass additional 
infrastructure bottlenecks such as the scarcity of paved roads. 
Drones, for example, are used for on-demand deliveries of blood 
for transfusion to hospitals across Rwanda as well as for map-
ping and monitoring “precision farming” in Côte d’Ivoire. Big 
data and crowdsourcing are also increasingly used in very diverse 
fields, from traffic congestion monitoring to the quick reporting 
of crisis situations and the mapping of violence in conflict areas.
Infrastructural development
Infrastructures have historically been a major bottleneck in 
Africa’s development. From transportation to energy, from wa-
ter distribution systems to ICT grids, the deficit of Africa’s in-
frastructures almost systematically hinders economic activities 
and social progress in the continent, despite important intra-re-
gional variations. Yet important infrastructure projects reshap-
ing Africa are on the rise.
A solid infrastructure system is at the core of economic 
and social development, but requires massive investments. 
According to the World Bank, bridging Africa’s infrastructure 
gap with the rest of the developing world would raise Africa’s per 
capita GDP by 1.7% per year12. Yet Africa still performs poorly 
in infrastructure. On the positive side, since 1990 some progress 
12 World Bank, Africa’s Pulse…, cit.
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has been made in telecommunications coverage and in access to 
clean water. However, over the past decade Africa’s infrastructure 
gap not only with advanced economies but also with the rest 
of the developing world has widened. Its performance in trans-
portation and in energy supply dropped respectively by 6% and 
3%13. Road density is lower than in the 1990s, only 37.4% of 
sub-Saharan Africans have access to electricity14 and Africa con-
sumes only 3.3% of global primary energy despite having 16% of 
the world’s population15. Similarly, gaps with other world regions 
in the ICT sector have worsened, especially regarding broadband 
connections and prices. Only one African in five has regular in-
ternet access16. Clearly, there are huge intra-regional variations 
– Africa’s 16 landlocked states lag much behind South Africa in 
terms of infrastructures – but even the continent’s top performers 
are still unable to catch up with international standards. 
Financial limits remain the most serious constraint to 
infrastructure development, but regulatory restrictions can 
likewise represent important obstacles. In 2016 total funding 
in Africa’s infrastructure decreased by 21% compared to the 
previous year17. According to estimates, Africa would need an 
annual outlay for infrastructure ranging from US$120 billion 
to US$174 billion (at 2015 dollar rates). But recent years’ 
commitments only averaged around US$74-83 billion year-
ly in 2012-2015, before slipping to US$62.6 billion in 2016. 
More than half of infrastructural commitments in 2016 (58%) 
were allocated by external finance (Infrastructure Consortium 
for Africa (ICA) members 29.8%, Arab funds 8.8%, China 
10.3%), leaving to African national governments 42% of over-
all commitments. The downward trend of 2016 was in line 
13 World Economic Forum, The Africa Competitiveness Report, 2017, p. 12.
14 World Bank, World Development Indicators..., cit.
15 African Development Bank Group, ICA, UNEP, and Sustainable Energy Fund 
for Africa, Atlas of  Africa - Energy Resources, 2017.
16 World Economic Forum, The Africa…, cit.. 
17 All data in this paragraph are from Infrastructure Consortium for Africa 
(2017).
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with a global economic slowdown and, in particular, reflected 
a reduction in Chinese funding, halved in comparison to an 
annual average of US$12 billion in 2011-2016. Still, China led 
the way in supporting infrastructural development in a num-
ber of African countries. Ethiopia18, for example, recently inau-
gurated a 750km new cross-border railway from Addis Ababa 
to the Djibouti port on the Red Sea, a US$3.4 billion project 
largely financed by China. Data also show that Africa’s infra-
structure needs are only marginally addressed by public-private 
and private sector investments, even less so in 2016 when the 
latter’s participation declined by 49%. Overall, the sectors that 
benefited the most were transports (39.2%), energy (31.9%) 
and water (16.9%), but significant variations occurred in re-
gions of destination too. Despite declining, South Africa alone 
collected 9.4% of total infrastructure financing in 2016, almost 
as much as the rest of southern Africa (10.4%). Still, West 
and East Africa topped the beneficiaries, receiving respectively 
26.1% and 21% of total funding. 
To solve Africa’s infrastructural deficit, regional approach-
es are on the rise. The African Union adopted a common infra-
structural development agenda (Programme for Infrastructure 
Development in Africa, PIDA). The initiative, which is joint-
ly managed by the African Union Commission, the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) Secretariat and 
the African Development Bank, sets out a vision particularly in 
the sectors of energy, transportation, ICTs and trans-bounda-
ry water resources. The aim is to foster infrastructural progress 
for regional integration and socio-economic development via a 
series of national, sub-regional and continental projects to be 
realised by 2040. A number of giant infrastructure projects are 
already underway such as, for example, the rehabilitation and 
upgrade of around US$12 billion worth of roads and railways 
in south-eastern Africa19; port expansions and construction 
18 BBC News, “Ethiopia and Djibouti launch first fully electrified cross-border 
railway in Africa”, 4 October 2016. 
19 https://www.icafrica.org/en/topics-programmes/north-south-corridor/ 
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in Djibouti, Tanzania and Kenya; urban development plans 
around capital cities; new dams, among which the Grand 
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.
Social progress
Demographic expansion and fast urbanisation offer both oppor-
tunities and challenges. Among the latter, the risk of growing un-
employment and poverty. Yet one of Africa’s positive stories in the 
past few decades has been precisely social progress. Human devel-
opment indicators such as life expectancy and low infant mortali-
ty rates have improved, but some divergent trajectories across the 
continent depict a blurred picture of Africa’s social progress. 
Africa’s social progress shows both encouraging and un-
satisfactory trends. In 1990 sub-Saharan Africa’s extreme pov-
erty share of total population amounted to 54.4%20. In 2013, it 
dropped to 41%, but in terms of absolute numbers it increased 
from 278 million to 390 million, making Africa the only de-
veloping region falling short of halving extreme poverty as set 
by MDGs targets. As Africa’s population grows faster than per 
capita economic growth, the absolute figure for extreme pover-
ty (less than US$1.90/day) is likely to continue increasing. 
This contrast between absolute and relative numbers also 
stands out in non-economic poverty indicators in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Health, nutrition and education have improved over 
the past twenty years, as adult literacy increased from 51.1% in 
1996 to 60.9% in 2016, youth literacy from 66.7% to 75.4%, 
gross primary school enrolment from 73.4% to 98.7%, life ex-
pectancy from 50 to 60 years, whereas the prevalence of child 
malnutrition dropped from 46.2% to 34.1% and the infant 
mortality rate from an average of 170 children per 1,000 live 
births to 7821. However, such numbers are still among the worst 
20 World Bank, World Development Indicators..., cit.
21 Data on literacy and malnutrition are from UNICEF databank, while data 
on primary school enrolment, life expectancy, and mortality rates are from the 
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in the world. Moreover, large swathes of Africa are still occasion-
ally on the verge of famine. In early 2017, South Sudan declared 
famine – the first ever since 2011 in Somalia – and over the 
year at least 28 million people in East Africa22 and 8.5 million 
in the Lake Chad region23 have been in need of humanitarian 
assistance. 
Geographical divergences also concern inequality. Rural areas 
are still much poorer and unequal than urban centres, although 
the gap shrank from 35% in 1996 to 28% in 201224. Moreover, 
inequality, as measured by the Gini index, is higher in southern 
Africa than the rest of the continent. Overall, Africa hosts 7 of 
today’s 10 most unequal countries25 but, apart from them, the 
region’s inequality performance is consistent with other devel-
oping regions in the world. 
Africa’s demographic expansion poses a major challenge 
to its labour market. Today 8% of Africa’s labour force is un-
employed and vulnerable employment concerns 62.5% of total 
employment26. As a result of population growth, Africa’s work-
ing-age population (15 to 64 years) is set to increase dramat-
ically. To capitalise on this increase and translate it into a de-
mographic dividend that can foster growth, sub-Saharan Africa 
alone will have to create around 20 to 30 million jobs per year 
until 2030 to absorb the youth cohort annually entering the 
working-age group27. By then, sub-Saharan Africa will have 
added 378 million young people to its workforce, that is, more 
than today’s North American population, and by 2050 they 
will represent two-thirds of global workforce expansion. 
World Bank.
22 WorldVision, East Africa hunger, famine: Facts, FAQs, and how to help.
23 Nigeria Northeast: Humanitarian Overview, Reliefweb, Report from UN Office for 
the Coordination of  Humanitarian Affairs, September 2017.
24 K. Beegle et al., Poverty in a Rising Africa, Washington, D.C., World Bank, 2016, 
p. 10. 
25 Ivi, p. 15. 
26 ILO, World Employment Social Outlook, Trends 2017, 2017, p. 16.
27 FAO, Rural Africa in Motion, Dynamics and drivers of  migration South of  the Sahara, 
2017, p. 20. 
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Migratory pressures
The demographic and socio-economic transition that is cur-
rently underway in sub-Saharan Africa weighs on migration 
trends. Migration is influenced by a complex range of factors. 
Vulnerability to conflicts, poverty and adverse environmental 
conditions (forced displacement) does play a role, yet African 
migration mostly comes down to individuals’ deliberate choices 
in search for better life opportunities. 
Fig. 4 - Inequality shows a geographical pattern
Source: World Bank, Africa Poverty Database, 2015
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Structure, evolution and management. Africa’s recent de-
mographic and socio-economic transformations are set to make 
migratory pressure structural. The growing African youth co-
hort, underpinned by new technologies and social media, has 
high expectations which have not been met by jobless growth in 
recent years or by the modest growth of sub-Saharan Africa’s av-
erage per capita GDP over the past 40 years (today US$1,632), 
which diverges sharply from the EU average (US$35,632)28. 
African countries often consider their people’s mobility as 
a development strategy, to decrease unemployment, generate 
remittances and decrease dissatisfaction. In this direction, ar-
rangements such as visa removals to facilitate intra-regional free 
movement of peoples have been introduced by several African 
regional organisations. 
African migration is no exception to global trends and is 
mostly intra-continental. In Africa the absolute number of in-
ternational migrants increased from 21.5 million in 2000 to 32.6 
million in 2015 as a result of population growth, yet its share of 
the total regional population remained stable at around 2.6% 
between 2000-2015, dropping from 3.2% in 1990, and lower 
than the world average (3.3% today). Moreover, 50% of Africa’s 
international migrants (and 67% of the sub-Saharan) move with-
in Africa, mostly to neighbouring countries in the same sub-re-
gion29. This trend also concerns forced displacements: being 
both a source and destination region of refugee flows, sub-Saha-
ran Africa alone hosts more than 26% of the world’s refugees30. 
Finally, regarding internal migration within national boundaries, 
more and more people, especially the young, are leaving rural ar-
eas to move to more attractive urban centres. Internal migration 
accounts for half of total migration trends in Kenya and Senegal, 
but it goes up to 80% in Nigeria and Uganda31.
28 World Bank, World Development Indicators..., cit. Per capita GDP in dollars 
(2010 constant prices).
29 G. Carbone (Ed.), Out of  Africa. Why People Migrate, Milano, Ledizioni-ISPI, 2017.
30 http://www.unhcr.org/africa.html 
31 FAO (2017), p. 22.
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The migration hump, or the migration-development nex-
us, counters common perceptions that see migration as a devel-
opment failure. Lack of economic development does not neces-
sarily provide incentives for people to move. Quite the opposite: 
long-distance migration requires financial and human resources. 
Empirical evidence suggests that higher levels of extra-continen-
tal migration occurs in countries with better access to infrastruc-
tures, higher GDP per capita, higher educational levels, and that 
are in advanced stages in the demographic transition32. Therefore, 
it is those with better income and education that are more likely 
to move. Pouring in economic aid or investments just to raise 
Africans’ wellbeing and stem migration flows may lead to unex-
pected effects. As the chart of the migration bump explains, only 
after a certain level of development (over US$5,000 GDP per 
capita) do the incentives to migration decrease.
Security: conflicts, terrorism, and violence
Africa is currently witnessing a series of conflicts, terrorist at-
tacks and episodes of violence that apparently contradict the 
image of a new Africa rising. Yet a comprehensive portrait of 
Africa’s security landscape needs to include the full evolution 
in time, space and nature of political violence in the con-
tinent, including such unexpected and promising develop-
ments as the new peace deal recently signed by Ethiopia and 
Eritrea. Following the voluntary resignation of prime minister 
Hailemariam Desalegn, aimed at easing Ethiopia’s domestic 
tensions, the country’s new leader Abiy Ahmed Ali immediate-
ly reached out to the government in Asmara. He promised an 
unconditional handover of the disputed border town of Badme 
and paid a historic visit to the Eritrean capital, thus paving the 
way for the formal peace agreement signed in Jeddah (Saudi 
Arabia), in September 2018.  
32 M.-L. Flahaux and H. de Haas, “African migration: trends, patterns, drivers”, 
Comparative Migration Studies, vol. 4, no. 1, 2016. 
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Fig. 5 - How Africans leave their countries 
(% total African population)
Source: G. Carbone (Ed.), Out of Africa. Why People Migrate (2017)
Patterns of political violence in Africa have varied over the 
decades. Post-colonial Africa suffered relatively few interstate 
wars. Civil strife has often been the norm. The post-Cold War 
period saw the highest levels of fatalities from political violence 
in independent Africa, peaking in 1992-1994 when nearly 1/3 
of the regional countries were involved in civil wars. Since the 
1990s there has been a progressive stabilisation, sustained by 
peacekeeping missions and external interventions. At least until 
2010, when, in a partial turnaround, incidents of political vio-
lence in Africa started increasing dramatically again, although 
fatalities have so far remained subdued compared to 1990s 
levels33. The region has also witnessed a change in the nature 
of violence, with the rise of jihadist movements and riots. The 
latter – violent forms of predominantly urban demonstrations 
– along with non-violent protests reached 36% of total political 
violence and protest events in 2016. Yet compared to conflicts 
33 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (version 7) data.
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proper, their scale of fatalities is overwhelmingly smaller and 
their drivers are frequently democratic causes. Finally, conflicts 
between farmers and herders have been a recurring plight in 
some African countries. 
Over the long term, the geographical dimension of conflicts 
has also evolved, as instability is today mostly clustered in a 
T-shaped area across the core of the continent, which involves 
an arc ranging from West Africa to the Horn (Mali, Nigeria, 
South Sudan, Somalia) and the African Great Lakes region 
(DRC, CAR, Burundi).
Despite the numerous ongoing conflicts, military expend-
iture in sub-Saharan Africa decreased by 3.6% in 2015-2016 
(US$19.2 billion in 2016), but it is still 8.5% higher than in 
200734. This recent downward trend was steered by economic 
cuts in oil-producing countries, whereas in conflict-torn coun-
tries there has been a slight increase, albeit significantly lower 
than in previous years.
The spread of violent extremism by terrorist and non-
state groups plays a substantial role in the recent increase in 
political violence. In Africa the number of terrorist events grew 
dramatically from 104 in 2004 to 3,418 in 2014. Such a twen-
ty-fold increase brought a parallel surge in the number of vic-
tims (from 525 to 14,455), which subsequently contracted but 
stayed much higher than in previous decades (7,908 in 2016). 
The deadliest terrorist groups include Boko Haram in north-
east Nigeria, the jihadists in the Sahel (AQIM and others), and 
the al-Shabaab in Somalia.
Deprivation, marginalisation and weak governance are re-
portedly the primary drivers or incentives of youth’s journeys 
into violent extremism in Africa35. Better economic prospects 
and state capabilities might be the right answer to violent ex-
tremism. Yet African countries have mostly reacted to it by cre-
ating ad hoc military coalitions – such as the G5 Sahel Force in 
34 Nan Tian et al., Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2016, SIPRI Fact Sheet, 
April 2017. 
35 UNDP, Journey to extremism in Africa, 2017. 
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the Sahel and the Multinational Joint Task Force in the Lake 
Chad basin – whereas attention to the development dimension 
of security challenges still lags behind. 
Fig. 6 - Political violence in Africa (1997-2016) 
Source: ACLEDv7
Fig. 7 - Terrorism in Africa (1980-2016) 
Source: Global Terrorism Database
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Environmental challenges 
Africa is rich in natural resources, diverse ecological systems, 
varied agricultural production, but at the same time afflicted by 
land and resource degradation, high geographical exposure to 
natural disasters, limited productivity. Environmental changes, 
combined with pre-existing vulnerabilities, can magnify chal-
lenges and inequalities that may lead to political unrest or pop-
ulation movements.   
Africa faces numerous environmental challenges. Natural 
resources are key assets for social development and economic 
growth, particularly for the agricultural sector, but are subject 
to climate-related threats, land degradation, mismanagement. 
All African regions, although in heterogeneous ways, are among 
those most adversely affected by climate change and other en-
vironmental stressors, because of high geographical exposure to 
natural disasters, demographic pressure, pre-existing vulnera-
bilities exacerbated by short-sighted development policies. The 
Sahel is the most affected region and has been dubbed “ground 
zero” for climate change36. Climate change projections show a 
cross-regional increase of temperatures in coming decades but 
a geographically varied impact on rainfall regimes across Africa. 
Intense rainfall and flash floods are expected to increase by 20% 
in West Africa in the next decade.  
Environmental disruptions weigh heavily on the econo-
my and the employment sector, considering that around 65% 
of Africa’s labour force is estimated to be involved in agricul-
tural activities and their output accounts for around 32% of 
Africa’s GDP37. 
Significant progress has been made but there is much 
more untapped potential. While agricultural output increased 
by 160% in the last three decades, Africa still has 60% of the 
world’s uncultivated arable land and remains a net importer of 
36 G. Carbone (2017).  
37 S. Whitfield, Environmental and social sustainability in Africa, Italy-Africa Ministerial 
Conference 2016, p. 4. 
A Vision of Africa’s Future36
food38. Moreover, due to the expansion of agricultural produc-
tion into low productivity land, Africa’s land degradation has 
worsened and today affects 75% of the continent, whereas two-
thirds of its lands are either desert or dry39. As a consequence, 
droughts and famine cyclically upset the region. Although mal-
nutrition rates have declined from 28% in 1990-1992 to around 
20% in 2014-2016, they are still the highest in the world40.
Africa has taken up these challenges. The African Union’s 
2063 Agenda draws on the 15th Sustainable Development Goal 
of the 2030 Agenda devoted to land degradation neutrality by 
voicing support for environment protection and climate resil-
ience. In practical terms, these challenges are being countered 
by technological innovations in agriculture; more sustainable 
land and water management based on improved situational 
analysis and practices; investments in climate-smart strategies 
(techniques and tools that can bolster resilience in agricultural 
practices)41; and environmental adaptation strategies, including 
through migration. Indeed, far from being only a regrettable 
consequence of climate change, population movements have 
long been a strategy for adapting to rainfall’s seasonality and 
periodic droughts. 
Towards regional integration
African nations entered the XXI century by re-stating their 
strong commitment to the creation of economic and political 
integration on the continent. Progress has been uneven, with 
some Regional Economic Communities leading the way and 
others struggling to integrate member countries. 
38 W. Plaizier 2 truths about Africa’s agriculture, World Economic Forum, 22 January 
2016.
39 UNCCD, Regional implementation annex for Africa. 
40 FAO, The State of  Food Insecurity in the World, 2015, p. 8; “2018 World Hunger and 
Poverty Facts and Statistics”, Hunger Notes. 
41 S. Whitfield (2016), p. 7. 
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Africans share a common vision and strategies for the eco-
nomic and political integration of the continent. The African 
Union (AU), established in 2000, most recently articulated its 
vision with “Agenda 2063” (2015), setting out transformation 
strategies that aim at making progress towards a united, inclu-
sive, peaceful, prosperous and sustainable Africa over the next 
50 years. Real progress, however, has been uneven. AU insti-
tutions remain in their infancy and political unity is mainly a 
faraway horizon. Important steps are being made in terms of 
economic integration. Intra-African trade is on the rise and ex-
pected to reach US$180 billion in 2017. The historic launch of 
the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), in March 
2018, is meant to further boost intra-regional integration and 
trade. Yet, at just about 19% of the continent’s $930 billion 
total trade42, it remains much lower – for example – than in-
tra-EU trade in goods (63% of all trade in goods by EU coun-
tries in 2015)43. 
Strengthening the building blocks: Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs). Sub-regional integration via officially 
recognised RECs is not only the foundation of Africa’s roadm-
ap towards continental integration – as foreseen by the 1994 
Abuja Treaty – but also a strategy for expanding, diversifying 
and strengthening economies that are too fragmented, often 
small in size, and in many a case landlocked. The RECs roadm-
ap envisages the elimination of internal tariff and non-tariff 
barriers, the creation of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions, 
the establishment of an African Common Market with free 
movement of people, capital and goods, and the final goal of 
Pan-African Economic and Monetary Unity. 
Individual RECs are making very uneven progress44. The 
East African Community (EAC) is leading the way, but sig-
nificant steps forward have also been made by the Economic 
42 FDI Spotlight, fdispotlight.com, 2017.
43 Eurostat, Intra-EU trade in goods - recent trends, January 2017.
44 UNECA, AUC, AfDB, Africa Regional Integration Index Report 2016, Addis 
Ababa, 2016.
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Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC), and the Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). 
COMESA, EAC, and SADC also launched a Free Trade Area 
project that will comprise 26 states, a combined 625m popula-
tion and a GDP in excess of US$1 trillion45. Other RECs – the 
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the 
Community of Sahel-Saharan States  (CEN-SAD), the Inter-
Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the 
Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) – are lagging behind. Differences 
are found inside individual RECs too, with some member states 
more clearly committed to implementing integration measures 
than others. 
Economic corridors are gaining pace as a platform for co-
operating on shared problems. Corridors help establish a plat-
form through which different African countries come together 
to address common infrastructure, transport and logistic chal-
lenges. Early experiences include the Northern Corridor (from 
Bujumbura, in Burundi, to Mombasa in Kenya), established in 
1986, but the continent is today criss-crossed by at least two 
dozen corridor initiatives, including the North-South corridor 
(linking the port of Durban in South Africa to the Copperbelt 
in Zambia and the DRC) or the Dakar-Abidjan-Lagos corridor 
project. Individual states retain responsibility for implement-
ing measures linked to the development of a corridor, implying 
important capacity gaps. Yet corridors are a crucial opportunity 
for regional integration, particularly for landlocked Africa, i.e. 
16 countries comprising a population of over 200 million and 
distances to ports of 1,000 to1,500 km46.
45 FDI Spotlight,…cit.
46 UNECA, AU, AfDB, Harmonizing Policies to transform the Trading Environment, 
Assessing Regional Integration in Africa VI, 2013.
Mapping Change in Africa 39
Fig. 8 - The Regional Integration Index 2016
Source: UNECA, AUC, AfDB.
 
Foreign powers and Africa
Africa’s ongoing transformations have been both the cause and 
the consequence of growing international interest in the conti-
nent. The China-in-Africa story is only the best-known part of 
recent external involvement in the area. Advanced economies 
(France, the US, Germany and many others) as well as emerging 
economies (India, Russia, Turkey and the like) have competed 
to expand their political and economic footholds in Africa. 
Drivers of foreign involvement (I): economic opportuni-
ties. The expansion of international trade and foreign direct 
investments in Africa testifies to key economic motives behind 
foreign linkages with the region. African countries mostly ex-
port natural resources, with a strong role for energy and min-
eral products that are highly valued by advanced and emerging 
economies, particularly China. But the image of one-way trade 
through which rich and emerging countries drain Africa’s re-
sources is incomplete. African imports are an important part 
of the picture, with emerging and frontier markets on the con-
tinent increasingly attractive for governments and businesses 
from the global North as well as from Asia.
Drivers of foreign involvement (II): geopolitical inter-
ests. European and American concerns with combating inter-
national terrorism and managing migration processes strongly 
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contributed to a resurgence of Western interest in Africa. The 
stabilisation of crises or ungoverned areas and, in particular, 
the control of national borders and migration flows is driving 
much of the EU’s foreign policy towards Africa, including the 
EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa and the EU External 
Investment Plan. But other players also show a keen geopolit-
ical interest in the region. China, for example, regularly takes 
part in UN peacekeeping missions and recently opened its first 
ever overseas military basis in Djibouti; the United States over 
the past decade established a new military command entire-
ly devoted to Africa and adopted its first “US Strategy toward 
sub-Saharan Africa”; Turkey had then prime minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan visit war-torn Somalia in 2011, the first head 
of government to do so in more than two decades.
The new toolkit for strengthening relations with Africa. 
Traditional tools have been employed to build and nurture 
close relationships with African partners. From raising develop-
ment aid levels to the multiplication of diplomatic missions or 
that of airline destinations. But new strategies have also rapidly 
gained use. Several countries, in particular, followed the exam-
ple of France and China in hosting large conferences in which 
to dialogue with African countries. Japan gathered 35 African 
heads of government and state in Nairobi for the 6th Tokyo 
International Conference on African Development, in 2016. 
The previous year, China itself disproved all ideas that it was 
taking a step back by pledging US$60 billion over three years 
for the continent at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, 
in Johannesburg. In the decade prior to 2017, Brazil, South 
Korea, France, India, Turkey, the Arab states, the United States, 
and Italy also held similar meetings or summits.
2.  Africa’s Multi-Speed Growth 
     Prospects: Diverging Policy Options?
Thang Nguyen-Quoc, Arthur Minsat, Rodrigo Deiana
Key facts
• Growth slowed down to 3% in 2015-17 after strong growth at 
5.6% in 2000-08 and post-global crisis resilience, with 4.5% 
in 2009-2014. Natural resource-rich countries experienced strong 
growth deceleration while growth in non-resource rich countries is 
more stable.
• Consumption has been driving growth – contributing 3.5 per-
centage points to GDP growth a year. 
• Investment contributions to GDP growth between 2015 and 
2016 decreased to -0.2 pp per year in resource-rich countries and 
0.7 pp in non-resource rich countries. 
• External financial flows reached 8.8% of GDP between 2009 
and 2015, driven by remittances (2.6%), FDI (2.5%) and ODA 
(2.4%).  
• Only 20 out of 52 African countries, where data is available, have 
managed to diversify their export basket by increasing the number 
of export products. 
• The demographic dividend can contribute 1.2 percentage points 
to Africa’s annual per capita growth in 2015-45, but requires 
creating productive jobs, investing in human and physical capital, 
decreasing fertility rates, and developing the formal financial sector.
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Introduction
The African continent has experienced strong growth since the turn 
of the century, leading to the narrative of “rising Africa”. Africa, in 
particular, recorded 5.6% annual growth between 2000 and 2008. 
This growth performance was better than that of Latin America 
and the Caribbean (LAC) at 3.6% but lower than Asia’s average of 
8% for the same period. Strong global demand for commodities, 
improved macroeconomic management and reduced debt servic-
ing thanks to debt cancelling initiatives are among the key driv-
ers behind this strong performance. African economies have also 
shown resilience to the global financial crisis as growth only dipped 
to 4.5% in 2009-14. A number of African countries have been able 
to utilise their fiscal space to invest in large-scale infrastructure and 
social expenditure. Consequently, per capita GDP grew by 3.1% 
in 2000-08 and by 2.9% in 2009-14. This performance contrasted 
with the 1990s when Africa’s per capita growth was negative.
Growth has slowed down since 2015 and the medium-term 
prospect does not look as promising as before. Annual growth 
in the region decelerated to 3% in 2015-17 due to lower com-
modity prices that significantly reduced the export income of 
the biggest economies in the region. Droughts and unfavoura-
ble weather events have also reduced agricultural production in 
a number of low-income countries. In the next five years growth 
in the continent is projected to rebound slightly to 3.9% annu-
ally thanks to improved commodity prices. At the current pace 
of growth prospects, Africa is unlikely to meet the 2023 targets 
of Agenda 2063’s first 10-year implementation plan. In the first 
half of the plan, 2013-17, Africa’s real GDP grew at a rate of 
3.4% a year, compared to a target of 7% a year. 
This chapter aims to highlight the diversity of growth chal-
lenges in the region. It first discusses three key issues: the short-
term growth prospects, Africa’s integration into the global econ-
omy and the long-term growth drivers. It then highlights four 
main policy areas to make growth more inclusive, and proposes 
five questions for discussion. 
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Africa is facing slower growth prospects 
Growth is heterogeneous across countries,  
and resource-rich countries face volatile growth
The growth performance is highly heterogeneous across differ-
ent African economies (Figure 1). Resource-rich (RR) countries 
achieved very high growth at 6.3% annually in 2000-08 thanks 
to higher export prices for raw metals and hydrocarbons. They 
also suffered the most from the slump in commodity prices 
where growth dropped to 2.6% in 2015-17. 
Fig. 1 - Evolution of annual growth in 2000-2022
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (2017)1
1 Resource-rich countries are defined as any country with at least five years 
for which resource rents excluding forest rents was at least 10% of  GDP. 
The 17 resource-rich countries are: Angola, Congo, Dem. Rep. Congo, Rep. 
Algeria, Egypt, Arab Rep. Gabon, Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, Libya, 
Mauritania, Nigeria, Sudan, South Sudan, Chad, Togo, and Zambia. The 16 land-
locked African countries are Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, South Sudan, 
Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
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In contrast, non-RR countries have maintained stable growth 
since 2000, hovering around 4% annually. Strong agricultural 
and services sector growth has driven GDP growth in many 
of these countries. Moreover, as net fuel importers, they also 
benefit from the recent low energy prices and smaller import 
bills in general.
Growth also varies across coastal, landlocked and island econ-
omies. The landlocked economies have registered better perfor-
mance than the continent’s average, thanks to rapid growth of 
several countries such as Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and 
Zambia. In Burkina Faso, Ethiopia and Rwanda, the agricul-
tural sector, heavy investment in infrastructure, rapid demo-
graphic and urban growth, the implementation of development 
strategies and strong ODA inflows have sustained high growth 
rates. In contrast, island and coastal economies show lower and 
more volatile growth rates during the period.
The services sector has been the main growth driver in re-
cent years, especially in resource-rich countries (Figure 2). In 
resource-rich countries, the services sector contributed 4.5 pp 
annually to GDP growth, or about 92% of growth, in 2009-14. 
In 2015 and 2016, services became an even more important 
component, contributing 5.2 pp to GDP growth. Services now 
account for the lion’s share of GDP at 56.6%, up from 40.3% 
in 2009. In non-RR countries, the services sector also drives 
growth, and at a more stable level. The services sector contrib-
uted 2.5 pp to annual GDP growth, or 60% of growth in 2009-
14, and it has maintained a similar contribution since then.
Dependence on natural resources exposes RR countries to high 
growth volatility. The resource-rich countries enjoyed stronger 
terms of trade and have managed very strong growth at more 
than 6% a year during the early 2000s due to high commodity 
prices, especially for fuel (petroleum, natural gas and coal) and 
metals. 
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Fig. 2 - Evolution of annual growth in resource-rich and 
non-resource rich African countries (1990-2015)
Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators (2017),
and IMF’s World Economic Outlook (2017)
In 2009 the mining, construction and utilities sector accounted 
for 25.4% of GDP. In 2015-16, as commodities decreased by 
almost a third in their prices, the mining sector shrank signif-
icantly by 3% of GDP a year. The mining, construction and 
utilities sectors shrank to 13.5% of GDP from 25.4% in 2009. 
Sustaining current level of investment is difficult,  
especially due to weak private investment 
and limited public revenues
Growth composition by expenditure shows that private con-
sumption has been the main driver on the demand side (Figure 
3.A). More importantly, the contribution of private con-
sumption to economic growth has increased progressively and 
reached 3.5 pp of GDP per year over the period 2009-2015. 
This contribution to GDP growth is comparable to the level 
in China and other developing Asian countries. However, as a 
share of total growth, it accounted for 69% of annual growth 
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in Africa during the 1990-2015 period – much higher than 
the equivalent share in China, other developing Asian countries 
and LAC. The rapid growth of private consumption is relat-
ed to the rapid urban growth of African economies (leading 
to greater demand for food and other consumption goods), to 
demographic growth, and to the relatively higher purchasing 
power of an emerging African middle class. 
External balance varies across countries, with commodity 
prices playing an important role. Non-RR countries were in 
trade deficits in 2000-08 and 2009-14 as higher commodity 
prices increased the cost of imported fuels and infrastructure in-
vestment, which led to importing a large amount of capital and 
intermediate goods. RR countries, in contrast, experienced a 
trade surplus in 2000-08 thanks to higher commodity revenues. 
In 2009-14, the global financial crisis reduced the demand for 
their exports, leading to negative net exports. Since 2015, the 
drop in commodity prices has significantly reduced the import 
bill for non-RR countries yet it also decreased the resource reve-
nue for RR countries. Consequently the two groups of countries 
face a reversal in fortune: external balance contributed positively 
to growth in non-RR countries and negatively in RR countries. 
Between 2000 and 2014 African countries were able to ac-
celerate growth through expanding investment, especially in 
non-RR countries. Gross fixed capital investment expanded 
fast, and its contribution to non-RR African countries’ growth 
reached 1.9 pp per year over the 2000-08 period before slow-
ing to 0.9 pp per year in the period from 2009-14. Similarly 
in RR African countries, investment’s contribution to growth 
reached 1.1 pp per year before decreasing to 0.6 pp per year. 
Many African governments took advantage of their fiscal buffer 
and of available liquidities to invest in large infrastructure pro-
jects. These policies notably aimed to fill the infrastructure gap 
and counter the negative cycle of the global economic crisis. 
Maintaining the current level of investment is challenging. 
Slower economic growth, lower natural resource rents, natu-
ral disasters such as the Ebola epidemic and civil conflict have 
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reduced public revenues in many resource-rich countries. 
Tighter global financial conditions will also raise the cost of 
borrowing for governments in low-income countries. The num-
ber of low-income countries in debt distress or facing high risks 
of debt distress increased from 7 in 2013 to 12 in 2016. Almost 
all African countries with credit ratings have been downgrad-
ed to below investment grade2. Several countries, especially re-
source-rich countries including Angola, are planning to consol-
idate their fiscal balance by cutting down on capital investment. 
Investment growth has lagged behind overall GDP growth, and 
thus its contribution to growth was negative at -0.2 pp per year 
in RR countries over the period 2015-16.
Private investment is relatively weak. Annual private invest-
ment stands at 14.2% of GDP, significantly smaller than de-
veloping Asia’s average of 24%. The majority (55%) of African 
entrepreneurs are now working in the retail trade, hotel and 
restaurant sectors. These businesses typically have a relatively 
quick turnover and do not require long-term investment. In the 
context of dwindling public investment, encouraging private 
investment becomes ever more important.
A number of factors explain the lack of private investment. 
High constraints on the business environment, a lack of long-
term certainty for investors, lack of credit to the private sector 
and lack of infrastructure are important though not sufficient 
explanations. The majority of African firms are micro-enterpris-
es and SMEs with little capacity to move out of informality. 
Limited access to good marketing networks and reliable de-
mand make it difficult for informal firms to maintain profit-
ability levels, or to innovate through product improvements. 
Even the most productive informal firms face these constraints. 
For example, in Ethiopia’s manufacturing sector, the larg-
est informal firm, with a median capital stock of 16,425 birr 
(about US$600), earns a marginal return to capital of only 1%, 
2 IMF, Seeking Sustainable Growth: Short-Term Recovery, Long-Term Challenges, World 
Economic Outlook, Washington, D.C., October 2017.
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whereas a formal firm with comparable capital stock earns at 
least 16.5% (table 4 in Siba, 2015).
Capital deepening has boosted economic growth,  
yet productivity growth remains weak 
The supply side composition of growth shows that capital has 
become the main driver for Africa’s economic growth. Capital 
service has overtaken labour as the major driving force behind 
GDP growth (Figure 4.A). Its contribution to GDP growth 
has been increasing since the early 2000s. For instance, cap-
ital increases greatly contributed to the rapid growth of sev-
eral African countries such as Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Senegal, Tanzania and Uganda. Interestingly, the contribution 
of capital to annual growth increased from 2.4 pp in 2000-08 
to 3.1 pp in 2009-14 in non-RR countries, while the contribu-
tion of capital to annual growth in RR countries declined from 
3.1 pp to 2.6 pp for the same periods. 
Capital deepening has boosted labour productivity. While 
Africa’s amount of capital growth was as low as in Latin America 
in 1992 when it grew by 2.5%, it has quickly accelerated since 
the mid-1990s and reached 6.6% in 2009, a level similar to 
Asia’s capital expansion (Figure 4B). Adjusted for rapid labour 
expansion, the capital to labour ratio in Africa has also increased 
steadily since 1998 and has attained a similar growth rate as in 
LAC at about 1.3% a year. This rapid expansion of capital al-
lowed Africa’s labour productivity to increase by 2.1% a year 
between 2000 and 2010.
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Fig. 4 - Composition of growth by supply factors 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from The Conference Board (2017)
Fig. 3 - Composition of growth in Africa 
from supply and demand side (2000-2016)
Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators, 
and IMF’s World Economic Outlook (2017)
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However, the recent growth in total factor productivity (TFP) is 
weak in both RR and non-RR African countries. Total factor pro-
ductivity measures how efficiently the economy uses capital and 
labour. It is calculated as the gain in output that is not accounted 
for by the change in the stock of capital and labour. For the 2009-
16 period, TFP growth contributed 0.2 pp to GDP growth in RR 
countries and 0.0 pp to GDP growth in non-RR countries. This 
average hid the high volatility and diversity in TFP growth howev-
er. In RR countries, TFP grew quickly during the 2000-08 period 
when commodity prices skyrocketed, especially among oil export-
ers such as Angola and Nigeria. As average energy commodity pric-
es more than halved between 2012 and 2016 and the production 
of the extractive sector dropped in Botswana, Equatorial Guinea 
and South Africa, TFP growth turned negative and contributed 
-1.7 pp to annual growth between 2015 and 2016. In many non-
RR countries and especially in agriculture-based economies, TFP 
growth is dependent on agricultural commodity prices and cli-
matic conditions. During the 2015-16 period, Ethiopia, Malawi, 
Namibia, and Zimbabwe experienced droughts or floods that re-
duced agricultural output and led to negative TFP growth.
The weak total factor productivity growth despite capital 
deepening suggests investment inefficiency. Weak governance 
of public investments has led to cases of wasteful public spend-
ing, financial mismanagement and insufficient maintenance3. 
Infrastructural bottlenecks also reduce the capital utilisation 
rates. For instance, frequent electricity outages have prevented 
factories from working multiple shifts. Investment inefficiency 
may also stem from the low supply capacity of the economy. 
For example, agricultural productivity grows at 3.4% a year in 
Africa, only roughly half of the average rate of developing coun-
tries, because of the lack of skills and support services to utilise 
and adapt the imported capital to Africa’s context4.
3 International Monetary Fund, Seeking Sustainable Growth: Short-Term 
Recovery, Long-Term Challenges, Washington, D.C., World Economic Outlook, 
October 2017.
4 A. Nin-Pratt, Inputs, productivity, and agricultural growth in Africa South of  the Sahara, 
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Most African countries have not utilised the full 
benefits of global trade and investment 
African countries are highly integrated into the global econo-
my. External financial inflows account for a much higher share 
of GDP in Africa than in Asian and Latin American countries. 
Imports and exports of goods and services represented about 
50% of Africa’s GDP in 2015-16, which is similar to Asia, and 
much higher than in the LAC region (44%). Similarly, Africa is 
the third world region most connected to Global Value Chains 
(GVCs), right after Europe and Southeast Asia, and more than 
in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). Both trade open-
ness and GVC participation increased throughout the early 
2000s. However, as the next two sections will show, African 
countries have not benefitted enough from their trade and in-
vestment linkage with the world. 
External financial inflows play an important role in 
Africa’s economies
External financial inflows play an important role in Africa’s 
economies. Total financial inflows (remittances, FDI, portfolio 
inflows and net ODA) into Africa reached 8.8% of GDP be-
tween 2009 and 2015. This level is significantly higher than the 
average for Asia (4.5%) and LAC (6.9%) (Figure 5). In absolute 
amounts, total inflows to Africa increased from US$103 bil-
lion in 2005 to US$183 billion in 2015. Financial inflows into 
Africa between 2009 and 2015 were much more heavily skewed 
toward remittances and ODA than on other continents. These 
inflows amount to 2.7% and 2.4% of Africa’s GDP respective-
ly. Private financial flows have increased over the last decade. 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to Africa in particular repre-
sented 2.5% of GDP in 2009-15. 
IFPRI discussion papers 1432, International Food Policy Research Institute 
(IFPRI), 2015.
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Fig. 5 - Total financial inflows as % of GDP (2009-2015)
Note: LAC: Latin America and the Caribbean
 
Sources: Authors’ computation based on IMF’s World Economic Outlook 
database5, OECD’s DAC data (2017)6, UNCTAD’s FDI statistics (2017)7
and World Bank’s WDI (2017)8
The importance of financial inflows varies across the different 
sub-groups in Africa. Total inflows stand at 10.9% of GDP 
in non-RR countries compared to 6.8% in RR countries. 
Remittances remain an important source of finance for both 
groups of countries at 2.2% and 3.2% of GDP respectively. 
Non-RR countries have been more successful in attracting FDI 
to the tune of 3.1% of GDP, especially to countries such as 
Sierra Leone (19%), Ghana (8%), and Lesotho (5%).
In the short term, the volatility of financial inflows poses 
various challenges. This is particularly pertinent for portfolio 
investments and ODA. Portfolio investment is particularly 
5 IMF, Seeking Sustainable Growth… cit.
6 OECD-DAC, International Development Statistics (database), 2017.
7 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2017, United Nations, 2017.
8 World Bank,World Development Indicators 2017, Washington, D.C, World Bank, 2017.
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volatile, reaching 1.5% of GDP in 2010 before decreasing to 
0.6% of GDP in 2016. 
In the medium and long term, using external inflows for 
sustained economic diversification is important. Foreign direct 
investments into Africa accounted for 2.4% of GDP between 
2009 and 2015, but they were concentrated mostly in the ex-
tractive sector with limited spillovers into the local economy. 
In particular, the coal, oil and gas industry absorbed 76.2% of 
all greenfield FDI into Africa between 2007 and 2016, while 
37.4% of the total went to extraction activities alone. Therefore, 
the spillovers have been limited and these flows have not at-
tracted more private investment or created many jobs. More re-
cently, however, FDI into Africa has diversified and now targets 
industries such as ICT, food and financial services. Econometric 
analysis shows that the most significant determinants of FDI in 
Africa’s manufacturing sector are domestic market size and in-
frastructure (e.g. ports, rail and road networks) to access natural 
resources. These two factors explain 28% of variations in FDI 
attraction to Africa9.
Remittance inflows have mostly served domestic consump-
tion. Remittances have increased more than four-fold since the 
early 2000s, and reached US$65 billion by 2015. These inflows 
seem to have led to a degree of informal redistribution between 
countries, since countries with high volumes of remittance 
inflows in Africa tend to have lower inequality and poverty10. 
At the same time, however, remittances may have supported 
household consumption rather than private investment, partly 
due to underdeveloped formal saving mechanisms for remit-
tance recipients. In such cases, remittance inflows can also in-
crease social inequalities in countries where emigrants belong to 
higher income households11.
9 AfDB, OECD, UNDP, African Economic Outlook 2016: Sustainable Cities and 
Structural Transformation, Paris, OECD Publishing, 2016.
10 A. Shimeles and T. Nabassaga, Why is inequality high in Africa?, African 
Development Bank Group, Working Paper Series, no. 246, January 2017.
11 J.C. Anyanwu, Determinants of  Foreign Direct Investment Inflows to Africa, 1980-2007, 
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Africa has diversified its trade partners 
but not its export products
Africa has managed not only to increase its trade but also to 
diversify its trade partners since the turn of the century. The 
continent’s trade with the rest of the world rose threefold, from 
US$276 billion in 2000 to US$806 billion in 2016. Over the 
same period, Africa also diversified its trading partners, moving 
from the traditional to engaging with countries such as China, 
India and other emerging partners. This is true both for African 
exports (51% of the total in 2016) and imports (46% of the 
total in 2016). 
However, Africa has not been able to diversify its export 
basket. Most Africa countries export only a few products with 
Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA), mostly hydrocar-
bons, minerals or agricultural products. This is shown by their 
position in the bottom left corner of Figure 6A. Moreover, few 
countries have been able to increase types of export products 
with RCA, as most of them fall below the diagonal line (in-
dicating no change in the number of export products with 
RCA). Some have seen a rising concentration of exports such as 
Burkina Faso, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. 
Diversification of export baskets can also be an important 
driver of sustained economic growth regimes. More diverse 
product baskets lead to more stable export earnings over the 
long run, reducing macroeconomic uncertainty and encourag-
ing more investment in the economy. Increases in export diver-
sification are associated with subsequent increases in growth. 
Adding new products to countries’ export baskets strongly cor-
relates with cumulative long-term growth of per capita GDP12. 
African Development Bank Group, Working Paper Series, no. 131, September 
2011; R.H. Adams, Jr., A. Cuecuecha, and J. Page, The Impact of  Remittances on 
Poverty and Inequality in Ghana, Policy Research Working Paper 4732, The World 
Bank Development Prospects Group, Development Economics Department & 
Africa Region, September 2008.
12 B. Klinger and D. Lederman, Discovery and Development: An Empirical Exploration of  
‘New’ Products, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3450, November 2004.
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The skill-learning processes and cumulative know-how of lo-
cal actors simplify the redeployment of production factors into 
higher value-added “nearby” activities13.
Fig. 6 - Africa’s integration into global trade
Notes: Definitions (OECD, 2013; AfDB/OECD/UNDP)14: Backward integra-
tion is the share of foreign value-added products in a country’s exports. 
It looks back from the perspective of a country’s exports through 
foreign inputs into local production; Forward integration is the share of 
a country’s value-added exports that are embedded in the exports of other 
countries. It looks forward from the country’s perspective at the flow of its 
exports around the world; specifically, those that other countries use 
to produce their own exports.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on TRADEMAP (database) and the EORA data
Upgrading to higher value-added products remains challeng-
ing for many African countries. Africa is the world’s third most 
connected region to GVCs, right after Europe and Southeast 
13 R. Hausmann, J. Hwang, and D. Rodrik, “What you export matters”, Journal of  
Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 1-25, March 2007.
14 AfDB, OECD, UNDP, African Economic Outlook 2016: Global Value Chains and 
Africa’s Industrialization, Paris, OECD Publishing, 2014, p. 137.
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Asia, and higher than in LAC (Figure 6B). But Africa has been 
locked into commodity exports without being able to diver-
sify into manufacturing exports, or into sectors with larger 
spillovers and dynamic externalities. The large role of mining 
and hydrocarbon products in exports undermines a shift in 
production towards strategic activities such as manufacturing, 
construction, and transportation. Africa still relies on raw min-
erals and agricultural commodities as its main export products. 
Dependence on resource-extraction means that export baskets 
for some African countries largely concentrate around a capi-
tal-intensive sector that employs relatively few workers, while 
productivity growth in agricultural exports remains low. 
The demographic dividend is an important driver 
of long-term growth
Africa is going through important demographic changes 
that will become an important driver of growth in the long 
run. The demographic dividend may contribute 1.2 percentage 
points to Africa’s annual per capita income growth in 2015-
45. The change in fertility and mortality rates leads to two po-
tential demographic dividends. The first dividend comes from 
the concentration of working-age populations, which increases 
the effective labour supply per consumer. This first dividend is 
expected to add 0.42 percentage points to per capita income 
growth in 2015-45. The accumulation of savings also enables 
greater investments in physical and human capital, particularly 
children’s health and education, which translate into long-term 
productivity growth. These investments can enable a second 
dividend which is expected to add 0.78 percentage point to 
Africa’s per capita income growth in 2015-45.
However, African countries are at very different stages of the 
demographic transition and thus the demographic dividends 
vary significantly. African countries can be classified into three 
groups, according to their current fertility levels (defined as av-
erage live births per woman):
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Fig. 7 - Demographic dividend by African regions, 
South America, and Southeast Asia (2015-2045)
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on A. Mason et al., Support Ratios 
and Demographic Dividends: Estimates for the World, 
UNDESA Technical Paper No. 2017/1, 2017
• the low fertility (LF) group, with a fertility rate of up 
to 3 live births per woman, comprises nine countries 
(Algeria, Botswana, Cabo Verde, Libya, Mauritius, 
Morocco, Seychelles, South Africa and Tunisia);
• the medium fertility (MF) group, with a fertility rate 
between three and five children per woman, includes 
26 countries (Cameroon, Comoros, Congo, Djibouti, 
Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, 
Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Namibia, Rwanda, 
Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Togo and Zimbabwe); 
• the high fertility (HF) group includes countries with fer-
tility rates above five live births per woman (Angola, 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African 
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Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, Gambia, Guinea, Mali, Mozambique, 
Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda, United 
Republic of Tanzania and Zambia). 
High fertility rates are somewhat persistent in time: over half 
of the countries in the MF and HF groups combined will 
still have fertility rates of more than 3 children per woman in 
2050. Eight countries will remain in the same fertility grouping 
(MF): Cameroon, Congo, Liberia, Mauritania, Sao Tomé and 
Principe, Senegal, Sudan and Togo.
Reaping the benefits from the demographic dividend requires 
absorbing youth into productive employment. The urgency of 
the problem varies across the three groups of African countries. 
This can be measured by the activity ratio, which is the ratio 
between the working-age population (roughly defined as 15 to 
64 years old) and the population outside this age bracket. Low 
fertility countries are on track to reach the peak of their activity 
ratio (at 2.05) in the next two decades, thanks to a much faster 
growth of their working-age population (Figure 8A). In these 
countries, youth unemployment is a severe concern. In many 
LF countries such as Botswana, Morocco and South Africa, 
skill mismatch has led to young people being overqualified for 
the jobs available. By contrast, for MF and HF countries, this 
increase is both more protracted in time (to last at least another 
45 years) and projected to reach lower peaks at 1.87 and 1.85, 
respectively. It is important to send girls to school and further 
decrease fertility ratios in these countries, in order to continue 
to change their age structure more favourably. 
Extending the length of the demographic dividend requires 
sustained investment in education and health – especially in 
medium and high fertility countries. The working-age popula-
tions in these countries are expected to expand by 220% and 
280% by 2050, respectively. Equipping these future entrants 
into the labour market requires improving educational attain-
ment from now on. Over 40% of the workforce in medium and 
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high fertility countries has not obtained primary education. 
Low fertility countries do significantly better in this depart-
ment since only 22.5% of workers have not obtained primary 
education.
Fig. 8 - Activity ratio and projected working age population in 
Africa (by fertility) (2015-2050)
Source: R. Deiana, A.Minsat, and T. Nguyen (forthcoming)
Policy options and prospects
Development strategies are diverging 
across African countries 
African governments have been highly engaged in policy re-
forms so as to reduce the time and cost of interactions between 
businesses and governments. Since 2010 Africa countries have 
regularly been among the ten best reformers globally. Many in-
itiatives have taken the form of regulatory reforms, for instance 
by making it easier to start a business and by using digital tech-
nologies to make public administration more efficient, thanks to 
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better management of time and human resources. For instance, 
over the period 2015-16, 17 African countries simplified their 
legal framework for conciliation procedures, dispute resolution 
processes or debt clearance procedures for small companies in 
financial difficulties. Some other countries introduced techno-
logical innovations in their administrative procedures such as 
establishing a new credit registry bureau (Tanzania), digitalising 
land records (Mauritius) and creating an online platform for 
registering company names (Morocco). 
Doing Business reforms have not proven efficient to boost pro-
ductive investment. Strengthening business regulatory frame-
works can attract more productive investment, in addition to 
the administrative reforms currently underway. Despite pro-
gress in business regulatory frameworks, regulatory uncertainty 
remains a big risk for investors in Africa. Ensuring tax certainty 
by making tax systems more predictable, transparent, and fairer 
is often more important for attracting long-term investments. 
Furthermore, helping African firms catch up with the glob-
al frontier will require additional policy support, beyond the 
usual business reforms that reduce start-up costs. Most African 
firms still lag far behind the productivity frontier for developing 
countries, even after accounting for factors such as the business 
environment (AU/OECD, forthcoming). 
Many African governments have concentrated their invest-
ments into Special Economic Zones (SEZs) to attract FDI. 
Unlike Doing Business’s broad-based agenda, cluster policy al-
lows governments to coordinate their investments for private 
enterprise growth by tackling multiple binding constraints 
simultaneously and concentrating resources. For budget-con-
strained countries, clusters can help focus resources into “pock-
ets of infrastructure” or “islands of excellence” where economies 
of scale can be reaped. More recently, several African countries 
such as Morocco and Ethiopia have identified Special Economic 
Zones (SEZs) to attract FDI firms and create manufacturing 
jobs. Rising labour costs in China have also sparked enthusiasm 
for industrial reallocation from China to Africa. FDI can also 
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help with technology transfer, in the form of production tech-
niques, management, or marketing practices. 
While such islands of excellence can bring many benefits, 
relying solely on SEZs cannot provide enough jobs and produc-
tivity spillovers for at least four reasons.
 
1. For a start, leading firms in SEZs often demand high-
er skills and quality levels than most African firms and 
labour pools can provide. Therefore, attracting global 
FDI firms into SEZs can create isolated growth enclaves 
without sufficient production linkages or technology 
spillover to the local economy. 
2. The export focus of these SEZs can exclude certain do-
mestic enterprises that also need to operate on domestic 
markets. In certain cases, policies of fiscal exemptions 
can preclude firms in SEZs from producing for local 
markets. This conditionality, de facto, cuts opportuni-
ties for potential domestic markets. 
3. Thirdly, SEZs alone will not create enough jobs for the 
incoming youth bulge in Africa. According to a survey 
of 91 SEZs in 20 sub-Saharan countries, SEZs account 
for approximately 1 million jobs, or 0.2% of national 
employment15.
4. Finally, high labour costs and low productivity hinder 
many African countries from attracting low-skill indus-
tries16. At a comparable income level, competitiveness 
rating, and labour force size, only countries such as 
Congo DR and Ethiopia have a labour cost per manu-
facturing worker that is comparable to Bangladesh. 
15 D.W. te Velde and C. Kingombe, Structural transformation and employment creation: 
the role of  growth facilitation policies in Sub-Saharan Africa, ODI Research reports and 
studies, December 2012.
16 A. Gelb et al., Can Africa Be a Manufacturing Destination? Labor Costs in Comparative 
Perspective, Center for Global Development, Working Paper 466, October 2017.
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While rising wages in China have raised hopes of mass indus-
trial reallocation from China to Africa, this is unlikely to be a 
game changer in the short term. Many low-skilled jobs in man-
ufacturing could be automated, reducing Africa’s attractiveness 
as a destination for manufacturing investment. In a recent sur-
vey of Chinese manufacturing firms, most would respond to 
labour shortages by investing more in capital equipment rath-
er than by moving production out of China. When they do, 
African economies face stiff competition from other actors such 
as countries from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN). The ASEAN countries enjoy several advantages over 
Africa in attracting Chinese FDI: established global production 
networks, physical and cultural proximity to China, and better 
competitiveness especially in infrastructure and human capital.
Implementation is the key to the success 
of regional integration 
Presently, the vast majority of African policy-makers are sig-
nalling a strong commitment to regional integration. On 
21 March 2018 in Kigali (Rwanda), the heads of 44 African 
countries signed the Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) 
Agreement. More are expected to sign in the coming months 
(AUC/OECD, forthcoming).
The new Continental Free Trade Area offers an important 
step towards tapping domestic markets. The CFTA aims to 
achieve four main objectives:
• create a single continental market for goods and ser-
vices, with free movement of business persons and in-
vestments, and thus pave the way for accelerating the 
establishment of the Continental Customs Union and 
the African Customs Union;
• expand intra-African trade through better harmonisa-
tion and coordination of trade liberalisation and facili-
tation regimes and instruments across regional econom-
ic communities (RECs) and across Africa in general;
• resolve the challenges of multiple and overlapping 
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memberships and expedite the regional and continental 
integration processes;
• enhance competitiveness at the industry and enterprise 
level by exploiting opportunities for scale production, con-
tinental market access and better reallocation of resources.
The experience of RECs in Africa shows that implementation is 
the most important determinant for the outcome of free trade 
agreements. Having regional integration agreement per se does 
not automatically translate into stronger trade flows or regional 
value chains. Cross-border exchanges within the East African 
Community (EAC) are found to be five times larger than 
average trade flows within Africa, while in the West African 
Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), they are about 
three times larger. At the same time, the Economic Community 
of Central African States (ECCAS) region continues to exhibit 
low levels of integration, with only 1.3% of total trade being 
intra-regional. This is mainly due to limited complementarity 
between countries’ trade profiles and underdeveloped trading 
infrastructure. 
Regional integration has great potential to strengthen ongo-
ing dynamics in favour of Africa’s growth:
1. Fully liberalising trade in goods could boost Africa’s 
GDP by 1% and total employment by 1.2%. Intra-
African trade could grow by 33% and Africa’s total 
trade deficit could be halved17.
2. Africa’s regional demand is increasingly favourable to 
growth. The middle class, defined as those spending be-
tween US$5 and 20 a day, increased from 108 million 
persons in 1990 to 247 million by 2013. Both food 
and non-food markets, excluding oil products, are more 
dynamic than the global averages.
17 UNCTAD, African Continental Free Trade Area: Challenges and Opportunities of  
Tariff  Reductions, Geneva, 2018.
A Vision of Africa’s Future64
3. Africa’s business opportunities are now attracting interna-
tional investors far beyond the continent’s endowment in 
natural resources: the potential of domestic and region-
al markets motivated about 53.4% of new FDI projects 
to Africa in 2013-17 (FDI markets database, accessed 
in February 2018). This share is similar to Asia’s level 
(55.7%), and ten points higher than in LAC (44.8%). 
4. Recent progress in reducing administrative procedures 
and the cost of starting and doing business has made 
the business environment more attractive: 29.5  % of 
foreign investors cite this improvement among the 
main motivations to invest in Africa, compared to 12% 
in 2003-2007.
Financing infrastructure may become more 
challenging
Africa still faces a significant infrastructure deficit despite the 
spike in recent investment (see above). Over 645 million people 
do not have access to electricity; 39% of formal businesses see 
lack of access to electricity as a major constraint18. More than 
30 African countries report regular power outages that result 
in loss of working days. Road transport is the main transport 
mode in Africa, carrying over 80% of goods and passengers, 
yet less than 53% of the roads are paved. Port facilities are esti-
mated to add up to 40% to the cost of traded goods in Africa. 
Rapid urbanisation, population and economic growth will fur-
ther increase demand for infrastructure in Africa. For instance, 
two-thirds of Africa’s urban infrastructure is yet to be built be-
tween now and 205019.
Africa faces a high funding gap for infrastructure. Recent es-
timates put total annual infrastructure investments at US$77 
18 AfDB, OECD, UNDP, African Economic Outlook 2017: Entrepreneurship and 
Industrialisation, Paris, OECD Publishing, 2017. 
19 AfDB, OECD, UNDP (2016).
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billion20 and US$81 billion21. This leaves a considerable financ-
ing gap of US$55 to 60 billion per year. The Africa Infrastructure 
Country Diagnostic (AICD) (2011) estimates a funding gap to 
the tune of US$31 billion a year, after addressing inefficiencies 
such as institutional bottlenecks and avoiding future rehabilita-
tion needs which could help save US$17 billion a year. 
In the short to medium term, Africa can benefit from multi-
ple sources of funding to finance its infrastructure. In 2015, to-
tal commitments from all sources analysed by the Infrastructure 
Consortium for Africa reached US$83 billion, a 12% increase 
from the previous year. Africa’s national governments ac-
counted for the largest share at 34% of total commitments. 
However, the projected slowdown in growth and smaller fiscal 
space available to African governments means African govern-
ments are unlikely to increase public investments. China (15%) 
and the Infrastructure Consortium for Africa (ICA) members 
are also important funders of infrastructure on the continent. 
Other sources of funding include private sectors (9%), the Arab 
Coordination Group (5%) and other bilateral/multilaterals 
(3%). 
In the long run, the mobilisation of domestic resources – es-
pecially domestic savings – will be necessary for infrastructure 
investment and maintenance. On average in Africa, domestic 
savings represented an annual amount of $US412 billion over 
the 2009-16 period, which is 19.4% of the continent’s GDP. 
The top 10 largest African economies had savings rates ranging 
from 44.5% of GDP in Algeria to 11.9% in Sudan. Yet low-
er commodity prices and slower economic growth may limit 
public revenue and spending in the short- and medium-term. 
Mobilising the fiscal space wisely can support productive 
investment.
20 Africa50’s website https://www.africa50.com.
21 IMF, Sub-Saharan Africa: Staying the Course, IMF Regional Economic Outlook, 
Washington, D.C., October 2014.
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Many African governments will face difficulties in 
sustaining current progress in poverty reduction
Many African governments will need to push further with their 
poverty reduction efforts, due to at least three main reasons. 
1.  First, about half of the countries (27) still have pover-
ty rates above 25%. Resource-rich African countries in 
particular have only managed to decrease poverty rates 
by 5 pp, from 41% in 1990 to 36% in 2013, despite 
strong growth in the early 2000s. Combined with the 
demographic growth over the past decades, the num-
ber of poor people living with under US$1.90 a day 
increased from 288 million in 1990 to 395 million of 
people in 2013. 
2.   Second, the debt relief from the Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC) Initiative has helped 30 African 
countries to increase their social spending during the 
early 2000s22. Because they are completing the HIPC 
programmes, they will need to find new approaches and 
sources of financing for poverty reduction programmes. 
3.  Third, another 45% of the population still live with 
between US$1.90 and US$5.50 a day – meaning that 
they remain in poverty or are vulnerable to falling back 
into poverty. Further effort in boosting their income 
and social protection will be needed to move this group 
firmly out of poverty. 
Social protection is a vital policy instrument to eradicate pov-
erty, increase economic resilience and facilitate human develop-
ment. Social protection systems can protect poor and vulner-
able households from external shocks by finding more stable 
livelihoods and by giving them cash or in-kind transfers. When 
22 The programme has decreased recipient countries’ debt services by about 1.5 
percentage points of  GDP between 2001 and 2015.
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done right, social protection can help poor households invest 
in education, health and economic activities. Agenda 2063 
highlights social protection as a crucial instrument to ensure 
that no citizen is without access to a basic income or essential 
healthcare.
A number of African governments have managed to reduce 
inequality via their fiscal systems, but lower growth in the short 
term may create budget pressures on these programmes. South 
Africa in particular has developed a progressive tax and so-
cial protection system that reduces the Gini coefficient by 18 
points, from 77 to 60 – which is the highest reduction among 
a sample of 29 developing countries in the Commitment-to-
Equity database.
Scaling up social protection systems will be a big challenge 
for policymakers. Today more than 40 African countries im-
plement unconditional in-kind transfers and public works 
programmes23. The number of countries implementing a cash 
transfer programme more than doubled between 2010 and 
2014. However, these programmes tend to be small and frag-
mented. Many rely on external resources such as ODA. Lower 
growth in the short term will create budget pressure on these 
programmes. Successful social protection systems have to ad-
dress multiple interlocking challenges over the long term, in-
cluding facing high informality, confronting the challenge to 
employment from the upcoming youth bulge, and adapting 
social protection to rapid urbanisation and climate change24. 
Gender aspects also need to be incorporated to increase access 
to social protection for women and girls, who often constitute 
a disproportionate share of the poor.
23 World Bank, The State of  Social Safety Nets 2015, Washington D.C., World Bank 
Group, June 2015.
24 AfDB, OECD, UNDP (2017).
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Five questions for discussion 
1.  How can the different African countries adjust to the 
general growth slowdown and smaller public revenue 
in many countries? How are development partners 
equipped to address the heterogeneity of growth chal-
lenges and drivers across Africa? How can Italy-Africa 
relations pave the way to increased (and more diversi-
fied) investment and growth in Africa?
2.  How can African governments and regional economic 
communities realise the ambition of the Continental 
Free Trade Agreements? What lessons can be drawn 
from European integration (and from Italy as an EU 
founding member), notably with regard to the free 
movement of African people?
3.   How can Africa finance its infrastructure development? 
What is the role for donors and particularly the EU 
(given the recently launched External Investment Plan) 
in filling the gap?
4.  How can African governments support the structural 
transformation process? What reforms in terms of social 
development, security and rule of law are to be cou-
pled with economic development policies? How can 
European countries strengthen the role of the African 
diaspora in promoting Africa’s structural transforma-
tion? What can Italy do to support economic and social 
development in Africa, particularly given its history of 
promoting SMEs? 
5.   How can African governments continue reducing pover-
ty? What can development partners do as most countries 
are completing the HIPC Initiative? What strategies can 
be undertaken by a country such as Italy, which has re-
cently scaled up its international development efforts?
3.  Sub-Regions First: 
     The Role and Evolution of Regional 
     Economic Communities in Africa
Brendan Vickers
Key facts
• To unlock the continent’s vast potential, African governments are 
working together to implement a threefold “developmental re-
gionalism” agenda: market integration, industrialisation and infra-
structure. Effective regional integration is more than simply remov-
ing tariffs – it is about addressing on-the-ground constraints that 
paralyse the daily operations of ordinary producers and traders.
• Intra-African trade in goods is low when compared to other regions 
of the world, accounting for around 20% of Africa’s total trade in 
2016. However, intra-African trade is also more manufacturing-ori-
ented than Africa’s commodity and mineral exports to the rest of 
the world. There are enormous untapped opportunities for growing 
trade, especially in food products, basic manufactures and services.
• Levels of intra-regional trade vary among the Regional 
Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa. The Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) has the highest share of intra-re-
gional exports, while the 2016 African Regional Integration Index 
ranks the East African Community (EAC) as the highest performing 
REC on the trade integration indicator.
• In March 2018, 44 African countries launched the world’s largest 
FTA for number of contracting parties, the African Continental 
Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). Effective implementation of the 
AfCFTA could increase intra-African trade by an estimated US$35 
billion per year by 2022.
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• Poor infrastructure impairs Africa’s regional and global competi-
tiveness and raises trade costs. The World Bank has estimated that 
sub-Saharan Africa’s infrastructure deficit is US$93 billion per year, 
with power generation being the largest infrastructure challenge.
• The EU and EU member states are extensively supporting the 
regional integration process in Africa. Africa continued to receive 
the largest share of EU Aid for Trade in 2015, with the highest dis-
bursement to southern Africa. However, there is room for all interna-
tional partners to improve their trade, investment and aid policies to 
better support Africa’s “developmental integration” agenda, especial-
ly linking to existing initiatives like the AU’s Agenda 2063, the Action 
Plan for Boosting Intra-African Trade, the Programme for Infrastructure 
Development in Africa, and the Action Plan for Implementation of the 
Accelerated Industrial Development of Africa.
Regional integration for growth, development and 
poverty reduction
On 21 March 2018, at the Extraordinary Summit of the African
Union in Kigali, Rwanda, 44 of the 55 AU member states signed 
the Agreement Establishing AfCFTA along with three Protocols: 
Trade in Goods, Trade in Services and Rules of Procedures for 
the Settlement of Disputes. At a time of integration fatigue in 
some parts of the world, including the European Union, and 
protectionist tendencies across the Atlantic, African countries 
are forging ahead and have launched the world’s largest FTA 
for number of contracting parties1. The AfCFTA follows short 
on the heels of another major milestone in African integra-
tion, the Tripartite FTA (TFTA). The TFTA, launched in June 
2015, links 26 countries from Cape Town to Cairo through 
their membership of three Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs), namely the Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC) and 
1 The AfCFTA will enter into force once 22 states have ratified it, which the 
Summit has hinted may happen within a year.
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the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
The decision to launch the TFTA, fast-track the AfCFTA 
and improve the connectivity and mobility of African citizens2 
reflect a renewed political consensus among African leaders on 
the importance of deeper integration to achieve growth, devel-
opment and poverty reduction. These objectives are outlined 
in the AU’s Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want, which sets out 
the priority areas for Africa’s development over the next fifty 
years. Indeed, effective implementation of the AfCFTA3 could 
increase intra-African trade by an estimated US$35 billion per 
year by 2022, particularly if complemented by effective opera-
tionalisation of the AU’s Action Plan for Boosting Intra-African 
Trade (Annex 1) and other trade facilitation and infrastructure 
plans at the regional level. Operationalising these initiatives of-
fers enormous untapped opportunities for growing intra-Afri-
can trade, especially in food products, basic manufactures and 
services. However, despite African leaders’ strong declaratory 
commitments to regionalism, and the recent signing of the 
AfCFTA, there remain many political, economic and institu-
tional challenges to deeper integration and effective implemen-
tation of regional trade agreements4. International development 
partners, including the EU and its member states, can support 
and help drive Africa’s integration agenda through trade, in-
vestment and aid, especially more targeted and focused Aid for 
Trade. The focus of this chapter is to identify some of the main 
issues, opportunities and challenges confronting Africa’s inte-
gration agenda, and to propose some options for international 
development partners to assist this process.
2 At the Ordinary Summit of  the AU on 28 January 2018, African leaders 
launched the Single African Air Transport Market, where the 23 participating 
countries cover more than 70% of  air travel in Africa, and concluded a protocol
to facilitate the free movement of  persons in Africa.
3 The AfCFTA will be implemented over 10 to 15 years and cover around 90% 
of  total product lines.
4 B. Vickers, A Handbook on Regional Integration in Africa. Towards Agenda 2063, 
Commonwealth Secretariat, London, 2017.
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The dynamics and drivers of economic integration 
in Africa
Regional integration has been a major objective of African gov-
ernments ever since African countries gained their independ-
ence in the 1960s. Regionalism in Africa has historically been 
pursued for two main purposes. The first is to enhance polit-
ical cooperation and unity at the pan-African level, including 
through the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) between 
1963 and 2002, and its successor, the African Union5.
The second is to foster economic growth and development. 
Regional integration is not an end in itself, but a means to 
achieve particular outcomes. For example, defragmenting 
Africa’s small markets is the key to attracting more investment 
and boosting intra-African trade, which will help achieve inclu-
sive economic growth, eradicate extreme poverty, ensure food 
security and provide better access to essential services such as 
health and education.
In the first two decades of the post-independence era, the 
focus of regional integration in Africa was more on political co-
operation rather than economic integration, as African leaders 
sought to rid the continent of the vestiges of colonialism. Since 
the 1980s efforts have been made to shift the focus of regional 
integration from political cooperation to economic integration, 
as evidenced by the emphasis on economic issues in the Lagos 
Plan of Action (1980) and the Abuja Treaty (1991)6. Since 
2000, there have been vast improvements in Africa’s growth 
5 The Assembly of  Heads of  State and Government of  the OAU adopted the 
Constitutive Act of  the AU in 2000 and established the Union the following year.
6 The Abuja Treaty lays out a roadmap to establish the envisaged African 
Economic Community (a monetary and economic union) through six stages ex-
tending over a period of  34 years, up to 2028. It was envisaged that the AEC 
would be achieved through the co-ordination, harmonisation and progressive 
integration of  the activities of  the eight identified RECs. The AfCFTA is the 
trigger for progressing to the fourth phase, namely an African customs union 
by 2019, which appears to be unrealistic and would be extremely challenging to 
achieve.
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and development prospects. African leaders adopted the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and subse-
quent AU plans, policies and strategies to boost intra-African 
trade, promote industrial development, invest in cross-border 
infrastructure and economic corridors, and fast-track the es-
tablishment of the Continental FTA. In January 2015, the AU 
adopted Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want, which sets out the 
priority areas for Africa’s development over the next fifty years.
Agenda 2063 has set the target of growing intra-African trade to 
half of the continent’s world trade by 2045.
Regional integration in Africa has tended to be viewed cyni-
cally because most AU member states belong to multiple RECs, 
creating a “spaghetti bowl” effect of overlapping trade rules and 
priorities.
Africa has the highest number of regional organisations in 
the world: 14 RECs at various stages of progress and integra-
tion, and as many related associations dealing with sectorial is-
sues such as standards or intellectual property. However, the 
AU recognises only eight RECs as the building blocks of the 
envisaged AEC, namely:
• Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)
• Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
• (COMESA)
• Community of Sahel–Saharan States (CEN–SAD)
• East African Community (EAC)
• Economic Community of Central African States
• (ECCAS)
• Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS)
• Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)
• Southern African Development Community (SADC)
All AU member states are members of at least one REC, and 
most are members of two. Multiple memberships of different 
RECs create a “spaghetti bowl” effect of overlapping trade rules 
and regulations, which may be confusing and costly for business 
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(Figure 1). Some of the integration priorities and ambitions 
of the different regional blocks may also diverge or conflict. 
Rationalising the number of RECs is therefore a long-standing 
priority in Africa.
Fig. 1 - The “spaghetti bowl” effect of multiple REC 
memberships in Africa
 
Source: Updated from B.Vickers (2017)
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However, Africa’s small domestic markets and competitive-
ness challenges makes deepening regional and continental inte-
gration indispensable for achieving economic growth, develop-
ment and poverty reduction.
Although Africa is home to more than one billion people, the 
continent is a patchwork of 54 sovereign states (plus Western Sahara) 
with “thick” national borders acting as barriers to intra-regional 
trade, investment and the movement of people. Fragmentation of 
the continent also means many sub-Saharan African countries have 
small domestic markets that undermine the potential for econo-
mies of scale and building export competitiveness, while arbitrarily 
drawn national borders during the colonial era pay little heed to 
the distribution of resources and natural endowments.
Sixteen sub-Saharan African countries are landlocked, rais-
ing their trade costs, while poor transport infrastructure to con-
nect people and markets in the world’s second largest continent 
– road, rails, ports – hinders competitiveness. For example, it 
takes an average of 38 days to import and 32 days to export 
goods across borders in sub-Saharan Africa – two of the longest 
wait times in the world. This is almost twice as long as in other 
regions such as Latin America, the Caribbean and Southeast 
Asia. In fact, it costs more to move a container from Kenya to 
Burundi than from Belgium or the United Kingdom to Kenya. 
Regional integration to overcome these market constraints and 
costs will allow producers, traders, investors and consumers to 
tap into their continent’s vast economic potential.
A larger and more integrated regional market may also at-
tract more Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows and trigger 
a trade-investment nexus that supports Africa’s structural trans-
formation objectives. In addition to traditional mining and 
extractive industries, attracting greater domestic and interna-
tional investment into Africa’s industrial and services sectors, as 
well as economic infrastructure, would contribute to building 
more diversified country and regional productive capacity. It is 
estimated that by 2025 Africa could almost double its current 
manufacturing output to US$930 billion, with three-quarters 
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of this growth triggered by intra-African demand and substi-
tuting imports of manufactured goods7. With 7 to 10 million 
young people entering the continent’s labour force each year, 
productive jobs and livelihoods for Africa’s young people will 
need to be delivered by the manufacturing and modern services 
sectors, rather than traditional primary exports.
The performance and composition 
of intra-African trade
Intra-African trade still remains low, but there is considerable 
potential to grow trade in goods and services among African 
countries. For 2016, intra-African trade was around 20% of 
Africa’s total trade with the world, compared with 62% within 
the EU and 23% within the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), while intra-regional trade in southern Asia 
is even lower than that of Africa8. The overall figure for intra-re-
gional trade could well be much higher if the substantial infor-
mal trade in goods and services that takes place in Africa was 
included in official statistics. For example, in SADC, informal 
cross-border trade generates US$17.6 billion per year, repre-
senting 30 to 40% of total intra-SADC trade9.
Intra-African trade is more manufacturing-oriented than 
Africa’s commodity and mineral exports to the rest of the world, 
including the EU. Manufacturing represents 67% of intra-Afri-
can exports compared to 32% of exports to Europe, 18% to the 
US and 14% to China10. It also has a higher intensity of services 
components. There are enormous untapped opportunities for 
growing intra-regional trade, especially in food products, basic 
7 McKinsey Global Institute, Lions on the Move II: Realizing the Potential of  Africa’s 
Economies, McKinsey Global Institute, September, 2016.
8 R. Berahab and U. Dadush, Will the African Free Trade Agreement Succeed?, OCP 
Policy Brief, April 2018.
9 B. Vickers (2017)
10 C. Lopes, We cannot afford to fail on the Continental Free Trade Area, The Former 
Executive Secretary’s Blog, UNECA, 24 May 2016.
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manufactures and services11. Africa’s households are projected 
to spend US$2.1 trillion by 2025, offering promising business 
opportunities in various consumer-oriented industries from 
housing to healthcare and leisure12. Services are the backbone 
of connectivity – “facilitating” the physical movement of goods 
and people (transport services) and the exchange of knowledge 
and information (communications services) – and many busi-
ness and professional services are now vital inputs for a compet-
itive manufacturing sector.
The performance of the services sector matters for economic 
growth and the overall productivity of the economy as a whole. 
However, data limitations hinder meaningful analysis of ser-
vices in Africa and their contribution to the continent’s growth 
and development13.
Levels of intra-regional trade and integration also 
vary among the RECs
In terms of regional integration, COMESA, EAC and 
ECOWAS have all launched customs unions, to be implement-
ed in a phased process. SADC, in contrast, has not been able to 
achieve its customs union target (2010) or progress to a com-
mon market (2015) owing to various political, economic and 
institutional challenges.
In terms of intra-regional trade, SADC has the highest 
trade intensity, with South Africa generating about 60% of in-
tra- regional exports14, while the ECCAS has the lowest. The 
EAC is the second highest performer in terms of intra-REC 
11 Services comprise a wide variety of  economic and social activities, embrac-
ing communications, transport, finance, energy, distribution, construction and 
business services, as well as final demand services such as tourism, recreation, 
education, health and environmental services.
12 McKinsey Global Institute (2016).
13 N. Dihel and A. Goswami (Eds.), The Unexplored Potential of  Trade in Services in 
Africa, Washington D.C., World Bank Group, 2016.
14 ICTSD, African Integration: Facing up to Emerging Challenges, Geneva, 2016.
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trade intensity, although its share of intra-regional exports has 
remained relatively flat since 2000 (Figure 2). Overall, how-
ever, the 2016 African Regional Integration Index ranks the 
EAC as the highest performing REC on the trade integration 
indicator15.
Fig. 2 - Trade intensity for select African RECs (2000-2014)
Source: ICTSD (2016)
The 2016 African Regional Integration Index finds that the 
EAC is the overall top performing REC, followed by SADC 
and COMESA. EAC has higher than average scores across 
each dimension of regional integration, except for financial and 
macroeconomic integration. SADC and ECOWAS have higher 
than average REC scores on regional integration overall. SADC 
has higher than average REC scores across the dimensions of 
regional infrastructure, free movement of people, and financial 
15 UNECA, AUC and AfDB, Africa Regional Integration Index. Report 2016, Addis 
Ababa, 2016.
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and macroeconomic integration. ECOWAS has higher than 
average REC scores across the dimensions of free movement 
of people and financial and macroeconomic integration. The 
Index findings show that each REC, and each country, score 
higher than average on at least one priority area of integration. 
This is a strong basis for each region to build on and for sharing 
lessons and insights to encourage greater policy reforms across
the continent16.
Promoting “developmental regionalism” in Africa
In Africa, the main focus of regional trade initiatives has been 
on liberalising trade in goods and promoting investment. Not 
enough attention and resources have been directed to address-
ing the underlying productive and supply capabilities of coun-
tries to compete regionally and globally. This partly explains the 
low levels of intra-regional trade.
Developmental regionalism recognises that the barriers to 
intra-regional trade in Africa are less to do with tariffs and regu-
latory constraints and more to do with poor infrastructure and
undiversified production structures. This approach calls for pol-
icy action at three levels:
• effective market integration (e.g. reducing tariffs, ad-
dressing non-tariff barriers and facilitating trade, in-
cluding by establishing one-stop border posts);
• cross-border infrastructure development (e.g. economic 
development corridors, like the Maputo Development 
Corridor or the North-South Corridor, and special eco-
nomic zones);
• industrialisation (e.g. use of industrial policies at na-
tional and regional levels to trigger value chains in agri-
culture, manufacturing and services).
16 Ibid.
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The leather and leather products (LLP) industry provides a 
good illustration of the opportunity for sub-Saharan Africa to 
form regional value chains and, in the process, create more add-
ed value in exports and generate higher employment. In one 
estimate, removing tariffs on LLP could almost quadruple aver-
age annual intra-regional trade in these products from US$245 
million to US$997 million, whereas removing all non-tariff 
barriers could boost this figure tenfold17.
But boosting trade competitiveness requires greater attention 
to behind-the-border issues. Many of the RECs are starting to 
address services trade and other “behind-the-border” issues 
such as investment, competition, standards and regulations and 
the movement of businesspersons. Establishing regional rules 
in these trade-related areas will help boost intra-African trade 
and investment and improve sub-Saharan Africa’s ability to 
competitively produce goods for regional and world markets. 
The second phase of the AfCFTA negotiations will develop pro-
tocols on investment, competition and intellectual property.
Obstacles to deeper economic integration 
in Africa
There is an extensive literature on the obstacles and challenges for 
Africa’s trade integration agenda. These reports and studies propose 
a range of concrete measures and action plans to ensure more ef-
fective integration in Africa. The following is a stylised summary of 
some of the major obstacles to deeper economic integration:
•  lack of political will to advance integration, including 
concerns about loss of sovereignty, policy space and tar-
iff revenue;
• overlapping memberships of RECs, with different rules 
of the game, which can be extremely confusing and 
17 R. Banga, D. Kumar, and P. Cobbina, Trade-led Regional Value Chains in Sub-
Saharan Africa: Case Study on the Leather Sector, Commonwealth Trade Policy 
Discussion Papers 2015/02, Commonwealth Secretariat, London, 2015.
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costly to business (e.g. tariff reduction schedules, rules 
of origin and ambition regarding regional integration);
• failure to respect and implement regional trade agree-
ments and their obligations;
• high tariffs on intra-regional exports and tariff peaks in 
many sectors, even though the total elimination of tar-
iffs on goods is foreseen in almost all RECs;
• persistence of NTBs that impede trade, due to import 
licenses, additional fees and surcharges, to stringent 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures;
• inefficient and corrupt customs and border management;
• restrictive policies in regional services markets, ranging 
from nationality requirements to regulatory heterogeneity 
for licensing, qualification and educational requirements;
• lack of adequate infrastructure, from transport to ICTs, 
to support both physical and digital cross-border trade 
in goods and services18;
• lack of robust dispute settlement on issues pertaining to 
obligations under regional trade agreements, including 
legal remedies for private traders and service providers 
when their rights are violated;
• lack of support for entrepreneurship, private sector de-
velopment and export competitiveness, especially for 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
The role of external dynamics, like the EU 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs)
Besides advancing the continental integration agenda, African 
countries are also deepening trade and investment relations 
with their established partners, such as the EU, Japan and the 
US, and emerging economies, especially China and India.
18 The World Bank estimates that sub-Saharan Africa’s infrastructure deficit is 
US$93 billion per year, with power generation being the largest infrastructure 
challenge.
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Distinct shifts in trade flows are taking place in which the rel-
ative significance of trading with developing country partners
has increased remarkably.
China now accounts for 12% of Africa’s total goods exports 
to the world, although the bulk of these exports are commod-
ities and minerals. India has doubled its share, from 2.5% in 
2000 to just over 6% in 2014. By comparison, the shares of the 
EU and the US have both declined over this period. The EU’s 
share of Africa’s world exports fell from 47% in 2000 to 36% 
in 2014, while the share of the US contracted from 16.5% in 
2000 to just under 6% in 2014 (Figure 3).
Fig. 3 - Share of major partners in Africa’s exports (2000-2014)
Source: B. Vickers (2017)
African countries have long raised concerns that external dy-
namics, including the EPAs, could undermine regional integra-
tion initiatives in Africa.
The EPAs are reciprocal but asymmetrical agreements be-
tween the EU and five sub-Saharan African regional groupings: 
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Central Africa, EAC, Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA), 
SADC and West Africa. Most of these groupings and their 
member states do not correspond to the official AU RECs, 
thereby undermining regional integration. The SADC EPA was 
implemented in October 2016, while four other EPA groups 
are at varying stages of finalisation or signature. Some interim 
EPAs are being provisionally implemented, although there is 
uncertainty about whether or not full regional EPAs are indeed 
feasible or desirable.
Under these agreements, the EU undertakes to immediate-
ly grant 100% duty-free market access to sub-Saharan African 
countries (with the exception of South Africa), whereas African 
economies are required only to progressively make duty-free not 
less than 75% of their imports from the EU. The agreements 
are expected to deliver benefits to both sides but the gains for 
Africa are expected to be concentrated in just a few non-in-
dustrial sectors (e.g. rice, milk, sugar and meat) and to accrue 
mainly to Africa’s more developed countries. Gains for the EU 
would be more generalised, largely owing to initial asymmetri-
cal protection structures. The projected increase in Africa’s ex-
ports to the EU would also come at the expense of intra-African 
trade, and African governments would suffer a sharp drop in 
tariff revenues. Compensation to African countries under the 
EPA Development Programme is expected to offset at least 
some of the possible costs of the agreement’s reforms.
There have recently been calls for the “smart sequencing” of 
the EPAs and the AfCFTA, allowing time for African countries 
to fully implement the AfCFTA before opening up on the scale 
envisaged by the EU19.
In other words, a “standstill” in the implementation of the 
EPAs may be necessary in order to strengthen intra-African 
trade. Brexit – the UK formally leaves the EU on 29 March 
2019 – also raises implications for the EPAs, since the balance 
19 UNECA, Economic Report on Africa 2015: Industrializing through Trade, Addis 
Ababa, 2015.
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of liberalisation commitments may be upset by the departure of 
the EU’s second largest economy, especially for some sub-Saha-
ran African countries that send most of their exports to the UK.
Policy options
Tackling the political economy obstacles to integration
Despite African leaders’ strong declaratory commitments to re-
gionalism, and the recent signing of the AfCFTA by 44 AU 
member states, there remain many political, economic, struc-
tural and institutional challenges to deeper integration and ef-
fective implementation of regional trade agreements. Despite 
its leading role in driving the AfCFTA negotiations, Nigeria 
did not participate in the Kigali Summit and did not sign the 
agreement because of the need for further consultations with 
domestic stakeholders.
In all regional arrangements around the world, there are con-
cerns about the “winners” and “losers” from deeper integration. 
Presently, seven African countries account for about 60% of 
total intra-merchandise exports, while the majority account for 
the remaining 40%. It is important to identify possible poli-
cy measures or mechanisms to promote a more balanced dis-
tribution of the benefits of regional integration. For example, 
consideration could be given to funds to compensate potential 
“losers”; to flexibility in reducing tariffs or excluding sensitive 
sectors or products; to regional industrial strategies promot-
ing inward investment and regional value chains; to regional 
cross-border infrastructure development programmes; to re-
gional services cooperation agreements; and to transit trade ar-
rangements, especially to link landlocked countries to regional 
and global markets.
Overall, there may be lessons to be drawn from the EU’s 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), which aims 
to strengthen economic and social cohesion in the EU by 
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correcting imbalances between its regions. International donors 
could also refocus their efforts towards helping countries un-
derstand the political economy behind resistance to integrative 
reforms.
Harnessing international support 
for regional integration
International development partners, including the EU and its 
member states, can support and help drive Africa’s integration 
agenda through trade and investment policies that support the 
building of production capacity and regional value chains in 
goods and services. For example, trade agreements and trade 
preference schemes should aim to:
• align with the AfCFTA and existing REC strategies, 
plans and priorities;
• offer 100% free market access for all least-developed- 
country (LDC) exports of goods and provide preferen-
tial access for services and service suppliers in line with 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) waiver;
• extend product coverage to include agro-process-
ing products and manufactured goods for non-LDC 
African countries that are outside of the EPAs;
• relax and simplify rules of origin, and eliminate  unnec-
essary non-tariff barriers;
• integrate and mainstream development-friendly trade 
rules.
Aid for Trade (AfT)20 is increasingly important for reduc-
ing trade costs and increasing trade capacity. For example, 
it could be used to support implementation of the WTO’s 
Trade Facilitation Agreement and regional trade facilitation 
programmes, invest in trade-enabling infrastructure, and 
20 AfT consists of  the following categories: technical assistance for trade policy 
and regulations; building trade-related infrastructure; building productive capaci-
ty; support with trade-related adjustment; other trade-related needs.
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help micro, small and medium enterprises (MSME) – espe-
cially women and young entrepreneurs – improve their trade 
competitiveness.
This type of aid can be disbursed through bilateral or re-
gional projects and programmes, or through multilateral chan-
nels such as the African Development Bank, the World Bank 
and the International Development Association (IDA). Both 
the traditional and emerging donors are extensively engaged in 
supporting the regional integration process in Africa, includ-
ing through institutional support to the RECs and financing 
cross-border infrastructure and other projects.
The EU and EU member states are the world’s leading pro-
viders of AfT, with 29% of the global total21. In 2015, the EU 
and its member states committed €13.2 billion to AfT, an in-
crease of 5.5% from 2014. Three donors accounted for 75% of 
these commitments: Germany (€5.1 billion), France (€2.6 bil-
lion) and the EU institutions (€2.4 billion). By comparison, in 
2015, Italy provided €166 million in AfT, which was more than 
double its 2014 contribution; in addition, Italy also tripled its 
trade-related assistance to just over €90 million, which mainly 
supported trade development activities. The EU’s AfT commit-
ments in two categories – i.e. trade-related infrastructure and 
building production capacity, which are major priorities for the 
AU’s Agenda 2063 – represented more than 97% of global AfT 
commitments in 2015.
Africa continued to receive the largest share of EU AfT in 
2015 (36% of total AfT). The highest disbursement went to 
southern Africa (€916 million in 2015), followed by West Africa 
(€865 million), the EAC (€810 million), East Africa minus the 
EAC (€764 million) and Central Africa (€187 million)22.
If appropriately used, aid can play an important comple-
mentary role in assisting developing countries achieve trade-led 
21 The second largest provider in the world is Japan (€10.6 billion in 2015), fol-
lowed by the World Bank (IDA) (€6.8 billion) and the United States (€3 billion).
22 TAC Economics, Aid for Trade Report 2017, Review of  progress by the EU and 
its Member States, 2017.
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sustainable development. However, there may also be an eco-
nomic pragmatism for EU member states in extending bilater-
al aid, which could help boost jobs and exports in the donor 
country. For example, in 2014, the UK gave US$5.9 billion 
in direct bilateral development assistance, making it one of the 
largest individual aid donors in the world. This generated an 
increase in UK exports of US$0.22 for every US$1 of aid spent, 
increasing trade revenue and providing an estimated 12,000 
more UK jobs23.
Strengthening the role of the RECs
Progress in advancing continental integration through the 
AfCFTA, and plans to establish its own Secretariat in the fu-
ture, raise questions about the role and importance of the cur-
rent RECs.
As the building blocks of the AEC, and with more ambitious 
liberalisation timeframes and targets compared to the AfCFTA, 
the RECs do retain a significant role. In fact, the RECs have 
played an instrumental role in supporting the continental inte-
gration process.
Valuable experiences and lessons at the REC-level have been 
practically transferred to higher-level processes, whether inter- 
REC with the TFTA or continentally with the AfCFTA
The RECs also tend to advance more swiftly in developing 
integrative trade practices at the sub-regional level compared to 
the more cumbersome AU process that involves 55 countries.
In addition to being learning organisations, the RECs are 
increasingly pioneers in developing regional governance frame-
works for many new trade issues. This again provides a valuable 
opportunity for cross-learning and replication at the continen-
tal level. For example, COMESA is currently prioritising digi-
tisation to adapt to the challenges – but also the opportunities 
23 M. Mendez-Parra and D.W. te Velde, Aid, exports and employment in the UK, ODI 
Briefing Note, May 2017.
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– of the technology-driven Fourth Industrial Revolution24.
This all means that international partners should continue to 
support the RECs and help strengthen their institutional capacity.
The EU’s European Development Fund (EDF) has provided 
important institutional support to the RECs, while some mem-
bers and their aid agencies also have their own bilateral support 
programmes. The 11th EDF (2014-2020) supports the RECs, 
as well as regional economic integration, trade and the pri-
vate sector, through three Regional Indicative Programmes for 
Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean (EASA-
IO), Central Africa and West Africa.
Some RECs have been criticised for being overly dependent 
on non-African donor funding. To ensure sustainable financing 
for the AU, a decision was taken in 2016 to implement a 0.2% 
levy on eligible imports from outside the continent.
Increasing EU support for AfCFTA implementation
Europe has a vital economic and security interest in a stable and 
increasingly prosperous Africa. Africa’s population is projected to 
reach around 2.5 billion people by 2050, presenting promising 
trade and investment opportunities as the world’s last remaining 
frontier market, but also raising critical challenges regarding se-
curity and stability. Since the AfCFTA will boost intra-African 
trade, create jobs and incomes and improve welfare, supporting 
the implementation of this pan-continental trade deal should be 
a major priority for the EU and its member states.
The Joint Africa-EU Strategy could provide a basis to ex-
tend support for the AfCFTA. At the 4th EU-Africa Summit in 
Brussels in April 2014, African and European heads of state and 
government adopted the Roadmap 2014-2017, which included 
support for “sustainable and inclusive development and growth 
and continental integration”. The EU initially offered capacity 
support for the AfCFTA negotiations. The focus should now 
24 F. Mangeni, “Regional economic communities vital lessons for CFTA”, East 
African Business Week, 21 February 2018.
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turn to technical support for implementation, including do-
mestic reforms like trade adjustment and revenue planning, 
and preparing for the second phase of the negotiations. The EU 
and its member states could consider establishing a dedicated 
EU-AfCFTA Implementation Fund, if appropriate.
The EU is already a major donor supporting Africa’s in-
tegration process through facilities like the European 
Investment Bank, the 11th EDF (2014-2020), the EU-Africa 
Infrastructure Trust Fund (EU-AITF) and the EPA develop-
ment programmes. The total EU-AITF resources amount to 
€812 million, of which €647.7 million come from the EDF 
and the remaining funds from EU member states participating 
in the Trust Fund25. These facilities should all practically sup-
port and complement the AU’s Agenda 2063, the Action Plan 
for Boosting Intra-African Trade, the Programme for Infrastructure 
Development in Africa, and the Action Plan for Implementation of 
the Accelerated Industrial Development of Africa.
Five questions for discussion
1.   There are still many political, economic, structural and in-
stitutional challenges to deeper integration and effective 
implementation of regional trade agreements in Africa. 
What are the most binding constraints to deeper integra-
tion and how could the EU and its member states help 
address these challenges (e.g. infrastructure development 
through public-private partnerships, domestic reforms to 
improve competitiveness, building production capabili-
ties by integrating and upgrading African economies into 
EU goods and services supply chains, etc.)?
2.  The AfCFTA is a major milestone in Africa’s integra-
tion process towards the envisaged AEC, but there will 
25 European Commission, International Cooperation and Development, 
EUAfrica Infrastructure Trust Fund.
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be serious implementation challenges and adjustment 
pressures. What support can the EU and its member 
states provide to help implement the AfCFTA and assist 
African countries in improving their trade competitive-
ness to take advantage of the new export opportunities, 
especially among women and young entrepreneurs (e.g. 
Aid for Trade, EU-AfCFTA Implementation Fund, 
ITC’s SheTrades initiative, etc.)? What role can digital 
trade and the digital economy play in boosting regional 
trade and integration in Africa?
3.  Levels of economic and trade integration differ among 
the RECs. How can the EU and its member states bet-
ter support the AU Commission, including designing 
interventions to help implement its Action Plan for 
Boosting Intra-African Trade, and strengthen the institu-
tional capacity of the RECs where practical integration 
is happening more swiftly than at the continental level?
4.  A major political economy constraint to integration is 
balancing the costs and benefits of integration. What 
lessons, if any, could Africa draw from the European 
integration experience, especially the use of structural 
funds, to ensure a balanced distribution of the benefits 
of integration?
5.  International development partners can better use their 
trade, investment and aid policies to support Africa’s 
“developmental integration” agenda. What improve-
ments to existing or new initiatives are necessary to 
support effective African integration (e.g. Joint Africa- 
EU Strategy, targeted Aid for Trade, review of the EPAs, 
etc.)? And how can traditional donors better engage and 
partner with emerging donors, like Brasil, China and 
India, in supporting Africa’s development priorities?
4.  Faster Than Expected? Technological 
     Progress and Connectivity in Africa
Michael Minges
Key facts
• There has been a massive increase in digital technology in Africa, 
particularly mobile connectivity. In virtually all countries in 
Africa, there is today a higher level of mobile phone ownership than 
electricity. The gap in mobile phone penetration between sub-Saha-
ran Africa and the rest of the world dropped from 99% in 1989 to 
23% by 2015.
• Mobile connectivity is being leveraged to support the delivery 
of services such as banking, electricity, health and agriculture. For 
example, mobile money has spread throughout the continent en-
hancing financial inclusion1. Pay-as-you-go models have emerged 
for buying solar panels to overcome the lack of grid connections 
in rural areas2. Health advice is texted to target groups such as HIV 
patients in Kenya3 and diabetics in Senegal4. Farmers and traders in 
Niger use mobile phones to reduce market information asymmetry5.
• The rapid growth of submarine cables in sub-Saharan Africa is an 
area where there has been astounding leapfrogging. Before 2009, 
1 MNS Consulting, Mobile Money: An Africa Success Story, 2017. 
2 B. McKibben, “The Race to Solar-Power Africa”, The New Yorker, 19 June 2017.
3 A. Patel, et al., “Economic evaluation of  mobile phone text message interven-
tions to improve adherence to HIV therapy in Kenya”, Medicine, 2017. 
4 UN-OHRLLS, Leveraging Investments in Broadband for National Development: The 
Case of  Rwanda and Senegal, 2017. 
5 J. Aker, “Information from Markets Near and Far: Mobile Phones and 
Agricultural Markets in Niger” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2010. 
A Vision of Africa’s Future94
there was only one monopoly-controlled cable on Africa’s west coast. 
The deployment of cables on Africa’s east coast in 2009 led to a surge 
of undersea fiber optic networks. By 2016, all coastal sub-Saharan 
countries except Eritrea and Guinea Bissau were connected to sub-
marine cables and seven were connected to three or more. 
• More so than any other infrastructure sector in the region, there is a 
high degree of private and foreign investment in the telecommu-
nication sector with varying levels of competition.
• Despite these digital gains, penetration of more advanced digi-
tal technologies lags. While mobile penetration was 78% in 2017, 
fixed broadband penetration was only 0.4% and internet was used 
by just 22% of the continent’s population6. This is holding back 
the advancement of services such as e-government and e-com-
merce and their potential contribution to economic growth and 
development. 
ICTs and Africa’s development
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) is wield-
ing greater influence as it evolves in speed, from narrowband 
to broadband, and in scope, from connecting just humans to 
connections with machines. The economic impact of different 
ICTs varies, with broadband internet having a bigger effect 
than traditional fixed landlines and mobile phones7. Broadband 
internet is a General Purpose Technology (GPT) cutting across 
all sectors to deliver efficiency and productivity gains8. Reasons 
for the impact are due to the rapid decline in the cost of digital 
technologies, particularly the internet, which have dramatically 
reduced transaction costs. This benefits economic development 
6 https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/stat/default.aspx. 
7 C. Qiang, C. Rossotto, and K. Kimura, “Economic impacts of  broadband”, in 
Information and Communications for Development 2009: Extending Reach and Increasing 
Impact. Washington, D.C., World Bank, 2009. 
8 G. Clarke, C. Qiang, and L. Xu, “The internet as a general-purpose technol-
ogy: firm-level evidence from around the world”, Policy Research Working Paper, 
Washington, D.C., World Bank Group, 2015. 
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in three ways9. First, the internet helps overcome information 
asymmetry by better linking sellers and buyers. Second, lower 
transaction costs enabled by the internet raises productivity in 
businesses. Third, the internet triggers innovation characterised 
by new business models, customisation of services and industry 
disruption. However, the dividends from digital technologies 
lag, particularly in developing regions like Africa. One reason 
is the digital divide in internet access. Nevertheless, adoption 
alone is insufficient to benefit from ICT. Countries also need 
to work on analog complements: strengthening competition, 
adapting workers’ skills and ensuring that institutions are 
accountable.
There are important trade-related aspects of ICT relevant for 
developing nations in a globalised economy. A reciprocal rela-
tionship exists between trade and ICT10, as an enabling trade 
environment facilitates development of ICT while ICT fosters 
and enables goods and services trade. Three dimensions char-
acterise ICT-related trade: trade in ICTs themselves (e.g. inter-
national communications), trade in ICT-enabled services (e.g. 
business process outsourcing) and ICT as a facilitator of other 
types of trade (e.g. electronic commerce). Barriers that impede 
the development of ICT-related trade such as insufficient in-
vestment can be addressed through trade commitments. 
The international development agenda stresses the im-
portance of ICT infrastructure for achieving Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). The ninth SDG calls for building 
“ ... resilient infrastructure, promote sustainable industrialisa-
tion and foster innovation”11. The importance of infrastructure 
investments for development is linked to their crosscutting na-
ture. SDG Target 9c has the following goal: “significantly in-
crease access to information and communications technology 
9 World Bank, World Development Report 2016: Digital Dividends, 2016.
10 TMG Inc., Trade in Information and Communication Services: Opportunities 
for East and Southern Africa, 2007. 
11 United Nations, Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure, Goal 9: Build resilient 
infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation, 2016. 
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and strive to provide universal and affordable access to the in-
ternet in least developed countries by 2020”. Though the target 
refers specifically to the least developed countries (LDCs), it is 
highly relevant for Africa since 33 of the 47 LDCs are on the 
continent. It is also significant that the emphasis is firmly on 
access to the internet. 
Europe has had a long historical relationship with Africa. 
Today this relationship is manifested through digital technolo-
gies. The vast majority of Africa’s internet traffic passes through 
Europe (Figure 1). Additionally, France’s Orange is a major in-
vestor on the continent with operations in over a dozen African 
countries12, while the United Kingdom’s Vodacom – supported 
by the Department of International Development – played a 
role in the rapid spread of mobile money on the continent, 
doing pioneering work which resulted in M-Pesa in Kenya (see 
below) and eventually spread throughout the region13. 
Technological change and connectivity in Africa
Mobile communications is the one ICT where Africa has been 
closing the gap with the rest of the world. The speed of mo-
bile evolution, policy reforms and the ways of financing invest-
ment are unique among other infrastructure sectors in Africa14. 
Though fixed telephone networks have been around since the 
early 1900s, access was always limited in sub-Saharan Africa to 
less than 2% of the population (Figure 2, left).
Once the first mobile networks were launched in sub-Saharan 
Africa in 1989, they grew rapidly. The gap between sub-Saha-
ran Africa and the rest of the world dropped from 99% in 1989 
to 23% by 2015 (Figure 2, right).
12 https://www.orange.com/en/Group/Orange-in-the-world
13 M. Joseph,  M-Pesa: the story of  how the world’s leading mobile money service was created 
in Kenya, 2017. 
14  M. Williams, R. Mayer, and M. Minges, Africa’s ICT Infrastructure: Building on the 
Mobile Revolution, Washington D.C., World Bank, 2011.
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Fig. 1 - Major international Internet routes in Africa, 2015
Source: P. Christian, “International Bandwidth Trends in Africa”, in The African 
Peering & Interconnection Forum, Maputo, 25-27 August 2015
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Fig. 2 - Telephones per 100 people
 
Source: Adapted from World Bank
The reason for the popularity of mobile in Africa is largely 
contextual: an ineffective monopoly of landline operators that 
did not pose a strong competitive threat to new mobile op-
erators, the lower investment costs of greenfield wireless net-
works, huge pent-up demand due to a lack of landlines, and 
the prepaid model that fit the region’s economic circumstanc-
es. Availability and quality of service have increased and prices 
gone down, but it is largely sector reform that has driven this 
radical change: markets have been opened and regulatory agen-
cies created, resulting in competition spurring investment. The 
region has skipped fixed telephone lines and jumped into mo-
bile technology15.
In Africa, cellphones are used for more than basic voice com-
munications and popular activities such as sending text mes-
sages and taking pictures. Mobile money is also increasingly 
common and mobile networks are generating innovation and 
15 Pew Research Center, Cell Phones in Africa: Communication Lifeline, 2015.
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boosting incomes, with farmers using cellphones to check mar-
ket prices and traders accepting payments in mobile money16. 
Some sub-Saharan countries stand out for mobile connec-
tivity on a par with developed nations, for the application of 
mobile communications in other sectors and for innovative ap-
proaches to mobile broadband network deployment:
• South Africa was notably one of the first sub-Saharan 
countries to introduce competition to its mobile sec-
tor. Today cellphones are as common in South Africa as 
they are in the United States, with 89% of adults hav-
ing one17. Although South Africa had an analog mobile 
network in the 1980s, it was essentially restricted to the 
well-off due to high costs and low coverage. The launch 
of second-generation mobiles and the introduction of 
competition between the two private companies MTN 
and Vodacom in 1994, transformed the industry. South 
Africa joined Guinea as the only two sub-Saharan African 
countries open to competition at the time. By the 2001 
census, almost a third of households in South Africa had 
a cellphone, by the 2011 census the number grew to al-
most nine in ten and, by 2016, cellphones were almost 
ubiquitous, with 96% of households having one (com-
pared to less than ten percent with a landline), a figure 
higher than the United States. Today there is widespread 
mobile broadband coverage with a 3G signal reaching 
99% of the population and 4G/LTE covering over three 
quarters of the country’s inhabitants, the highest levels in 
sub-Saharan Africa. Additional competition through the 
market entry of Cell C in 2001 and the incumbent fixed 
line operator Telkom in 2010 has sustained this growth. 
MTN and Vodacom have also been instrumental in in-
troducing cellphones to other sub-Saharan countries18 
with subsidiaries in 19 markets in the region. 
16 “Mobile phones are transforming Africa”, The Economist, 10 December 2016. 
17 Pew Research Center, Cell Phones in Africa:…, cit.
18 W.A. Mbarika and I. Mbarika, “Africa Calling”, IEEE Spectrum, 2006.
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• Kenya is a trendsetter in the application of mobile to the 
financial sector. In 2007, Safaricom launched M-Pesa, 
the first mobile money service in Africa. Its populari-
ty exceeded expectations and today Kenya has one of 
the highest rates of mobile money penetration in the 
world, strengthening financial inclusion in the country. 
The percentage of the population aged over 15 with an 
account rose from 42% in 2011 to 75% in 201419. One 
success factor is the light-handed regulatory approach 
banking officials took in allowing mobile money20. 
Mobile money has spawned add-on applications such as 
links to savings and insurance and payments for e-com-
merce. One triple-play example combines cellphones, 
mobile money and off-grid electricity: M-Kopa Solar21. 
It produces solar panels to cater to the huge demand for 
electricity in rural areas22. One challenge is that most 
rural dwellers cannot afford the outright purchase of a 
panel so M-Kopa Solar provides a solution by charging 
a small daily amount with payments made using mobile 
money. Once the panel is paid for, it belongs to the 
purchaser. To ensure compliance, the panel circuitry is 
remotely controlled over the mobile network. 
• Being a landlocked, least developed country has not 
stood in the way of Rwanda’s aspirations for the ICT 
sector. One innovative government-led initiative is the 
adoption of the world’s first wholesale-retail model 
for a fourth generation mobile network. KT Rwanda 
Network (KTRN), a joint venture between Korea 
Telecom and the government, was established in 2013 
to, among other things, deploy 4G technology. KTRN, 
which builds the network and acts as a wholesaler 
19 World Bank, Financial Inclusion Data / Global Findex, Kenya. 
20 S. Burns, “Finance for All: Kenya’s M-PESA”, Alt-M, 28 June 2016. 
21 http://solar.m-kopa.com/about/
22 According to a 2015 survey, only 16% of  rural households had electricity. See: 
NMCP, KNBS, and ICF International, Kenya Malaria Indicator Survey 2015, 2016.
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selling capacity to existing mobile operators and ISPs23, 
launched the 4G network in 2014 with the target of 
covering 95% of the population by 2018. One reason 
for this model is that the government wanted to accel-
erate the rollout of superfast mobile technology. The 
existing mobile operators were hesitant to deploy 4G 
until they had recovered the investment in their 3G 
networks. 
The rapid growth of submarine cables in sub-Saharan Africa 
is another area where there has been astounding leapfrogging. 
Before 2009, there was only one monopoly-controlled cable on 
Africa’s west coast (Figure 3, above). The deployment of cables 
on Africa’s east coast in 2009 led to a surge of undersea fib-
er optic networks. By 2016, all coastal sub-Saharan countries 
except Eritrea and Guinea Bissau were connected to subma-
rine cables and seven were connected to three or more (Figure 
3, below). The growth has been stimulated by a combination 
of rising demand for internet capacity, open-access submarine 
cables, pan-African telecom groups and assistance from the de-
velopment community. One study covering a dozen countries 
found large positive effects on employment rates since the ar-
rival of submarine internet cables24. The cables enabled faster 
internet to drive applications such as cloud-based supply chain 
solutions for linking tea facto ries to farmers in Kenya or online 
trade declarations in Ghana.
This recent growth in high-speed connectivity is driving the 
uptake of digital services in Africa. As in the rest of the world, 
social media use is growing rapidly in the region and emerg-
ing as a popular way for citizens to communicate with govern-
ments and obtain information from other sources. The impact 
of social media during the Arab Spring in North Africa was 
notable not only for coordinating demonstrations but also for 
23 UN-OHRLLS, Leveraging Investments in Broadband for National Development:…, cit. 
24 J. Hjort and J. Poulsen, The Arrival of  Fast Internet and Employment in Africa, 
NBER Working Paper, 2018. 
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Fig. 3 - Undersea fiber optic cables in Africa, 2009 and 2016
Source: https://manypossibilities.net/african-undersea-cables/
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communicating what was happening on the ground to the rest 
of the world25. Governments in the region have an uneasy re-
lationship with social media. On the one hand, they use them, 
such as Facebook pages, for government agencies or tweeting 
important information. On the other, they are worried about 
information flows they cannot control and sometimes shut 
off access, particularly during elections or periods of political 
disturbance26. 
E-commerce is nascent in the region. Less than four percent 
of sub-Saharan Africans bought something online in 201727. 
Numerous challenges inhibit the adoption of online shopping, 
including poor legal frameworks, payment obstacles, limited 
internet use, low incomes and undeveloped logistics. However, 
the opportunity is immense, with over a billion potential con-
sumers. Jumia, an e-commerce platform, operates in more than 
a dozen African countries and is the region’s first “unicorn”, 
a startup valued at over US$1 billion28. The spread of mobile 
money also provides a payment alternative to the low penetra-
tion of credit cards.   
Though Africa has made impressive progress in expanding 
digital connectivity over the last few years, there is still further to 
go to increase broadband infrastructure, lower costs and leverage 
benefits more fully29. Despite the steady gains, the region con-
tinues to lag behind all others in access to digital technologies. 
This is partly due to the link between per capita income and 
telecommunication access. However, in many cases the market 
is not functioning as well as it could. This is sometimes related 
25 H. Brown, E. Guskin, and A. Mitchell, The Role of  Social Media in the Arab 
Uprisings, Pew Research Center Analysis, 28 November 2012.  
26 C. Cross, “African Governments Versus Social Media: Why the Uneasy 
Relationship?”, The Conversation, 6 March 2017. 
27  The Global Findex Database 2017 at https://globalfindex.worldbank.org
28 J. Bright, “An E-Commerce Challenge in Africa: Selling to People Who Aren’t 
Online”, The New Yorker, 30 June 2016. 
29 M. Minges, Rapid desk based study: summary of  the main constraints to increased digital 
connectivity in Sub-Saharan Africa, Evidence on Demand, Department of  International 
Development, Gov.UK, 1 January 2016. 
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to exogenous factors such as poor governance, lack of electricity, 
the high cost of doing business and a low level of digital skills. 
Other factors are internal to the sector and include imperfect 
competition, a lack of open access to fiber optic backbone net-
works and constrained spectrum allocation. Government strat-
egies to narrow the digital gap through universal service funds 
have been largely ineffective throughout the region. Solutions 
to these challenges require a top-level multi-sector approach. 
They can be alleviated through a more competitive market envi-
ronment including embedding open access principles in sector 
regulations, support for training regulators, more efficient and 
speedier spectrum allocation, improved universal service pro-
grams and initiatives for promoting mass digital literacy.
Policy options and prospects 
ICT is an important sector in its own right and with impacts 
across other sectors. Growth within the sector is dependent on a 
proper regulatory environment to stimulate competition and in-
vestment. The impact of digital technologies on other sectors is 
dependent on regulations as well as knowledge of how to apply 
ICTs in areas such as finance, agriculture, health, education, etc. 
African countries need the right enabling framework for stim-
ulating telecommunication infrastructure development includ-
ing creation of a sector regulator, introduction of competition 
and private sector investment. The World Trade Organization 
(WTO) Reference Paper outlines six basic principles for an ap-
propriate regulatory environment to foster a vibrant telecom-
munications sector30. Though published over twenty years old, 
the paper remains applicable today. 
The principles include competitive safeguards for an-
ti-competitive behavior such as cross-subsidisation and con-
trol over key bottleneck facilities such as towers and fiber optic 
30 WTO, Negotiating group on basic telecommunications, Telecommunications Services, 
Reference Paper, 24 April 1996.
Faster Than Expected? Technological Progress and Connectivity in Africa 105
backbones. Some governments have separated their incum-
bents into wholesale and retail companies to minimize subsidi-
sation. This is the case of Botswana where the incumbent was 
split into Botswana Fiber Network (BOFINET) and Botswana 
Telecommunications Corporation Limited in 2012. 
A second principle is interconnection, referring to the phys-
ical connection of different operator networks. The lack of in-
terconnection rules for transparent cost-based wholesale pric-
ing has often resulted in the use of multiple SIM cards since it 
is cheaper to call on the same network (on-net) than to make 
calls across networks (off-net). A number of African regulators 
have established cost-based wholesale prices for mobile voice 
and text. 
The principles recognise the right of countries to adopt 
universal service mechanisms administered in a transparent, 
non-discriminatory and neutral manner. This is particularly 
important for sub-Saharan Africa where there is a wide gulf be-
tween ICT facilities and access in urban and rural areas. Many 
countries in the region have struggled with the design of ef-
fective universal service programs. Often the type of universal 
service initiative has not had widespread impact, resulting in an 
ongoing digital divide between urban and rural zones. While 
many African countries collect funding for universal service 
through a levy on operators, they have not always been effective 
in dispersing the money. One study found that most universal 
service funds in the region had “deficiencies in fund structure, 
management and operation” requiring “significant reform and 
restructuring in order to be transformed into functional and 
effective investment support vehicles for unserved and under-
served areas”31. Contributions to universal service funds com-
bined with other sector specific taxes are burdensome in some 
countries, diverting money from investment and raising prices 
for consumers32. 
31 GSMA, Sub-Saharan Africa – Universal Service Fund study, 2014. 
32 M. Rogers and X. Pedros, Taxing mobile connectivity in Sub-Saharan Africa: A review 
of  mobile sector taxation and its impact on digital inclusion, GSMA, 2017. 
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Rules about licensing requirements for market entry are not 
always transparent. This includes distinguishing between types 
of licenses, when they are needed and publicly available infor-
mation about licensing criteria (i.e. period of time required to 
reach a decision, terms and conditions, etc.). One challenge 
is pricing licenses correctly in order to attract strong players 
while, at the same time, not charging so much as to discourage 
market entry or result in higher prices for consumers. 
The establishment of an independent sector regulator is an-
other key principle. The regulatory agency should be separate 
from suppliers of telecommunications services. The decisions of 
and the procedures used by regulators should be impartial with 
respect to all market participants. While most African countries 
have established an ICT sector regulatory agency, in practice 
some struggle for independence due to the continuing govern-
ment ownership in incumbent operators.  
Finally, in the African context where most access is through 
wireless networks that require frequency spectrum, efficient 
mechanisms and transparent procedures are needed for the 
allocation of scarce resources, such as frequencies, numbers 
and rights of way. This is related to the licensing issue, as fre-
quency is sometimes offered at unsustainable prices that affect 
proper market functioning33 or there is no strategic impetus to 
develop an efficient spectrum allocation mechanism, resulting 
in bottlenecks in the deployment of frequency-hungry mobile 
broadband networks. 
Besides these principles, effective ICT strategies are vital to 
providing guidance and accountability as well as to describing 
how digital technologies fit in with overall national develop-
ment plans. The most effective ICT strategies are those with 
realistic targets and corresponding budgets and mechanisms 
for monitoring and evaluation. Ongoing multi-year plans offer 
some predictability about the government’s direction for the 
sector, providing reassurance for the private sector. 
33 UN-OHRLLS, Leveraging Investments in Broadband for National Development:…, cit.
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The quality of competition also appears to matter. The 
strength of telecommunication operators, their experience from 
operations in other countries and scale seem to make a differ-
ence. This is the case in Mali, which saw mobile penetration rise 
to over 100 subscriptions per 100 people due to intense compe-
tition between two powerful operators, subsidiaries of France’s 
Orange and Morocco’s Telecom with extensive operations in 
sub-Saharan Africa34. 
Moreover, digital skills across various domains are essential 
for sub-Saharan Africa to successfully exploit ICT opportuni-
ties. Governments need the right skills to create policies and 
regulate the sector. Technical skills are needed across sectors to 
develop ICT applications and services while digital literacy is 
essential for citizens to make productive use of the internet. The 
transition to internet is a challenge because it requires a higher 
level of skills than simply making telephone calls or sending 
text messages. Rwanda has launched an ambitious target of 
providing digital literacy to five million citizens over four years 
through a digital ambassador program that sends young people 
around the country to provide the training35. If the initiative is 
successful, it could boost internet penetration to 85% and serve 
as a model for other countries in the region. 
Finally, the need to stimulate innovation is critical for trig-
gering new uses for ICTs that benefit the economy and society. 
Most innovation frameworks are based on top-down theories. 
These models see innovation output reflected by patents, trade-
marks, and scientific journal citations and driven by National 
Innovation Strategies with emphasis on large scale Research 
and Development (R&D). The difference between top-down 
R&D-based innovation and the generation of bottom-up ideas 
is particularly important in emerging economies where “inno-
vation in developing countries is more incremental than radical 
34 “Télécoms: match serré entre Orange et Sotelma”, Jeune Afrique, 20 October 
2010. 
35 ITU, ICTs, LDCs and the SDGs: Achieving universal and affordable internet in the 
least developed countries, 2018.
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and takes place in an informal setting more often than it does 
in formal R&D laboratories.”36 Innovation in developing coun-
tries is often “under the radar” of traditional indicators such as 
patents and R&D37. Almost 80% of firms surveyed in Ghana 
reported introducing some form of innovation between 2011 
and 201338. Their biggest external constraints to innovation 
were markets dominated by large enterprises and institutional 
inflexibility regarding regulations and standards. As the 2015 
Global Innovation Index notes, governments need to encourage 
disruptive innovation that challenges traditional industries: “To 
succeed in innovation, nations need to do more than merely 
enable some value-added innovation to supplement what is al-
ready going on in other, leading economies. They need to en-
able disruptive innovation, which is often generated by new 
market entrants, especially those emerging in their own econo-
mies”. In Africa, thousands of entrepreneurial innovators have 
clustered in tech communities across the continent. A laissez–
faire attitude to bottom-up innovation has created the space for 
communities of entrepreneurs to experiment that likely would 
not have evolved so easily if there was direct government in-
volvement in the ecosystem itself39. 
Governance is a major challenge in the region and is an 
enormous factor for the impact ICT can have on development. 
Good governance generates the impetus to drive nations for-
ward through clear and transparent strategies and policies. This 
is particularly relevant in the ICT sector where many African 
36 Cornell University, INSEAD and WIPO, The Global Innovation Index 2015: 
Effective Innovation Policies for Development, Ithaca NY, Cornell University, 
2015.
37 G. Zanello, X. Fu, and G. Essegbey, Innovation Under the Radar in Low Income 
Countries: Evidence from Ghana, presented at UNU-WIDER Conference: “L2C - 
Learning to Compete: Industrial Development and Policy in Africa”, Helsinki, 
Finland, 24-25 June 2013.
38 X. Fu et al., Innovation in low income countries: A survey report, Growth Research 
Programme, November 2014. 
39 R. Firestone, The Importance of  Mapping Tech Hubs in Africa, and beyond, Washington 
D.C., World Bank, 24 August 2016. 
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governments have played a passive role. This has resulted in a 
mindset that licensing infrastructure providers is an end in it-
self and that impactful services and applications will magically 
follow. However, unless governments take a more active part, 
this is unlikely to happen. As a result, while the infrastructure 
is there, the gap in usage challenges the “build and they will 
come” theory40. At the same time, the foremost change affect-
ing governance has been advances in the use of information and 
communications technology. The internet, mobile communi-
cations and social networking have facilitated the transforma-
tion of public administration in some countries, and triggered 
a shift in the relationship between citizens and governments in 
others41. This has transformational potential for Africa if it can 
be properly leveraged42.
Five questions for discussion 
1. Africa’s success with digital technologies has main-
ly revolved around narrowband mobile technologies. 
Mobile money or text-based agricultural information 
for farmers are cases in point. Some argue that this is a 
good example of an appropriate technology where most 
users have basic phones. Others feel that the popularity 
of narrowband mobile is holding back the adoption of 
powerful technologies such as fourth- and fifth-gener-
ation wireless technologies and the Internet of Things 
(IoT) that could have a huge development impact for 
the region. What are the strengths and weaknesses of 
these viewpoints?
2.   Digital entrepreneurship and innovation are growing on 
the continent with a number of “Made in Africa” success 
stories such as mobile money and pay-as-you-go solar. 
40 UN-OHRLLS, Leveraging Investments in Broadband for National Development:…, cit.
41 UNDESA, UNDP, and UNESCO, Governance and Development, 2012. 
42 DANIDA Study, Using ICT to Promote Governance, 2012. 
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This needs to be fostered. Is the laissez faire government 
attitude helping the tech ecosystem or the lack of gov-
ernment support hindering it by not fostering the nec-
essary enabling environment that would make it more 
attractive to venture capital?
3.   African governments are adopting ambitious ICT sector 
plans and some are creating software parks. Do such 
top-down solutions foster development of the digi-
tal economy best? Or is bottom-up innovation to be 
encouraged?
4. .Government support for rural connectivity has been 
largely unsuccessful in Africa, where experiences with 
universal service funds have often been disappointing.43 
What models might reduce the digital gap between ur-
ban and rural areas? 
5.  Social media applications are popular due to the rela-
tively low level of skills needed to use them, but impact-
ful services such as online public services and e-com-
merce44 are lacking. One challenge is that the dominant 
platforms owned by huge global tech companies are in-
creasingly monopolising services and applications. On 
the one hand, it makes it difficult to compete with these 
platforms, while on the other myriad obstacles block 
the region from leveraging these platforms. How can 
Africa’s growing ICT infrastructure benefit from these 
dominant platforms?  
43 GSMA, Sub-Saharan Africa – Universal Service Fund Study…, cit. 
44 AliResearch, Inclusive Growth and E-Commerce: China’s Experience, 2017. 
5.  Peace and Security Challenges 
     in Africa
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Key facts
• Political violence and protest are increasing and shifting forms 
across Africa. Compared to rates in 2000, riots and protests have 
increased by 16%, while bombings and battles increased by 11% 
and 5% respectively. Attacks on civilians have increased by 8%.
• Political instability increased while wars decreased for two rea-
sons: domestic politics and political elites. Civil wars (defined 
here as activity by rebels) have decreased, suggesting that the over-
throw of state power, political exclusion and poverty are not the key 
motivations for armed groups. Rebel activity has decreased by 50% 
(down to 17% of all reported events in 2018, from 34% in 2004). 
In many countries violence is the manifestation of competition 
among powerful elites (including regional powers, splintered mili-
tary, fragmented internal regime competition, or established non-
state groups). There is no “end game” in these conflicts outside of 
power redistribution between a small cohort and violent stalemates.
• Differences in a country’s conflict type and intensity are motivated 
by patterns of governance within a state. The two most important 
characteristics in modern African conflicts are that multiple forms of 
violence occur simultaneously within a country but have a low level of 
spatial overlap. The type of governance practiced by regimes, including 
representation and treatment of different groups, is closely associated 
to the form of political violence that emerges therein. As government 
structures shift towards or away from democracy, decentralisation, or 
devolution, the type of conflict that emerges also changes. Civil war 
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violence often emerges from exclusive political environments, where 
large sections of the population are disenfranchised or marginalised. 
However, in transitioning and democratising states, violent compe-
tition often revolves around negotiating “who sits at the table” and 
“who gets what”. Clear cases of such violence are evident in Kenya, 
South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
• Even within major conflicts, multiple local forms of political 
violence proliferate. Violence has become more decentralised, at 
both state and non-state levels. Many sub-conflicts emerge from 
intersecting and volatile motivations and opportunities. The most 
common are political militias attacking civilians. This has several re-
percussions: civilians in the developing world are currently attacked 
by an increasing number, and type, of groups. For example, in the 
Congo-DRC, the likelihood that two attacks are perpetrated by the 
same organisation is 1 in 10 (down from 1 in 6 during the “war” 
period), despite the millions of dollars poured into “post-conflict” 
management.
• Conflict adapts to new circumstances. Conflict agents are actively 
adapting to incentives and to changes in their political, econom-
ic, social, and physical environments. Because many distinct, and 
discrete, conflict forms co-occur, groups “brand” themselves to cre-
ate an identity that will incorporate the highest number of possible 
supporters and financers. Jihadist groups and associated ‘terrorism’ 
across Africa emerged in cases that feature two dominant character-
istics: states that already had conflict and other, more typical, con-
flict-support identities (ethnic, regional, tribal) are already activated.
Political Islam allowed for a new cross-cutting identity to emerge 
and challenge existing cleavages.
Introduction
Compared to the general decline experienced in the 1990s, 
there has been a recent increase in disorder and insecurity across 
the world. Over the last 15 years, 53 countries have been, or 
currently are, affected by some type and level of political vio-
lence; their aggregated population is 3.34 billion or almost half 
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of the world’s population. Africa is one of the most affected are-
as for conflict. Almost every African country is affected by some 
form of political violence and disorder. One out of two people 
have been affected by, or live in proximity to, political violence. 
Peace is not the absence of violence. Conflict and peace tend 
to coexist with different levels of intensity in Africa, even after the 
formal end of a conflict. Living within a conflict-affected country 
does not mean that each and every community is directly impact-
ed by the same form of violence. There is tremendous subnational 
variation in conflict dynamics and patterns, and countries can be 
affected by a multiplicity of them, simultaneously. For example, 
forms of “terrorism” or extremist acts against civilians feature in 
many types of conflict. Terrorism occurs far more often in already 
conflicted areas than outside these zones; and the majority of vic-
tims of terrorism are those living in conflict-affected states.
One of the reasons that conflict has increased is that efforts to 
quell violence often focus on the wrong elements of unstable so-
cieties. Labelling a state “fragile” does not provide any insight into 
how the politics of that country creates an environment in which 
conflict flourishes. Often, explanations for violence are retroac-
tive, as the international community looks for grievances, poverty 
or many apolitical explanations (e.g. resources, climate, etc.). 
It is vital for policy makers to understand that conflict is the 
result of political competition. The strongest and most power-
ful in society contest each other, and often the state, to create 
advantages. Identifying the beneficiaries of such violence is cru-
cial to understanding how to end conflict. Further, states and 
regimes are not neutral, or absent, in governance and conflict; 
strong states – such as the Ethiopian government, at least until 
the recent leadership change – have often used violence strategi-
cally to further entrench power. Weak central states – such as the 
Central African Republic – are often one violent agent among 
many equals creating conflict for political survival.
This perspective emphasises that grievances are widespread, 
but they do not necessary lead to violence. Grievance-based ex-
planations for violence centre on exclusion and marginalisation. 
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In turn, efforts to promote inclusion are often presented as a 
“fix” to solve political problems in developing countries. But 
inclusion can lead to elite competition over access to power 
and state resources. In short, politics causes political violence. 
International community actions that legitimate political elites 
and political settlement often reinforce the “benefits” of vio-
lence for the strongest elites.
But development and violence are not mutually exclusive. 
In many lesser-developed states, income growth occurs during 
unstable periods. Periods of economic growth, albeit volatile, 
are occurring in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Kenya, 
Nigeria and Ethiopia. But countries that experienced both civil/
transnational wars and political instability often did not meet 
globally agreed upon development goals or significantly advance 
towards those goals in the past decade. These bleak facts suggest 
that it is difficult, if not impossible, to “develop out” of conflict.
Drivers of conflict and violence 
Political violence is a result of domestic politics
The driver of political violence is domestic politics, including 
representation, identity politics and state capacity.  Regimes 
are not neutral actors: how governments govern their territo-
ries makes different subnational groups more or less likely to 
contest the state. Before the recent government change, the sit-
uation with the marginalised Ethiopian Oromo, compared to 
their favoured Tigrayian neighbours, was such a case in point. 
However, conflict can also come from competition within the 
regime between strong members: consider the beginning of the 
South Sudanese war, the tensions in Zimbabwe during elec-
tions, or the violence in Libya as strongmen sought to replace 
Ghaddafi. Current research on the dynamics of exclusion and 
inclusion, patronage, resource revenues, competition, corrup-
tion and elites argue that it is not only the fact of being excluded 
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that correlates to higher violence, but also the nature and terms 
of inclusion itself, which can be conflict-generating. 
A “national” approach to governance suggests that civil wars 
are less likely to occur in democratic and autocratic states and 
far more likely to occur in countries with transitioning insti-
tutions1. Political repression and exclusion in autocratic re-
gimes can drive civil war2. Recent events, including the Arab 
Spring, have shaken conventional wisdom on autocratic stabil-
ity. Autocrats’ attempts to suppress rebellion may also backfire 
when the state’s capacity is weakened (in times of budgetary 
crisis) or repression takes the form of violence3, and generally, 
political change heightens the risk of civil war and domestic po-
litical instability4. Other forms of conflict – such as competitive 
1 J. Goodwin and T. Skocpol, “Explaining revolutions in the contemporary Third 
World”, Politics and Society, vol. 17, no. 4, 1989, pp. 489-509; M. Krain and M. 
Edson Myers, “Democracy and civil war: A note on the democratic peace prop-
osition”, International Interactions, vol. 23, no. 1, 1997, pp. 109-118; H. Hegre et al., 
“Toward a democratic civil peace? Democracy, political change, and civil war, 
1816-1992”, American Political Science Review, vol. 95, no. 1, 2001, pp. 33-48; N. 
Sambanis, “Do ethnic and nonethnic civil wars have the same causes? A the-
oretical and empirical inquiry”, Journal of  Conflict Resolution, vol. 45, no. 3, 2001, 
pp. 259-282; M. Reynal-Querol, “Ethnicity, political systems, and civil wars”, 
Journal of  Conflict Resolution, vol. 46, no. 1, 2002, pp. 29-54; J. Fearon and D. Laitin, 
“Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war”, American Political Science Review, vol. 97, no. 
1, 2003, pp. 75-90.
2 T.R. Gurr, “Why minorities rebel: A global analysis of  communal mobiliza-
tion and conflict since 1945”, International Political Science Review, vol. 14, no. 2, 
1993, pp. 161-201; Idem, Peoples versus states: Minorities at risk in the New Century, 
Washington D.C., United States Institute of  Peace, 2000;  L.-E. Cederman, A. 
Wimmer, and B. Min. 2010, “Why do ethnic groups rebel? New data and analy-
sis”, World Politics, vol. 62, no. 1, 2010, pp. 87-119.
3 A. Wimmer, “Who owns the state? Understanding ethnic conflict in post-colo-
nial societies”, Nations and Nationalism, vol. 3, no. 4, 1997, pp. 631-665.
4 S.P. Huntington, “Democracy’s third wave”, Journal of  Democracy, vol. 2, no. 2, 
1991, pp. 12-34; S. Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action 
and Politics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994; Y. Sahin and J.J. Linz, 
Between State: Interim Governments and Democratic Transitions, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1995; M. Bratton and N. van de Walle, Democratic Experiments 
in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective, Cambridge, Cambridge 
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militia violence – are more common in democracies5. But the 
expansion of democracy has not resolved conflict-generating 
processes in fragile and developing contexts.
Increasingly, the terms of inclusion within transitioning 
government – the distribution of positions, authority, and re-
sources among included elites – incentivise domestic political 
instability across states6. Members of groups included in regime 
hierarchies are more likely to engage in domestic political insta-
bility, and members of politically irrelevant communities typi-
cally engage in local, community-based violence7.
The expansion of democracy has not resolved conflict-gener-
ating processes in fragile and developing contexts8. Power dis-
tribution across parliaments, judiciaries and the military and 
decentralisation and election monitoring increase the number 
and power of non-regime elites shaping government policy. In 
turn, this leads to high levels of elite competition and fragmen-
tation over access to state resources and power across African 
states in particular9. Within systems where political office has 
University Press, 1997; H. Hegre et al. (2001).
5 H.J. Choi and C. Raleigh, “Dominant forms of  conflict in changing political 
systems”, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 59, no. 1, 2014, pp. 158-171.
6 A.M. Fischer, Resolving the theoretical ambiguities of  social exclusion with reference 
to polarisation and conflict, Social Exclusion DESTIN Working Paper, January 
2008; S. Lindemann, Do Inclusive Elite Bargains Matter? A Research Framework for 
Understanding the Causes of  Civil War in Sub-Saharan Africa, Crisis States Discussion 
Paper, 15 February 2008.
7 C. Raleigh, “Political hierarchies and landscapes of  conflict across Africa”, 
Political Geography, vol. 42, 2014a, pp. 92-103.
8 M. Bratton and E.C.C. Chang, “State building and democratization in sub-Sa-
haran Africa: Forwards, backwards, or together?”, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 
39, no. 9, 2006, pp. 1059-1083; D. Branch and N. Cheeseman, “Democratization, 
sequencing and state failure in Africa: Lessons from Kenya”, African Affairs, vol. 
108, no. 430, 2009, pp. 1-26; C. Raleigh, “Pragmatic and promiscuous: Explaining 
the rise of  competitive militias across Africa”, Journal of  Conflict Resolution, pub-
lished online ahead of  print, 2014b, DOI: 10.1177/0022002714540472.
9 A.  Lijphart, Democracy in plural societies, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1977; 
D. Brancati, “Decentralization: Fueling the fire or dampening the flames of  eth-
nic conflict and secessionism?”, International Organization, vol. 60, no. 3, 2011, pp. 
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redistributive implications10, incumbents and opponents have 
incentives to design forms of violence to assure access to power. 
Hence, using violence to secure a position in government is an 
effective tool for competing elites (including members of gov-
ernment) where the stakes of competition are exceedingly high.
Periods of specific political competition can incentivise vio-
lence: elections can be a testament to the participatory nature 
of democracies, but electoral violence is disturbingly common. 
Election violence is common in African states11 and transition-
ing democracies more generally12 because it often benefits the 
organizers, who do not suffer significant consequences13. Many 
agents in new democracies depend on violence to create cleav-
ages in society that elites can manipulate.
Democratic competition, electoral politics and political set-
tlement negotiation may instead lead to new manifestations 
of violence, as elites adapt familiar tactics and strategies (of a 
violent nature) to negotiate and improve their position in com-
petitive politics. Mounting domestic political instability is as-
sociated with the proliferation of violent actors such as political 
militias.  Militias use violence as a means to shape and influence 
the existing political system, but do not seek to overthrow na-
tional regimes. They often operate as armed gangs for different 
651-685.
10 A. Schedler, Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of  Unfree Competition, 
Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner, 2006; J. Gandhi and E. Lust-Okar. “Elections un-
der authoritarianism”, Annual Review of  Political Science, vol. 12, 2009, pp. 403-422; 
L.R. Arriola and J. Chelsea “Electoral violence in democratizing states”, 2012.
11 P. Collier and P. Vicente, “Violence, bribery, and fraud: the political econo-
my of  elections in Sub-Saharan Africa”, Public Choice, vol. 153, no. 1, 2012, pp. 
117-147; U.E. Daxecker, “All quiet on election day? International election ob-
servation and incentives for pre-election violence in African elections”, Electoral 
Studies, vol. 34, 2014, pp. 232-243.
12 E.M. Hafner-Burton, S.D. Hyde, and R.S. Jablonski, “When do governments 
resort to election violence?”, British Journal of  Political Science, vol. 44, no. 1, 2014, 
pp. 149-179.
13 S. Brown and C.L. Sriram, “The big fish won’t fry themselves: Criminal ac-
countability for post-election violence in Kenya”, African Affairs, vol. 111, no. 
443, 2012, pp. 244-260.
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political elites, including politicians, governments, and oppo-
sition groups14. These violent competitions are still based on 
community grievances (perceived or real), problematic and in-
consistent governance and limited economic development. 
Therefore, conflict adapts to political contexts. Different po-
litical structures across countries or in the same country over 
time are more likely to give rise to specific forms of conflict. A 
country that develops from an autocracy to a democracy will be 
less likely to experience civil and transnational war and more 
likely to incur domestic political instability15. Hence, democ-
ratisation processes do not eradicate political violence. Instead, 
they can give rise to more forms of conflict (other than civil and 
transnational war). 
Capable states, incapable regimes
Much of the evidence on intra-state conflicts explains local 
differences in violence as a result of state capacity vacuums16, 
weak legitimacy17 regime characteristics18 or a breakdown of 
order19. Increasingly, subnational analysis reveals that the pres-
ence, depth and actions of government vary across the state. 
Significant evidence suggests that the power, reach, capacity and 
type of governance differs within and across countries and cre-
ates variable levels of political power, livelihood vulnerabilities 
14 C. Raleigh (2014b).
15 H.J. Choi and C. Raleigh (2014). 
16 D. Sobek, “Masters of  their domains: The role of  state capacity in civil wars”, 
Journal of  Peace Research, vol. 47, no. 3, 2010, pp. 267-271; C. Hendrix, “Measuring 
state capacity: Theoretical and empirical implications for the study of  civil con-
flict”, Journal of  Peace Research, vol. 47, no. 3, 2010, pp. 273-285; C. Thies, “Of  
rulers, rebels, and revenue: state capacity, civil war onset, and primary commodi-
ties”, Journal of  Peace Research, vol. 47, no. 3, 2010, pp. 321-332.
17 C. Clapham, Africa and the International System, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1996; P. Englebert, State Legitimacy and Development in Africa, London, Lynne 
Rienner, 2000.
18 See H. Hegre et al. (2001).
19 W. Reno, Warfare in Independent Africa, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2011.
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and collective action capabilities. States are non-neutral actors, 
who can be intentionally incapable of governing across their ter-
ritories and institutions, deny their responsibilities to the public 
and use political disorder or absence as a form of politics20. 
Where states have failed to govern effectively, due to inca-
pacity or challenge, local political elites become significant loci 
of power, capacity, influence and support. In fragile situations, 
hybrid or parallel structures operate. They can be forces of 
deep repression and violence, to the detriment of local popu-
lations; governments may also be a force for good, providing 
much-needed services21. Conflicts such as the one in the Lake 
Chad Basin22, the Ituri conflict in Congo23 and the northern 
Mali pre-crisis in 2011 all share a similar logic: the withering 
away of the state, allowing local elites to replace state authori-
ty24. As a result, there is little evidence of “ungoverned spaces” 
20 R. Batley, “Engaged or divorced? Cross-service findings on government rela-
tions with non-state service-providers”, Non-state Provision of  Basic Services, vol. 
26, no. 3, 2006, pp. 241-251; A. Joshi and M. Moore, “Institutionalised co-pro-
duction: Unorthodox public service delivery in challenging environments”, The 
Journal of  Development Studies, vol. 40, no. 4, 2004, pp. 31-49; C.J. Scott, Seeing Like 
a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed, New Haven, 
Yale University Press, 1999; S. Unsworth, An Upside Down View of  Governance, 
Brighton, Institute of  Development Studies, 2010; P. Chabal and J.-P. Daloz, 
Africa Works: Disorder as a Political Instrument, Oxford, James Currey, 1999.
21 K. Ananth Pur and M. Moore, “Ambiguous institutions: Traditional govern-
ance and local democracy in rural South India”, Journal of  Development Studies, 
vol. 46, no. 4, 2010, pp. 603-623; A. Joshi and M. Moore (2004); R.C. Crook and 
D. Booth, “Conclusion: Rethinking African governance and development”, IDS 
Bulletin no. 42, 2011, pp. 97-101; Z.C. Mampilly, Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance 
and Civilian Life during War, London, Cornell University Press, 2011.
22 J. Roitman, “New sovereigns? Regulatory authority in the Chad Basin”, in T. 
Callaghy, R. Kassmir, and R. Latham (Eds.) Intervention and Transnationalism in 
Africa Global-Local Networks of  Power, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2001, pp. 240-263.
23 K. Vlassenroot and T. Raeymaekers (Eds.), Conflict and social transformation in 
Eastern DR Congo, Gent, Academia Press, 2004.
24 P. Justino, Nutrition, governance and violence: A framework for the analysis of  resil-
ience and vulnerability to food insecurity in contexts of  violent conflict, HiCN Working 
Papers 132, Households in Conflict Network, 2012; P. Justino, T. Brück, and P. 
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in fragile states because those areas are where local governance 
is stronger than national governance25.
Economic marginalisation, uneven development 
and a country’s geography can increase the feasibility 
of collective action and armed strategies
The causal relationship between poverty, grievances and ine-
quality constitutes the most significant debate in development 
and conflict research. Poverty has an inconsistent relationship 
with conflict. Some evidence shows that violent conflict is most 
likely to break out in low-income areas, even if the state is not, 
overall, particularly poor and in areas that diverge significantly 
from national income averages26. Poorer areas are more likely to 
experience increased conflict-related deaths27; higher levels of 
poverty lead to higher rates of homicide28. Some studies have 
found a close relationship between certain forms of conflict 
Verwimp, Research and policy implications from a micro-level perspective on the dynamics of  
conflict, violence and development, HiCN Working Papers 139, Households in Conflict 
Network, 2013; S. Kalyvas, “The ontology of  ‘political violence’: Action and 
identity in civil wars”, Perspective on Politics, vol. 1, no. 3, 2003, pp. 475-494; Idem, 
“Ethnic defection in civil war”, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 4, no. 8, 2008, pp. 
1043-1068.
25 C. Dowd and C. Raleigh, “The myth of  global Islamic terrorism and local con-
flict in Mali and the Sahel”, African Affairs, vol. 112, no. 448, 2013, pp. 498-509.
26 H. Buhaug et al., “It’s the local economy, stupid! Geographic wealth dispersion 
and conflict outbreak location”, Journal of  Conflict Resolution, vol. 55, no. 5, 2011, 
pp. 814-840.
27 Q.-T. Do and L. Iyer, “Geography, poverty and conflict in Nepal”, Journal of  
Peace Research, vol. 47, no. 6, 2010, pp. 735-748.
28 D. Soo Chon, “Contributing factors for high homicide rate in Latin America: 
A critical test of  Neapolitan’s regional subculture of  violence thesis”, Journal of  
Family Violence, vol. 26, no. 4, 2011, pp. 299-307; W. Pridemore, “A methodo-
logical addition to the cross-national empirical literature on social structure and 
homicide: A first test of  the poverty-homicide thesis”, Criminology, vol. 46, no. 1, 
2008, pp. 133-154; C. Moser and C. McIlwaine, “Latin American urban violence 
as a development concern: Towards a framework for violence reduction”, World 
Development, vol. 34, no. 1, 2006, pp. 89-112.
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(for example, lower-intensity conflict) and poverty29; as well 
as variations in the significance of poverty at various stages of 
conflict30.
The poorest neither motivate nor participate in most con-
flicts. Transient poverty can play a role in conflicts where high 
levels of grievances pre-exist. Chronic poverty, however, de-
creases the likelihood of conflict by reducing the mobilisation 
capacity of the poorest groups. Political inequalities remain a 
persistent problem where “excluded” groups experience relative 
deprivation, in contrast to the favoured position of ‘included’ 
communities. This results in differential access to and exercise 
of power, with consequences for government policies, and relat-
ed socio-economic inequalities31. Economic exclusion leads to 
limited access to public offices32, poorer levels of health and ed-
ucation, greater income inequalities33, and limited public good 
provision34)35. 
29 See on conflict in Indonesia: M. Pradhan, P. Barron, and Kai Kaiser, Local con-
flict in Indonesia: Measuring incidence and identifying patterns, Washington D.C., World 
Bank, 2004. 
30 See on conflict in Colombia: S.M. Murshed and S. Gates, Spatial Horizontal 
Inequality and the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal, UNU-WIDER, Research Paper no. 
2003/43, 2004.
31 F. Stewart, “Inequality in political power: A fundamental (and overlooked) 
dimension of  inequality”, European Journal of  Development Research, vol. 23, no. 4, 
2011, pp. 541-545.
32 Y. Bangura, Ethnic inequalities and public sector governance, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 
2006.
33 F. Stewart, Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in 
Multiethnic Societies, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan,  2008.
34 R. La Porta et al., “The quality of  government”, Journal of  Law, Economics and 
Organization, vol. 15, no. 1, 1999, pp. 222-279.
35 Contrary to perceptions of  state inclusion, favouritism, and nepotism, commu-
nities with co-ethnics in power do not consistently have disproportionate access 
to powerful positions or public goods over other areas without such standing (K. 
Kasara, “Tax me if  you can: Ethnic geography, democracy and the taxation of  
agriculture in Africa”, American Political Science Review, vol. 101, no. 1, 2007, pp. 
159-172; L.R. Arriola, “Patronage and political stability in Africa”, Comparative 
Political Studies, vol. 42, no. 10, 2009, pp. 1339-1362; P. Francois, I. Rainer, and F. 
Trebbi, The dictator’s inner circle, NBER Working Paper no. 20214, Issued in June 
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The ability to finance a conflict is different from the role pov-
erty plays in motivating conflicts. Access to resources is impor-
tant as an enabling factor by making violence more feasible, but 
it is not a cause. Early research focused on natural and precious 
resources, while recent research has considered both criminal 
resources and aid as contributions to income. Narcotics pro-
duction, as research confirms, is boosted by armed conflict, 
and the resulting drug trade enables insurgents to finance their 
struggle. Homicides, however, are higher in countries that 
serve as money-laundering sites rather than drug-producing 
and transit countries (many West African and Sahel states are 
ready examples of this phenomena). Foreign aid has a complex 
relationship with violence: aid has been found to increase the 
attraction of the state to rebel competitors. At the same time, 
it is plausible that aid increases a state’s capacity to repress any 
competitors and opponents.
An abundance of natural resources influences violence patterns: 
opportunities to loot and exploit resources increases the feasibil-
ity of civil and transnational wars36. Without the ability to loot/
predate or finance, sustained rebellion may not be feasible. This 
finding is questioned, however, particularly at the subnational lev-
el. The presence of oil or other precious resources can increase the 
risk of civil wars, while others find that the “greed” narrative for 
resource wealth tends to obscure the impacts of inequality37. Yet 
there is a widening understanding of what can be used as violence 
financing, which has led to a focus on aid, illicit goods and the 
links between organised crime and political violence.
2014). Hence, the “exclusion” argument can be quite difficult to prove.
36 P. Collier and A. Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War, Working Paper No. 
2355, World Bank, Washington D.C. 2000; P. Collier and A. Hoeffler, Greed and 
grievance in civil war, Oxford Economic Papers, 56, 2004, pp. 563-595; P. Collier, 
A. Hoeffler, and M. Söderbom, “On the duration of  civil war”, Journal of  Peace 
Research, vol. 41, no. 3, 2004, pp. 253-273; P. Collier, A. Hoeffler and D. Rohner, 
Beyond greed and grievance: Feasibility and civil war, Oxford Economic Papers, 61, 
2009, pp. 1-27.
37 M.E. Sorli, N.P. Gleditsch, and H. Strand, “Why is there so much conflict in 
the Middle East?”, Journal of  Conflict Resolution, vol. 49, no. 1, 2005, pp. 141-165.
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Demographic and environmental factors can create trigger 
conditions for violence. Empirical studies on the relationship 
between climate and conflict do not confirm a causal link be-
tween the two, despite the co-occurrence of these problems 
within developing states. There is little evidence of a direct re-
lationship between climate variability and violent conflict; any 
effect of climate is mediated through pre-existing violence and 
social conditions that produce conflict. Trends in the geogra-
phy of violence emphasise that urban areas are an increasingly 
crucial site of political contestation and violent confrontation, 
while rural, peripheral areas experience lower levels of violence 
as a consequence of the decline of civil wars.
Data and trends analysis
The patterns noted below are generated from the Armed 
Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). This is a 
disaggregated conflict collection, analysis and crisis-mapping 
project. ACLED collects the dates, actors, types of violence, 
locations and fatalities of all reported political violence and pro-
test events across Africa.
 “Political violence and protest” includes events that occur dur-
ing civil wars and periods of instability, public protests and re-
gime breakdowns. ACLED’s aim is to capture the forms, actors, 
dates and locations of political violence and protest as it occurs 
across states38. 
38 ACLED has collected Africa data since 2001. The details of  the collection are 
available at acleddata.com. All the details of  the collection methodology, sources 
and collections can be found at acleddata.com/resources/general-guides/ and 
acleddata.com/resources/methodology/. All historical and real-time data can be 
downloaded at acleddata.com/data.  ACLED altered its collection methodolo-
gy in 2010-2011, which (along with increasing availability of  sources) increased 
the number of  events collected. However, despite the increase based on source 
availability, there is clear evidence that the number of  events, controlling for the 
number of  sources, have also increased. This is particularly true for rioting and 
protest demonstrations.
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Conflict and protest numbers
Evidence from the ACLED dataset demonstrates that conflict 
in Africa increased from 2010-2011. Several forms of political 
violence are included in this count, not just interstate or civil 
wars (Figure 1). 
Civilian targeting has become more prevalent, largely as a 
result of violence perpetrated by political militias (actors not 
included in most conflict datasets). Tactics of remote violence 
(i.e. bombing, which is not specifically coded by most conflict 
datasets) have become more prevalent and lethal and are now at 
their highest reported levels. Meanwhile, every type of actor has 
reportedly committed violence more frequently in recent years.
Tab. 1 - 2000-2018 event counts and proportions
Event types Count Proportion
Battles 42,782 29.5%
Remote violence 9,786 8%
Violence against civilians 41,835 29%
Riots/protests 41,348 28.5%
Strategic nonviolent developments 9,467 7%
The rising number of violent incidents across the continent 
over the last several years is largely driven by violence in four 
countries, namely Nigeria (especially Boko Haram’s terrorist ac-
tivity), Libya (increased use of remote violence tactics), Somalia 
(where Al Shabaab violence persists), Congo-DRC and South 
Sudan (Figure 2)1.
1 Whether increases in conflict event numbers are a function of  reporting is 
taken into account here. Any disaggregated conflict data project should be clear 
about sourcing, levels of  change in source materials, scales of  sourcing, and 
reliability. ACLED has produced two working papers on this subject (G. Duffy, 
Central African Republic, ACLED Country Report, January 2015) to conclude 
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In selected cases, conflict has become less deadly (with each 
conflict event resulting in fewer fatalities): the ratio of events/
fatalities has decreased in several countries that were particularly 
violent (e.g. South Sudan, Somalia, Sudan, the Central African 
Republic, and the Democratic Republic of Congo). There are, 
however, exceptions to this trend: the ratio of events/fatalities 
has nearly doubled in Nigeria and more than doubled in Libya.
 
Fig. 1 - Over time patterns, 2007-2017
 
that while the number of  available local and national sources has increased, this 
alone cannot account for the increases in events. This trend is largely driven by 
the increase in riots and protests that have been reported in recent years.
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Civilians are most at risk in Somalia, Burundi, South Sudan, 
Nigeria, Sudan and DRC, where 400 instances of violence 
against civilians (per country) were reported in 2017. Civilian 
targeting accounted for more than half of the reported, organ-
ised, armed conflict events in Burundi (96%), Sudan (68%), 
Kenya (59%) and Nigeria (51%)2. Violence against civilians 
was also responsible for significant shares of organised armed 
violence in DRC (41%) and Somalia (30%).
Fatality data and different ways to gauge 
intensity and frequency
ACLED has several rules about fatalities numbers, sourcing and 
reporting: ACLED does not have a fatality threshold for event 
inclusion. This means that conflict and demonstration events in 
ACLED do not have to produce any fatalities in order to be in-
cluded as a valid event. No arbitrary number of deaths defines a 
conflict. ACLED reports fatalities only when a reputable source has 
relayed that information. Further, researchers seek out information 
to triangulate – where and when possible – the numbers from any 
report. ACLED uses the most conservative estimate available, and 
will revise and correct the totals – upward or downward – when 
better information comes available. ACLED advises caution in using 
all fatality numbers from its, or any other conflict data source. Fatality 
information is the most biased, and least accurate, part of any conflict 
report and extreme caution should be employed when using any fatality 
number to show patterns.  
As shown in Figure 3, militias and state forces are more re-
sponsible for attacks than rebels and international forces. The 
presence of militias and state forces suggests that decentralised 
violence is proliferating against civilians and multiple diverse, 
localised militias attack civilians more than coordinated groups. 
2 Organised, armed violence refers to battles, remote violence, and violence 
against civilians, specifically; riots and protests are not accounted for in these 
totals.
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Fig. 2 - Top 15 states with armed organised violence 
across Africa
Agents of violence
Since 1997, the profile of perpetrators of political violence on 
the African continent has changed. While a variety of actors has 
engaged in violence over recent years (Figure 4), political con-
flict is perpetuated, primarily, by political militias and govern-
mental armed forces. The results show a steady rise, over time, 
in the number of incidents attributed to political militias3. 
3 Militias use violence as a means to shape and influence the existing political 
system, but do not seek to overthrow national regimes. They often operate as 
armed gangs for different political elites, including politicians, governments, and 
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Fig. 3 - Map of civilian attacks
Fatalities related to such attacks increased dramatically from 
2009 to 2014 (from 3,190 fatalities in 2009 to 21,154 fatalities 
in 2014).
Political militias have been the most active armed groups 
over the last ten years and account for over 36% of all political 
violence in 2017, decreasing from 41% in 20164. Their engage-
opposition groups (Raleigh, 2014b).
4 Rioters and protesters are excluded for this tally as a) they involve civilians and 
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ment in violence surpassed that of rebel forces (in 2001) and 
of government forces (in 2014) – although state forces have 
rebounded.
In 2017, political militia activity largely involved targeting 
civilians and battles with government forces. Civilian targeting 
accounted for over half of all political militia activity (63%) 
resulting in almost 6,000 fatalities (1,500 more than in 2016). 
Meanwhile, political militia actions against government forces 
decreased from 3,800 in 2016 to 2,700 in 2017.  
Furthermore, as Figure 4 shows, although all groups in-
creased their engagement in violence, militias show the greatest 
proliferation (among armed, organised groups). 
Fig. 4 - Group type proportion activity
are not armed, organised violence and b) their inclusion can distort the patterns 
of  overt violent activity.
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Fig. 5 - Changes in group activity type
 
Islamic extremism
Islamist activity across Africa has received considerable at-
tention. Violent political groups across Africa are increasing-
ly assuming a motivation in political Islam; coupled with the 
growth of Islam across African states and the marginalisation 
of many Muslim communities, this has proved a potent combi-
nation. Recent high-profile conflicts (including in the Sahel, 
Somalia and northern Nigeria) are mobilised around Islamist or 
“extremist” ideologies and accompanied by the widespread use 
of terrorist tactics. The mobilisation of conflict around these 
ideologies reflects key shifts and adaptations in conflict forms in 
recent years. Violence under similar ideologies may be relatively 
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new in some contexts, but the underlying drivers of conflict are 
no different from previous instances of violence in the same 
context5. What is different about violent Islamist groups is their 
ability to mobilise a larger number of fighters under a broader 
Islamist identity, rather than a narrower communal or ethnic 
identity. This has, in turn, improved their ability to draw finan-
cial, logistical and troop support for violent Islamist struggles 
around the world. Also, they can point to opportunities to cre-
ate alternative governance structures under Islamist rule in col-
lapsing or profoundly fragile contexts (including in Somalia).
There are two main dimensions to the Islamist threat. The 
first concerns areas of opportunity for Islamist groups to 
emerge, i.e. poor governance and external interests6. The second 
is that multinational groups (al-Qaeda and Islamic State) ac-
tively recruit smaller, local groups into a “franchise movement”. 
These groups – especially al-Qaeda – act as mediators among 
these community-based groups. This allows internationally ac-
tive groups to be present and active in several countries. While 
the threats of IS and al-Qaeda are publicly known to be em-
bedded in conflicts across Nigeria and Somalia, the threat of 
these groups is less understood, but it is, arguably, as deadly and 
dangerous across the Sahel.
A recent report by ACLED reveals the networks of Islamist 
and non-Islamist groups operating in the Sahel. These net-
works demonstrate the successful co-optation by Islamist or-
ganisations of both sympathetic and non-ideological groups. 
This trend is significant because of the inability of national gov-
ernments to successfully co-opt and operate in areas that are 
effectively overtaken by Islamist networks. This is not a result 
of “ungoverned territory”, but rather the absence of a national 
government and the proliferation of other forms of subnational 
5 C. Dowd, “Cultural and religious demography and violent Islamist groups in 
Africa”, Political Geography, vol. 45, 2015, pp. 11-21.
6 See C. Dowd, “Fragmentation, conflict, and competition: Islamist anti-civil-
ian violence in sub-Saharan Africa”, Terrorism and Political Violence, 2016, DOI: 
10.1080/09546553.2016.1233870.
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authority, as shown in Figure 67. Islamist violence may be par-
ticularly difficult to address with current peacebuilding policies, 
as a negotiated political settlement may not be an aspiration for 
violent Islamist groups in some contexts.
Riots, protests and remote violence
The most evident changes in the modalities of conflict across 
Africa are in remote violence (bombing), and riots and pro-
tests8. The use of remote violence is becoming more common 
and deadlier in conflict zones around the world, and Africa 
is no exception9. Remote violence  is defined by ACLED as a 
violent event where a spatially removed group determines the 
time, place and victims of the attack using an explosive device. 
In these types of events, engaging in conflict does not require 
the physical presence of the perpetrator, since the job is carried 
out through bombings, improvised explosive device (IED) at-
tacks, missile attacks, etc. 
7 For further notes and a table of  alliances, see https://www.acleddata. 
com/2018/03/21/targeting-of-the-islamic-state-in-the-greater-sahara-isgs/. 
Map by Melissa Pavlik and content by Heni Nsaibia.
8 Theorists argue that tools of  remote violence are symbolic weapons, which can 
be used to demonstrate a regime’s vulnerability to violence or a government’s 
inability to protect its citizens (G.H. McCormick and F. Giordano, “Things come 
together: symbolic violence and guerrilla mobilisation”, Third World Quarterly, vol. 
28, no. 2, 2007, pp. 259-320). By targeting agents of  the state, civilians, popular 
monuments, or symbols, conflict actors can use these weapons to undermine 
confidence in the government and coerce public opinion and government pol-
icies (A. Merari, “Terrorism as a strategy of  insurgency”, Terrorism and Political 
Violence, vol. 5, no. 4, 2007, pp. 213-251). For non-state actors such as political 
militias that are weaker than government forces, remote violence is an ideal tactic 
to either damage state forces with minimal risk or to coerce the state without 
controlling it. This tactic also fits into a strategy of  groups resorting to so-called 
“weapons of  the weak” after losing territory and influence, which has been ob-
served in numerous settings, including Afghanistan (J. Denselow, “Reclaiming 
the humanitarian space”, The Guardian, 7 August 2010).
9 ACLED,  Version 5 Data, 2015, http://www.acleddata.com/data/acled- 
versions-1-5-data-1997-2014/.
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Fig. 6 - Networks of armed organised agents across Mali
As governments consolidate their control over the territory 
and as credible attempts to usurp state power decrease, remote 
violence might become a more frequent element of African 
conflicts, as it removes the state from direct combat. There are 
two additional reasons for the increase in remote violence. The 
first is the recent proliferation of state-based conflicts in North 
Africa, where the capacity of regimes is higher and mirrored by 
the capacity of the non-state agents. The second is that external 
agents have increased their role in African conflicts and are of-
ten much better equipped with new technologies. 
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Remote violence constitutes 7% of all reported events, but 
these events are clustered in a few countries: Somalia (where 
half of all remote violence occurred), Libya, Egypt, Mali, 
Nigeria and Tunisia. Governments are increasingly using these 
tools. International agents constituted approximately 3-4% of 
all the organisations active in conflict across Africa in the past 
five years. Within that period, over 40% of their activity was 
remote violence, while that period’s average rate of remote vi-
olence was 11%. That means that international agents are four 
times more likely to use remote violence than any other armed, 
organised agents across Africa. International agents were most 
active in Somalia and Mali. 
Besides remote violence, riots and protests also played an 
important role. According to the ACLED dataset, riots and 
protests amounted to 34% of disorders since 2012. Riots and 
protests are a manifestation of unrest with the potential to fur-
ther destabilise a political system and ultimately lead to physical 
insecurity and overt conflict. Riots can be deadly, and events 
that begin as protests can evolve into riots or battles or result in 
violence against civilians10.
Nearly half of the riots and protests observed across Africa 
are concentrated in three countries: Egypt (18%), South Africa 
(17%), and Nigeria (11%) (Figure 7). In Egypt, these events 
were largely triggered by the continued fallout from the Arab 
Spring (an example of which is the Egyptian protest law11). In 
South Africa, rioting and protesting was associated with gen-
eral elections competition and mobilisation around national 
issues, such as corruption and service delivery12. In Nigeria, 
10 A riot is defined as a violent disturbance of  the public peace by three or more 
persons assembled for a common purpose and can be either spontaneous or 
organised. Protests are defined as nonviolent, spontaneous organisations of  ci-
vilians for a political purpose. If  violence occurs during a protest as a result of  
protesters’ actions, it is categorised as a riot and not a protest. If  violence is 
committed against protesters, without any violence by protesters in return, the 
event is deemed an instance of  violence against civilians.
11 Amnesty International, The Arab Spring: Five Years On, 2013. 
12 W. Hartley,  “Funds needed to control protests”, Business Day Live, 8 September 2014.
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the dominant reasons for rioting and protesting included 
Boko Haram and the oil industry. Figure 7 shows that coun-
tries plagued by other forms of conflict (armed, organised vio-
lence) are also sites of mass protest and demonstrations. Often, 
African states experience divergent, parallel and diametrically 
opposed forms of disorder, with little evidence that there are 
shared goals, agents, support groups or locations. The issues 
that give rise to both forms of disorder are co-occurring but not 
overlapping. This means that governments govern and respond 
differently to populations that present various threats or risks to 
regime consolidation and continuity.
Where are conflict and violence most pronounced, 
and how does this differ from the past?
In the mid-to-late 1990s, the most significant and widespread 
political violence occurred in West Africa’s Mano river region, 
Central Africa and East Africa. Since then, there has been a no-
table decrease in violence levels in Angola, Southern Africa and 
the Mano river region.
On the other hand, there has been a distinct increase in violence 
in North Africa, the Sahel, and East Africa. The emergence of 
high-intensity violence in new areas reflects the fragility of po-
litical competition in many poor states and the vulnerability 
of political processes in new states. Countries such as Egypt, 
Libya and South Sudan have undergone dramatic transitions of 
governance in the wake of regime change, and/or state creation. 
Finally, the fact that violence is re-emerging under new forms 
in historically conflict-affected contexts reflects its cyclical na-
ture. Violence frequently re-adapts to new modalities where 
political settlements, peace processes and institutional change 
have either been insufficient to address the underlying causes 
of violence or have reinforced conflict-generating inequalities, 
grievances and divisions.
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Fig. 7 - Riots and protest magnitude
Recycling elites and armed groups’ leadership often facili-
tates this, wherein leaders and combatants participate in mul-
tiple, armed, active groups over the lifespan of a conflict or re-
emerge as militia leaders or politicians when the institutional 
and political environment incentivise different forms of action. 
Examples include the reconfiguration of violent conflict in a vi-
olent Islamist disguise in northern Mali, persistent cycles of war 
and state fragility in the Central African Republic and cyclical 
violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
The locations and prevalence of violence and protest events 
across Africa from 2010 to 2018 suggest that conflict is not 
concentrated only in expected clusters (e.g. T bar, conflict arcs, 
etc.). These are insufficient to describe the actual patterns of 
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instability across Africa. Conflicts and protests are widespread, 
volatile and motivated by domestic governance practices and 
domestic politics (Figure 8) rather than a manifestation of a 
diffusing regional conflict pattern.
Policy options and prospects 
International policy responses to conflict and violence have 
primarily focused on creating institutions and implementing 
specific guidelines to stem large-scale violent conflict. However, 
while these policy responses have been effective in some cir-
cumstances, they can also have indirect and unforeseen con-
sequences, as violence and conflict adapt to changing circum-
stances. Domestic institutional changes aimed at addressing a 
specific type of conflict create opportunities for other forms of 
violence and conflict to emerge or persist, including domestic 
political instability and large-scale social violence. International 
policy responses, and associated institutions, are generally poor-
ly equipped to address alternative manifestations of violence.
Tailoring an international policy response means recognising 
the political nature of violent conflict, the conditions in which 
social violence occurs and the opportunities seized by actors 
to leverage changing political and social conditions to perpe-
trate new forms of conflict and violence. It is crucial for policy 
to incorporate knowledge of the domestic political cleavages, 
agendas and agents in order to comprehend the likelihood of 
violence, anticipate unintended consequences and generate bet-
ter risk analysis and mitigation policies.
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Fig. 8 - Locations of conflicts
Success in international policy responses has often come from 
the adoption, by donors, of a simultaneous approach of subna-
tional analysis to understand domestic politics and regionali-
sation by gathering regional powers to mitigate neighbouring 
disorder. Subnational analysis can uncover how multiple vio-
lent agents interact to produce continuing conflict or “areas of 
peace”; it is also imperative to understand why and how some 
areas of a country are violent while others are not.  A common 
trend in conflict management is to generate responses and poli-
cies that seek to join regional and larger bodies to promote stabi-
lisation and longer-term security management systems. Violent 
agents and dynamics exhibit clear patterns of regionalisation, 
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presenting particular challenges to siloed approaches to ad-
dressing violence (country-specific and sub-regional). At the 
operational level, one trade-off is that regional bodies often face 
resource constraints compared to their bilateral or multilater-
al donors, causing them to rely heavily on donor assistance. 
Regionalised approaches also risk placing too much emphasis 
on top political levels, ignoring the modalities through which 
actors at lower levels (including diasporas and civil society) in-
fluence a conflict resolution process. Regionalisation involves 
local communities, and thus, interventions with a regional fo-
cus should not come at the price of local-level engagement.
Key frameworks for international policy response to conflict 
and violence include state building and peacebuilding, the crea-
tion of political settlements and a stabilisation approach applied 
in contexts of civil/transnational wars. While these approaches 
represent a welcome focus on the political nature of violence 
and conflict, they come with a number of trade-offs and risks.
As far as it concerns peacebuilding and state building, these 
approaches have contributed, over the last decade, to creating 
politically resilient regimes at the cost of social resilience to po-
litical shocks and stresses. The New Deal program by a coalition 
of Western states through the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) was created to overcome 
challenges associated with a lack of contextual understanding 
of existing local power dynamics, conflict drivers and networks. 
Nonetheless, the approach presents a number of trade-offs. For 
one, peacebuilding agendas shift externally defined goals in 
state building and peacebuilding onto developing states, despite 
these states being less able to deliver on many aspects of govern-
ment stability and consolidation. The responsibility of donors 
to provide aid in ways that are most effective and helpful to re-
cipient countries remains a second order priority. Relatedly, do-
nors often operate under liberal peace-based assumptions with 
reference to the types of institutions and priorities that should 
be present in partner countries rather than acknowledging what 
is present. As a result, existing formal and informal governance 
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structures are often negated or even replaced. Another central 
challenge for the international community lies in striking a bal-
ance between the primacy of national agency and ownership, 
and donor demand for accountability, transparency and results.
Concerning the creation of political settlements, in recent 
years there has been growing commitment to building political 
settlements that are legitimate, inclusive and credible. However, 
political settlements are not a conflict management tool per se. 
They are rather a representation of power distribution and op-
erate to “balance power” between elites and potential spoilers. 
Irrespective of the growing attention paid to political participa-
tion and inclusiveness for the management of conflict, there are 
also risks associated with an excessive focus on political settle-
ments. In building elite coalitions, other legitimate voices may 
be obscured. Entry into, or “renegotiation” of, elite bargains 
and settlements can be violent, costly and persistent in devel-
oping states. The framework risks incentivising violence among 
elites, leading to high rates of domestic political instability.
Finally, as far as it concerns stabilisation, its goal is to fa-
cilitate integrated security and development approaches across 
departments and agencies that combine planning and activities 
related to conflict prevention, early diplomacy, peacebuilding, 
peace enforcement, early recovery and state building. The shift 
towards stabilisation comes with a number of trade-offs. First, 
stabilisation approaches are largely reactive rather than pre-
ventative. Second, despite a trend towards comprehensive gov-
ernmental approaches, stabilisation is predominantly designed 
by the ministries of defence in order to fulfil a security agenda. 
This can result in particular attention paid to immediate man-
ifestations of violence rather than to underlying processes that 
drive conflict. A stabilisation approach can also risk blurring 
the distinctions between security and development priorities. 
Across development actors, approaches to conflict management 
have been characterised by a growing preoccupation with coun-
tering violent extremism and anti-radicalisation, with a clear 
impact on highly securitised aid.
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The takeaways from this perspective on violence include a 
number of acknowledgments. Solutions for violent domestic 
politics are to be found beyond elections, forced democratisa-
tion and inclusive politics. Elites manipulate and abuse the “rules 
of the game” for their own purposes, rather than playing their 
“games within rules”. Such ambitions can, however, be hindered 
by open media, independent election commissions, judiciaries, 
civil services, and so forth. It is necessary to stop being blinkered 
by “identity labels” (such as Islamism, ethnicity or nationalism), 
used by groups to gain attention and support. Violent “labels” 
are used by groups to distinguish themselves in a crowded field 
of competitors. What matters are the incentives for violence that 
emerge during political competition and where the threats to 
regimes and citizens come from. Finally, an understanding of 
domestic politics of states, elites, and recent histories cannot be 
substituted for institutional approaches, which include elections, 
national level democratic reforms or open markets.  Developed 
world intransigence and active lowering of humanitarian re-
sponsibilities will continue to have devastating consequences for 
those near and far. It is hubris to think that Europe will remain 
unscathed or unaffected by spreading disorder. 
Five questions for discussion 
• How does the Sustainable Development Goal #16 
(SDG) (“Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for 
sustainable development”) aim to lessen the risk of con-
flict for communities? Is the proposed theory of change 
likely to deal with all manner of conflict equally?
• How does the international community evaluate its 
own conflict mitigation work across Africa, given the 
rise in violence?
• If inclusion (democratisation, elections, and corrupt 
practices) increases violence, why are exclusion and 
poverty the focus in many international conflict pro-
grams (N.B. these factors are closely associated with the 
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rise of civil wars, but are not associated with state vio-
lence, militia violence, riots, protests or violence against 
civilians outside of civil war contexts)?
• If “Islamist” violence mainly occurs in places where (1) 
previous political violence was common; (2) the rela-
tionship between local, possibly Muslim, communities 
and the government is very poor; and (3) there are mul-
tiple conflict risks from several, non-Islamist, armed 
groups, then how can the international community ad-
dress the problem and growth of these groups?
• This analysis suggests that conflict is not about the 
breakdown of state authority and power, but a feature 
of competition between politically strong actors within 
states. Hence, the “state failure” debate is based on in-
correct assumptions. What does conflict programming 
look like if it is based on mitigating “strategic conflict” 
instead of “weak state conflict”?
6.  Exploring Intra- and Extra- 
     Continental African Migration: 
     Trends, Drivers and Policy Options
Richard Mallett
Key facts
• The bulk of cross-border African migration is intra- rather than 
extra-continental – that is, international flows are primarily con-
tained within the continent. However, trends over recent decades 
indicate that the gap between the two is gradually shrinking.
• Although there has been significant growth in emigration rates 
from many countries in sub-Saharan Africa – particularly since the 
early 2000s – Africans continue to be under-represented in the 
global migrant stock.
• Changes in African migration trends are poorly explained by 
demographic factors, and conflict accounts for just a fraction of 
cross-border movement.
• There is strong evidence that as countries develop and grow, emi-
gration expands as people’s aspirations and capabilities to migrate 
strengthen. This process starts to reverse once countries transition 
to upper middle-income status, but that stage is decades away for 
most places in sub-Saharan Africa.
• The prevailing European orthodoxy of deterrence-centred migra-
tion policy is both expensive and largely ineffective. This is sup-
ported by a growing body of evidence. It is time to urgently rethink 
policy options for managing migration better and to pursue innova-
tion within the boundaries of political possibility.
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Introduction
Africa is often presented as a continent in a permanent and 
increasing state of exodus – one driven by abject poverty, acute 
demographic pressure, and the dislocating impacts of endem-
ic conflict. From a European perspective, such framings are 
used to justify and promote deterrence-based policy responses 
that involve curtailing freedom of movement and containing 
African populations in their countries- and regions-of-origin. 
While this approach gained particular currency in the early 
2000s, since the recent onset of Europe’s so-called “migration 
crisis” it has only solidified and deepened. 
But how accurate is the depiction of an Africa consumed by 
poverty- and conflict-driven mass movement, to what extent is 
current policy effectively managing the continent’s migration 
flows, and what are some of the areas in which future policy 
could be usefully focused? This overview chapter sets out to 
shed some light, drawing on the latest and most up-to-date evi-
dence to put forward a constructive analysis of these questions. 
Three sections follow. The first describes recent and current 
trends in African cross-border migration – building a picture 
of changes in both intra-continental (mobility between African 
countries) and extra-continental (mobility beyond Africa) mi-
gration – before analysing a series of factors that might be con-
sidered core drivers of that movement. In light of this evidence, 
the following section then discusses the character and limita-
tions of the current policy orthodoxy, and explores viable op-
tions for alternative responses. In the final concluding section, 
five key questions that emerge from the chapter’s analysis are 
put forward in an effort to stimulate constructive debate about 
the future of policy in relation to African migration.
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An overview of African migration: 
trends and drivers
This section is split into two parts. The first covers recent and 
current trends in African cross-border migration in both an 
intra-continental and extra-continental sense. The second part 
uses the latest evidence to put forward an account that helps 
us understand what has been driving this movement, with a 
particular consideration of the roles that demography and de-
velopment may (or may not) play.
What is happening? A picture of recent and current 
trends
In recent decades, the bulk of cross-border African migra-
tion has occurred within the continent. An influential analysis 
of the dynamics of African migration over recent decades shows 
that, between 1960 and 2000, most Africans who participated 
in cross-border movement did so within the continent1. In oth-
er words, over this period rates of intra-continental migration 
outweighed those associated with extra-continental migration.
Within the category of intra-continental migration, the bulk 
has occurred between neighbouring countries. This suggests 
that, in initial terms at least, African migrants tend to make 
relatively short journeys within their regions-of-origin, rather 
than embarking on long migrations (e.g. to Europe) from the 
outset. What this partly reflects is the fragmented nature of 
many people’s migration journeys, which involve jagged move-
ments from one place to the next over gradual periods of time, 
often in a relatively non-linear fashion2.
1 This section draws extensively, at points, on M.-L. Flahaux and H. de Haas 
(2016). Their analysis is highly relevant to the discussion presented here, and thus 
merits considerable inclusion.
2 M. Collyer, “In-between places: trans-Saharan transit migrants in Morocco and 
the fragmented journey to Europe”, Antipode, vol. 39, no. 4, pp. 668-90, 2007.
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We have also seen an increasing concentration of African mi-
grant populations in particular countries or particular clusters 
of countries within the continent. The overall pattern, particu-
larly since post-independence, is one of coast-bound migration 
from more marginal inland countries, urbanisation, and grow-
ing rural-urban mobility. We have thus seen increasing move-
ment from primarily agricultural, inland areas to sites in main-
ly coastal countries. Prime examples – or important migration 
‘hubs’ – include Djibouti, Gabon and Libya.
Other analyses both confirm this overall picture and 
add a little more detail. For example, data presented by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) shows that, in 2013, the 
largest “host” countries of sub-Saharan African migrants were 
Côte d’Ivoire, South Africa and Nigeria (2.3 million, 2 million 
and 900,000, respectively)3. These substantial migrant stocks 
appear to be associated with two key factors. First, the relatively 
large and diversified nature of these countries’ economies. And 
second, the presence of pre-existing migration corridors – for 
example, between Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire, and between 
Zimbabwe and South Africa. Cultural and linguistic affinities 
are at play here. The IMF’s analysis also suggests that the main 
“sending” countries to these African destinations tend to be ge-
ographically proximate, lacking in decent economic opportuni-
ty, and prone to instability (linked to either natural disasters or 
political violence). 
Even more recent data support the notion that African mi-
gration continues to be both largely contained within the con-
tinent and geographically regional in nature4. The following 
examples are illustrative: in 2017, the share of international 
migrants from East Africa still residing in East Africa was 65%, 
for those from Central Africa it was around 50%, and for West 
3 J. Gonzalez-Garcia et al., “Sub-Saharan African migration: patterns and spillo-
vers”, Spillover note 9, Washington, D.C., International Monetary Fund, 2016.
4 A.S. Abebe, “Understanding the patterns and causes of  African migration: 
some facts”, in Foresight Africa: top priorities for the continent in 2018, Washington, 
D.C., Brookings Institution, 2018.
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Africa it was 86%. The only region with a higher proportion of 
its migrants moving beyond the continent was North Africa, 
at around 50%. It bears noting here that, despite these com-
paratively higher rates, half of all international migration from 
North Africa still occurs within the continent – even if just a 
fraction of that is contained within the region itself (rough-
ly 14%). Indeed, movement between regions more generally 
– for example, from west to south – has been increasing over 
recent years and looks set to continue this way, as processes 
of economic growth unfold and infrastructural developments 
accumulate5.
The gap between intra- and extra-continental migration 
is narrowing, and the geographical distribution of African 
migration is diversifying. Although intra-continental mi-
gration has historically outpaced extra-continental migra-
tion, since 1960 the gap has been steadily closing. As Figure 1 
below shows, the numbers of both intra- and extra-continen-
tal African migrants simultaneously increased between 1960 
and 2000 – from 6,176,385 to 10,500,000 and 1,830,776 
to 8,734,478, respectively. But the rate of growth has been 
uneven, with extra-continental migration catching up in rel-
ative terms. 
5 M. Awumbila, Drivers of  migration and urbanization in Africa: key trends and issues, 
Paper presented at the UN Expert Group Meeting on Sustainable Cities, Human 
Mobility and International Migration, New York, Population Division, United 
Nations, 2017.
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Fig. 1 - The number of international African migrants 
has been increasing in absolute terms since 1960, 
in both an intra- and extra-continental sense
Source: Information drawn from M.-L. Flahaux and H. de Haas (2016)
Estimates of “emigration intensity”, which represents the share 
of any given country-of-origin population that have become 
international migrants, can be used to highlight this6.
Calculations show that, over the time period in question, the 
average intensity of intra-continental migration declined from 
2.1% to 1.3% (i.e. in 1960, 2.1% of country x’s population 
resided in another African country, while by 2000 this share 
had fallen to 1.3%). At the same time, the average intensity 
of extra-continental migration increased from 0.6% to 1.1%, 
a shift that can largely be accounted for by generally increased 
emigration rates from North African countries, which have 
been noticeably greater than other regions. 
6 M.-L. Flahaux and H. de Haas (2016).
Exploring Intra- and Extra-Continental African Migration 149
Putting these variations to one side for a moment, what is also 
interesting is that between 1960 and 2000, the overall intensity 
of African emigration – that is, taking cross-border movement 
both within and beyond the continent into account – actual-
ly declined. Although in absolute terms the volume of African 
international migrants expanded over this period, in relative 
terms the intensity fell from 2.8% to 2.3%. More recent esti-
mates for 2015 suggest that this continues to be the case, with 
little indication of any major reversal having occurred7. 
These various shifts in intensity have been accompanied by 
geographical diversification in extra-continental migration. 
While in 1960 most African migrants went to the UK and 
France – highlighting the significance of the colonial link – by 
2000 we were seeing an increase in those migrating both to other 
European countries (Germany, Holland, Italy, Portugal, Spain) 
and countries even further afield (Australia, Canada, USA). 
So too has there been diversification in regions-of-origin. 
Within the category of African migration to Europe, North 
Africa has long been over-represented. This still largely re-
mains the case, but, according to data from the Country-to-
Country (C2C) project administered by the Determinants of 
International Migration (DEMIG) initiative, between 1975 
and 2011 there was a noticeable increase in the share of West 
Africans migrating to Europe. It is now the case that migrants 
from West and North Africa account for more than 80% of 
the European flow, something Flahaux and de Haas ascribe to 
proximity on the one hand, and to historical labour recruit-
ment practices on the other (particularly with Mali, Senegal, 
and several countries in the Maghreb). 
The most recent estimates point to growth in African mi-
gration, particularly beyond the continent. Coverage limi-
tations aside, the latest UN8 data helps us sketch out a “big 
picture” of the current situation. According to this data, in 
7 G. Carbone and T. Corda, “Conclusions: policy implications for the EU”, in 
G. Carbone (Ed.) Out of  Africa: Why People Migrate, Milan, Ledizioni-ISPI, 2017.
8 UN (2017).
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2017 there was a total of 258 million international migrants 
worldwide. Of that figure, 106 million were from Asia, 61 mil-
lion were from Europe, 38 million were from Latin America, 
and 36 million were from Africa (Figure 2). This means that, 
proportionally speaking, African international migrants are 
under-represented in the global migration stock. Looking more 
specifically at countries of origin, of the top 20 “contributing” 
countries in 2017, just one was in Africa (Egypt). Eleven were 
located in Asia, and six in Europe.
Fig. 2 - Of the 258 million international migrants worldwide, 
just 36 million are of African origin
Source: UN (2017)
A similar dynamic exists in relation to global flow trends over 
the last 15 years or so. Of all international migrants added to 
the global migration stock between 2000 and 2017, Asia con-
tributed 30 million, Europe 22 million, North America 17 mil-
lion, and Africa 10 million. 
However, these absolute figures conceal important changes in 
emigration growth trends across different regions. Recent anal-
ysis of the UN data by the Pew Center9 reveals that, between 
9 P. Connor, “International migration sub-Saharan Africa has grown dramatically 
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2010 and 2017, the total volume of international migrants from 
sub-Saharan African countries grew by 31%. By contrast, emi-
gration from the Asia-Pacific region and Latin America rose by 
15% and 9%, respectively. Only the Middle East-North Africa 
(MENA) region experienced faster growth, at 39%. 
Moreover, growth in African emigration has been ramping 
up over recent decades. According to the data, the emigration 
growth rate for sub-Saharan Africa during the 1990s stood at 
just 1%, before climbing rapidly to 25% in the 2000s and 31% 
in the 2000-2017 period. A variety of similar trends took place 
over the same time period, with the number of North Africans 
living in EU countries, for example, rising from 3 million in 
1990 to 5.2 million in 2017.
As things now stand, of the ten countries with the highest 
growth in emigration rates in 2017, nine are in sub-Saharan Africa 
(the one non-African country, Syria, tops the list with a 536% 
growth in emigration between 2010 and 2017 – see Figure 3). 
And, in line with the work of Flahaux and de Haas, this latest data 
confirm that African migrants are increasingly going extra-conti-
nental: while the bulk of African migration is still contained within 
the continent, this share fell from 75% in 1990 to 68% in 2017.
Fig. 3 - Between 2010 and 2017, nine out of the ten fastest growing 
emigration rates were found in sub-Saharan African countries
Source: Pew Center analysis of UN data (P. Connor, 2018)
since 2010”, FactTank article, 28 February 2018. 
A Vision of Africa’s Future152
What is driving change in African migration trends? 
Demography, development, and state policy
To recap the major trends in contemporary African migration, 
over the last few decades we have seen: 1) an increase in the 
overall volume of cross-border migration, with particularly ex-
pansive growth occurring since 2000; this is despite the fact 
that Africans continue to remain proportionally under-repre-
sented within the global stock of international migrants; 2) a 
steady closing of the gap between intra- and extra-continental 
migration, although the bulk of cross-border migration contin-
ues to remain intra-continental; 3) a geographical diversifica-
tion in the composition of both flows and destinations. 
In this second part of the section, attention is turned to some 
of the main factors that appear to have driven such changes. 
Although migrations are complex phenomena, irreducible to a 
single cause, the intention here is to focus on a few selected sets 
of drivers that are relevant to ongoing policy debates, drawing 
on the latest evidence to explore the role they may or may not 
play.
Demographic factors play less of a role than we might 
expect. In the context of African migration, demography and 
conflict are frequently framed as the core drivers of cross-border 
mobility, which is in turn facilitated by the apparent porosity 
of national borders within the continent. To what extent does 
this framing hold up in the face of recent academic research? 
One new study by de Haas and Fransen10 uses data from the 
UN’s latest Global Migration Database to analyse how differ-
ent dimensions of social transformation shape international mi-
gration trends and patterns. Demography features as one such 
dimension – alongside economic, technological, political and 
cultural factors – which the authors gauge through four prox-
ies: share of young people aged between 15 and 35 relative to 
overall population (as a measure of the “youth bulge”); percent-
age of people living in urban areas; rate of urban population 
growth; and speed of economic modernisation. Using data that 
10 H. de Haas and S. Fransen, Social transformation and migration: an empirical inquiry, 
Paper 141, Oxford, International migration Institute Network, 2018. 
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cover bilateral country-to-country estimates of migrant stocks 
for all countries in the world between 1990 and 2010, the au-
thors conclude that “one of the most striking findings is that 
the relative size of the population aged 15-35 does not have 
a significant effect on emigrant rates” and that “demographic 
factors are unlikely to have a direct relation to emigration”. 
Research into African migration more specifically appears 
to corroborate this view in relation to that particular context, 
showing that higher rates of extra-continental migration tend 
to be associated with countries that are relatively more ad-
vanced in their demographic transition, as indicated by lower 
mortality and fertility levels11. In other words, population pres-
sure – particularly from young cohorts of society – does not 
appear to be a primary driver of international migration outside 
the continent. 
These findings raise questions of traditional transition mod-
els, which have tended to assert a kind of “demographic deter-
minism” in relation to migration. They suggest we need to be 
careful about assuming that particular demographic structures 
or shifts automatically lead to particular changes in migration 
flows, and that we should acknowledge there may be other fac-
tors which mediate or override the role of demography. 
Development matters, but not in the way often assumed. 
If demographic factors play, at best, an indirect role in shaping 
emigration rates, what else might matter? As mentioned above, 
conflict and violence are often a core feature of narratives con-
cerning the so-called “African exodus”. This is despite the fact 
that 86% of international migration in Africa is not related to 
conflict12. Moreover, even in sub-regions where conflict and vi-
olence have been particularly prevalent (such as the Great Lakes 
region of central/eastern Africa), evidence suggests that while 
conflict is likely a partial driver of mobility, it would be “wrong 
to neglect the ongoing, perhaps mundane social processes that 
11 M.-L. Flahaux and H. De Haas (2016).
12 UNHCR, Statistical yearbook 2010, Geneva, 2011. 
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drive mobility, such as the search for an education, a spouse 
or a better life in the city”13. Again, this is a caution against 
“exceptionalising” certain factors that often feature centrally in 
popular representations of African migration.
Another such factor, commonly assumed to be a primary 
driver of international migration, is poverty. It is widely be-
lieved that a lack of development and economic growth fuel 
emigration, as poor individuals seek better opportunities in far-
off places. Such thinking gives rise to ideas such as the “brain 
drain”, where talented people in low-income countries transfer 
themselves, their capacities and their contributions to wealthier 
countries. 
There is now quite a substantial body of evidence refuting 
the linear logic that poverty breeds emigration. A 2014 study 
directly addressed the question – i.e. “does development reduce 
migration?”14 – and, after surveying 45 years’ worth of literature 
on the topic, found that emigration generally rises with eco-
nomic development until countries reach upper-middle income 
status. Broadly speaking, the poorest countries have some of the 
lowest levels of international emigration, but that changes as 
they start to become wealthier. Emigration rates then rise until 
countries reach a relatively advanced stage of development, at 
which point they begin to fall back. Thus, although we need to 
be careful about generalising too far or ignoring the possibil-
ities that future scenarios may present, much of the evidence 
supports an “inverted-U” model of the relationship between 
economic development and emigration (Figure 4).
13 O. Bakewell and A. Bonfiglio, Moving beyond conflict: reframing mobility in the African 
Great Lakes region, Working paper 71, Oxford, International Migration Institute, 
2013. 
14 M. Clemens, Does development reduce migration?, Discussion paper 8592, Bonn, 
IZA, 2014. 
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Fig. 4 - Emigration rates tend to increase as poor countries 
develop, before falling as they reach 
upper middle-income status
Situating the question in the African context, the aforemen-
tioned work of Flahaux and de Haas15 is supportive of this con-
clusion. Based on their analysis of the World Bank and DEMIG 
datasets, they sum up as follows:
There seems to be a rather clear relation between levels of so-
cio-economic development and the volume and geographical 
orientation of African emigration. More marginal, poorer or 
landlocked countries tend to have lower absolute and relative 
levels of extra-continental migration, and their migration is pri-
marily directed towards other African countries.
By contrast, African countries with higher levels of extra-conti-
nental migration tend to be more urbanised, have higher rates 
of per capita GDP growth, and occupy coastal locations (which 
is helpful in terms of overcoming geographical barriers to 
movement). This is all in line with migration transition theory, 
which has been well tested using historical and contemporary 
data sources. At the root of this theory is an association between 
development and migration that is based on an understanding 
15 M.-L. Flahaux and H. de Haas (2016).
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of migration as a function of people’s aspirations and capabilities 
to migrate. That is, as developmental processes unfold, people’s 
access to material resources, social networks, education, me-
dia and knowledge expands. In parallel, development-related 
improvements in infrastructure and transport systems mean 
that travel becomes less expensive and less risky. As such, poli-
cy efforts to curb international migration from poor countries 
by increasing their levels of development are only likely to be 
playing into this well-established process – that is, until such 
countries reach the income-status point at which emigration 
begins to fall once again (which in many cases will not be for 
several decades).
The actions and behaviours of states shape migration 
flows, far beyond the implementation of migration-specific 
policies. Before turning attention to policy options in light of 
this evidence in the next section, it is worth offering a brief 
consideration of other drivers known to matter in the context 
of African migration trends. One area of particular interest that 
has been receiving growing attention is the role of state policy 
in shaping migration flows. Typically, the focus has been on the 
actions, laws and policies of traditionally defined “destination 
countries”, such as those in Europe, with a particular empha-
sis on (im)migration-specific policies. These can be thought of 
as targeted measures that are expressly designed to directly af-
fect or regulate migration in one sense or another, and include 
things like visa requirements, border controls, and selective re-
strictions on the entrance of labour migrants. 
The latest evidence suggests that while migration-specific 
policies such as these can play a role in shaping flows, they are 
generally less influential than we might expect – and certainly 
could not be classified as a core driver. For example, drawing 
on asylum application data from 20 OECD countries between 
1985 and 1999, Thielemann16 finds that measures specifically 
16 E. Thielemann, Does policy matter? On governments’ attempts to control unwanted mi-
gration, CCIS Working Paper 112, San Diego, CA, University of  California, 2004. 
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designed to deter “unwanted” migration have often been inef-
fective: destination choice, he explains, tends to be driven by 
factors well outside the remit of asylum policy. Multi-site qual-
itative work by Hagen-Zanker and Mallett17 in Europe adds 
narrative depth to these findings. Their research suggests that 
where policy does come into the migration decision-making 
process, the role of public policy and economy more broadly 
– e.g. access to education and labour market opportunities in 
potential “host countries” – appears to outweigh any effect of 
migration-specific regulations and controls. (Interestingly, the 
perceived “pull” of European welfare systems were rarely part 
of interviewees’ narratives, reflecting a wider body of research 
that finds very little evidence to support the so-called “welfare 
magnet” hypothesis18).
These various analyses generally align with the quantitative 
findings of Czaika and de Haas19, which show that although mi-
gration policies have the potential to alter the character of mi-
gration flows – in the authors’ words, they can create a number 
of “substitution effects” in relation to geographical trajectory, 
composition of flows, and the timing of migrations – they are 
relatively incapable of controlling the overall volume of migra-
tion. One good illustrative example would be the significant rise 
in European visa requirements after 1985, which Flahaux and 
de Haas20 connect to the geographical diversification of African 
migration away from the former colonial powers of France and 
the UK in the period that follows.
Only because a government’s migration-specific policies ap-
pear to exert limited effects on flows, however, this does not 
17 J. Hagen-Zanker et al., Migration from the margins: mobility, inevitability and vulner-
ability in mid-western Nepal and north-western Pakistan, Report 5, London, Secure 
Livelihoods Research Consortium, 2014. 
18 C. Giulietti, The welfare magnet hypothesis and the welfare take-up of  migrants, World 
of  Labor Article, Bonn, IZA, 2014. 
19 M. Czaika and H. de Haas, “The effectiveness of  immigration policies”, 
Population and Development Review, vol. 39, no. 3, 2013, pp. 487-508. 
20 M.-L. Flahaux and H. de Haas (2016).
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mean that states play no role in migration processes. In Czaika 
and de Haas’ words, “the importance of factors such as eco-
nomic growth, labour market structure, education, inequality, 
and conflict points to the role of non-migration policies and 
institutions – and, more generally, of nation-states – in shaping 
migration processes” 21. 
Significantly, this broader focus on state action and behav-
iour means that “sending countries” or “countries of origin” 
come into the equation, which has not always been the case 
thanks to the long hold of ‘receiving country bias’ on migration 
research. On this question, recent evidence and analysis sug-
gests that the actions of African states can constitute powerful 
drivers of African cross-border migration. 
The post-independence processes of African state formation 
have been shown to significantly affect migration flows, for ex-
ample through nationalist political narratives and the accom-
panying dynamics of migrant scapegoating and public xeno-
phobia, particularly during times of economic crisis22. Under 
certain conditions, this combination can give rise to govern-
ment-imposed expulsions of migrant populations.
In addition, state-imposed restrictions on people’s liveli-
hoods can help drive onward movement. Evidence suggests, for 
example, that many Eritreans flee their country in order to es-
cape compulsory national service, and then continue to pursue 
secondary migration beyond the immediate region, partly as a 
result of their legislated exclusion from the formal labour mar-
ket in neighbouring countries23. 
Finally, a substantial five-year study conducted by the 
OECD24, drawing on a huge body of mixed-methods data from 
ten developing countries, found that domestic sectoral poli-
cies can affect the decision to migrate in a number of ways. In 
21 M. Czaika and H. de Haas (2013).
22 M.-L. Flahaux and H. De Haas (2016).
23 R. Mallett et al., Journeys on hold: how policy influences the migration decisions of  Eritreans 
in Ethiopia, Working paper 506, London, ODI, 2017.
24 OECD, Interrelations between public policies, migration and development, Paris, 2017. 
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relation to the economy, for example, when vocational training 
programmes fail to meet the demands of the domestic labour 
market, emigration tends to increase. On the other hand, public 
investment in social protection can both curb emigration and 
encourage the permanent return of migrants living overseas. 
This is not to say there is a perfect menu of public policies that 
can be put in place to seamlessly regulate migration, but rather 
that, depending on the way in which certain policies are designed 
and implemented, migration flows may be indirectly affected.
Policy options: in search of viable alternatives
Popular representations of African migration imply a continent 
caught up in a permanent and increasing state of exodus – one 
driven by abject poverty, acute demographic pressure, and the dis-
locating impacts of endemic conflict. This narrative both encour-
ages and legitimises a kind of policy response that is ultimately at 
odds with the realities of how and why African migration is ac-
tually occurring. As a result, the core issues and problems, which 
we continue to learn more and more about thanks to important 
research-based advances, continue to go improperly addressed.
The bulk of the orthodox policy response to African migra-
tion in recent decades has centred on curtailment and contain-
ment, something which has only become more pronounced 
against the backdrop of Europe’s so-called “migration crisis”. 
A regime of deterrence has emerged front-and-centre, ground-
ed in a logic of preventing people from reaching and access-
ing European territory. Deterrence policy takes a number of 
forms, ranging from heavily funded border controls and strict 
processing procedures to the implementation of information 
campaigns and livelihood interventions in “countries/regions of 
origin”25. While the specific theory of change varies depending 
25 J. Carling and M. Hernandez-Carretero, “Protecting Europe and protecting 
migrants? Strategies for managing unauthorised migration from Africa”, British 
Journal of  Politics and International Relations, no. 13, pp. 42-58, 2011. 
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on the type of measure put forward, the intention of migration 
control is a shared objective.
The real question is whether such an approach actually works. 
Going by much of the latest evidence, the answer is that it does 
so only to a very limited extent. In line with the aforementioned 
research that casts doubt on the impacts and “directness” of mi-
gration-specific policies, deterrence measures generally appear ca-
pable of altering the dynamics of migration decisions and flows, 
but not of halting movement altogether. This is partly because 
such attempts fail to address the real drivers of international mi-
gration, and partly due to flaws in their design and implemen-
tation. Policies designed to curb migration by improving de-
velopment outcomes, for example, are based on a misinformed 
understanding of the relationship between poverty and mobility. 
Recent studies have also shown that measures such as livelihood 
programming (e.g. micro-credit, vocational skills training) and in-
formation campaigns often fail to engage with the structural fac-
tors that really drive people’s aspirations for onward migration26.
What would a more sensible and appropriate policy response 
look like? In their recent paper, Can development assistance de-
ter emigration?, Michael Clemens and Hannah Postel27 make 
the important point that “because successful development goes 
hand in hand with greater migration, aid agencies seeking to 
affect migration must move beyond deterrence”. At the basis 
of their argument are ideas about migration transition theory, 
which were introduced in the preceding section – that is, as poor 
and low-income countries develop and become wealthier, great-
er numbers of people acquire the aspirations and capabilities to 
migrate. And while the intensity of emigration tends to slow as 
26 R. Mallett et al. (2017); MMP, “How powerful is policy? The role of  policy in 
shaping migrant decision-making”, Feature article, Mixed Migration Platform, 
2017; D. Schans and C. Optekamp, “Raising awareness, changing behaviour? 
Combatting irregular migration through information campaigns”, Cahier 2016-
11, Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie, 2016. 
27 M. Clemens and H. Postel, “Can development assistance deter emigration?”, 
Brief, Washington D.C., Center for Global Development, February 2018. 
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countries continue to grow, as Clemens and Postel make clear, 
most of today’s low-income countries will not reach the stage of 
developing past middle-income status for several decades. 
None of the latest evidence we have suggests that interna-
tional migration from Africa is going to slow or stop any time 
soon, even with new forms of prevention and deterrence in 
place. The sheer inevitability of this trend demands urgent pol-
icy innovation, or at least some degree of deviation away from 
the current orthodoxy. Continuing to push and prioritise the 
mantra of deterrence-based migration and development policy 
will not only constitute a waste of public spending, but will 
also force increasing numbers of migrants into precarious and 
clandestine migration channels. A recent and growing body 
of evidence describes and explains this process, demonstrat-
ing how a lack of safe and legal pathways is often outweighed 
by the strength of people’s aspiration to move, through what-
ever means available28. The result is that migration for many 
is becoming a far more expensive and violent process than it 
otherwise would be, with migrant mortality rates on a steady 
rise in recent years29. Based on International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) data30, global rates of migrant mortality dur-
ing travel have increased in the past few years, from less than 
1% in 2015 to 2% in 2016 to 3% in 2017. And although not 
perfectly comparable, ODI calculations indicate that the rate 
for January 2018 was around 10%31.
While in many countries the politics of abandoning or depri-
oritising deterrence-based policy will be difficult to manage – 
this kind of approach often serves a significant performance 
function in relation to domestic politics – there are a number 
28 H. Crawley et al., “Destination Europe? Understanding the dynamics and driv-
ers of  Mediterranean migration in 2015”, Final report, MEDMIG, 2016; H. de 
Haas et al. (2018); J. Hagen-Zanker and R. Mallett (2016). 
29 J. Brachet, “Manufacturing smugglers: from irregular to clandestine mobility in 
the Sahara”, Annals of  the American Academy, no. 676, 2018, pp. 16-35. 
30 IOM, “Missing migrants project”, Geneva, 2018. 
31 Internal calculation, ODI.
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of options and alternatives available. Three broad categories are 
identified.
Beyond an intervention-based approach
It is not possible to regulate migration at 100% effectiveness, 
but it is possible to shape the conditions under which it occurs. 
Many measures attempt regulation by targeting elements of the 
migration decision-making process that are either marginal or 
irrelevant. For example, European funds continue to support 
information campaigns that are designed to deter migration by 
raising would-be migrants’ awareness of the perils of irregular 
travel. However, a recent study of 33 such campaigns clearly 
shows how ineffective this approach is: the information pro-
vided is often distrusted, already known, or essentially useless32. 
Similarly constrained are livelihood programmes attempting to 
discourage mobility by improving people’s capabilities, capital 
and wellbeing. These kinds of interventions tend to address 
only the symptoms of problems rooted in deeper, more struc-
tural issues (such as restrictions on the right to work or inequal-
ity and discrimination in the marketplace).
Based on the evidence presented in this paper, one sensible 
option would be to move away from intervention-based ap-
proaches to regulating migration (which are not capable of 
addressing root problems and structures) and to think beyond 
migration-specific policies (which play a far less powerful role 
than state action more generally). Part of this would involve 
paying detailed attention to the character and behaviour of 
African states, and thinking about what – if anything – might 
be done to help form more inclusive and equitable social con-
tracts. It would also involve a diversion of funding away from 
one-off programming efforts towards a broader investment in 
public policy and public goods (for example, helping to build 
up social protection systems, which have been shown to curb 
emigration, or supporting economic processes of inclusive 
32 D. Schans and C. Optekamp (2016). 
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structural transformation). This requires thinking about policy 
in non-migration-specific terms, and a willingness to engage in 
broad-based rather than migrant-specific policy action. For ide-
as about how this might be realistically pursued, the expanding 
literature on “thinking and working politically” in international 
development – which includes several concrete case studies of 
how donors have supported public policy reform through “po-
litically savvy” approaches33 – would be useful.
One other option within this category would be to concentrate 
greater efforts and resources on strengthening regional mobility 
blocks. Economic unions such as the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) potentially have a much larger 
role to play in regulating regional and international migration. 
While good on paper, however, they are often weakly implement-
ed, with a thin presence “on the ground”. Developing the capacity 
of such bodies to broker and manage deals that could have a seri-
ous effect on migration flows could thus be a wise use of resources.
Continue the push for safer migration 
and more legal channels
While Africa does not accurately fit the popular “continent in 
exodus” narrative, there is no reason to believe that the current 
flows are going to suddenly dry up (particularly in light of the 
latest estimates of substantial emigration growth amongst cer-
tain countries in sub-Saharan Africa). Hence the need to think 
about new ways in which the international community might 
better manage migration in order to improve the quality of 
movement, reduce the high levels of risk and threat so many 
migrants are exposed to, and reduce the importance of the role 
currently played by (often violent and exploitative) migration 
33 D. Booth, Thinking and working politically, Professional Development Reading 
Pack 13, Birmingham, GSDRC, University of  Birmingham, 2015; D. Booth and 
V. Chambers, The SAVI programme in Nigeria: towards politically smart, locally led devel-
opment, Discussion Paper, London, ODI, 2014; J. Sidel, Achieving reforms in oligar-
chical democracies: the role of  leadership and coalitions in the Philippines, Research Paper 
27, Birmingham, Developmental Leadership Program, April 2014. 
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“middlemen” or brokers – a group of actors whose creation and 
prominence has been a direct result of European migration pol-
icy since the early 2000s34.
Under this category, several concrete options can be consid-
ered. At the more politically challenging end of the spectrum 
lies advocating for an expansion of refugee resettlement quotas 
and an easing of existing migration restrictions, such as bor-
der controls. These, however, are likely to be difficult to push 
through. Potentially more manageable is the implementation of 
targeted schemes and initiatives that would create safer migra-
tion opportunities for a more limited number of people. The 
following measures might be considered:
1.   Schemes to encourage circular migration. Evidence sug-
gests that by facilitating certain types of cross-border 
movement, migrants are more likely to engage in return 
and circular migration. By contrast, when more restric-
tive migration policy gets implemented, migrants are 
less likely to return “home” as a result of the increased 
difficulty of re-gaining entry, and thus tend to stay put 
in “receiving countries”35. Collaborative arrangements 
that seek to encourage bilateral circular migration have 
already been put in place in some contexts: Spain’s part-
nership with Colombia to facilitate the cyclical move-
ment of agricultural workers is one such example36. 
From the host country perspective, the added advantage 
of this kind of approach is that workers from overseas 
can be usefully brought in during periods when labour 
shortages occur in particular sectors.
34 J. Brachet (2018)
35 M-L. Flahaux, “The role of  migration policy changes in Europe for return 
migration in Senegal”, International Migration Review, vol. 51, no. 4, 2017, pp. 
868-92.
36 IOM, Temporary and circular labour migration: Experiences, challenges and opportunities, 
Geneva, 2009.
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2. “Humanitarian visas”37. This approach, which allows 
people living in situations of humanitarian crisis to 
temporarily move to safer countries, has been cham-
pioned by the likes of Alexander Betts. In his words, 
“small consular outposts could be created outside the 
European Union, in places like Bodrum in Turkey or 
Zuwara in Libya […] At these transit points people 
could be quickly screened and those with a plausible 
asylum claim would be allowed access to Europe”. We 
are beginning to learn more about the significant returns 
achieved by such approaches. As one example, Clemens 
and Postel38 recently examined a US-led initiative to 
provide a limited number of Haitians with temporary 
work visas following the devastation of 2010’s earth-
quake. Their findings, in the words of The Economist39, 
are “mind-boggling”: temporary migrants participat-
ing in the scheme earned a monthly income 1,400% 
higher than those back in Haiti. The article went on 
to say that the study’s findings “match those for a sim-
ilar scheme that offered temporary agricultural work 
in New Zealand to people from Tonga and Vanuatu”. 
That policy was assessed by economists at the World 
Bank as “among the most effective development poli-
cies evaluated to date”. It is worth noting that the eco-
nomic benefits of such initiatives are not limited to par-
ticipating individuals: large shares of migrant earnings 
are typically remitted, supporting not only immediate 
household members but also the local economies of ar-
eas struggling to recover after conflict. Furthermore, the 
37 This paragraph is based on R. Mallett and A. Pain, “Post-war recovery and 
the role of  markets: policy insights from six years of  research”, Global Policy, 
forthcoming.
38  M.A. Clemens and H. Postel, Temporary work visas as US-Haiti development cooper-
ation: a preliminary impact evaluation, Policy Paper 101, Washington D.C., Center for 
Global Development, 2017.
39 “Visas as aid”, The Economist, 26 January 2017.
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potential recovery effects of labour migration and remit-
tance-sending are not necessarily limited to economic 
revitalisation: recent research from Mali shows that, 
when collectively organised, remittances from Malians 
living in France contribute substantially towards the 
provision of schools, health centres and water facilities 
in “villages of origin”40. The impacts on processes of re-
covery are thus potentially multidimensional.
3.  Worker / employment initiatives. Of a nature similar 
to the schemes outlined above, there are also options 
to proactively target labour migration in particular. 
Initiatives such as the regional labour mobility pro-
grammes recently trialled in Brazil – geared towards 
Colombian refugees residing in Ecuador – can both 
facilitate economic integration and reinforce the prin-
ciple of fair sharing on a regional basis41. These are un-
like traditional resettlement programmes insofar as they 
instead focus on the resettlement of entrepreneurs and 
those “able to work”, providing them with access to 
jobs as well as short-term financial assistance. The detail 
of design matters very much in this instance: a recent 
analysis of 231 legal pathway interventions (linked to 
livelihood support) found that such programmes are 
far more likely to be effective when they proactively re-
spond to the demands of local labour markets42. Whilst 
perhaps not surprising, this principle does not always 
feature in programme formulation. The report also 
found that impacts can be maximised when cross-sec-
tor collaboration (e.g. between different elements of the 
40 L. Chauvet et al., “Migrants’ home town associations and local development 
in Mali”, The Scandinavian Journal of  Economics, vol. 117, no. 2, 2015, pp. 
686-722.
41 C. Montenegro, “Social protection: A fourth durable solution?”, Forced 
Migration Review, no. 51, 2016.
42 LSE and ODI, Creating livelihood opportunities: a review of  the design and effectiveness 
of  legal pathways for migrants, Capstone report, London, 2018.
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public and private sectors) and offer support beyond 
simple access to the labour market (e.g. language train-
ing, ongoing mentorship).
Maximise the developmental gains of migration
Following on from the previous category of options, the start-
ing point here is inevitability: international migration within 
and from Africa is likely to continue, so why not make the most 
of this natural process? Rethinking migration as a process of 
development – as opposed to it being a failure of development 
– allows policy makers to more freely explore the potential wins 
involved. Currently, regimes of deterrence intentionally create 
barriers to migration, thus rendering it more dangerous and 
more costly: not only do preventative measures cost European 
taxpayers money, they also undermine the returns and contri-
butions that migrants themselves can make. So, given the polit-
ical will, what might be done? Again, a number of options are 
available:
1.   Improving the right to work. In many countries, both 
in Europe and Africa, migrants are barred from entering 
the labour market on legal and formal terms. The UK, 
for example, does not permit those waiting on asylum 
decisions – the vast majority of which take in excess of 
six months’ worth of processing – to work. This then 
creates situations of adverse dependency: newly arrived 
individuals, who in many cases are capable of applying 
their skills and contributing to the public purse, end 
up relying on state support just to survive. The same 
can be said of many African states that ban refugees’ 
legal entrance into the labour market, thus encouraging 
dependence on humanitarian structures. This is a lost 
opportunity for all parties involved.
2.  Reducing the costs of remittance-sending and labour 
recruitment. Recent research by the ODI showed that 
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members of the African diaspora paid an intermediation 
interventions involve cost of 12% on a US$200 remit-
tance transfer – almost twice the global average43. It also 
estimated that by reducing this “tax” to 5%, transfers 
would increase by US$1.8 billion annually, equivalent to 
the sub-Saharan African cost of paying for the education 
of 14 million primary school age children. Along similar 
lines, migrant recruitment agencies find themselves in 
an easy position to extract substantial profits from those 
seeking to work overseas44. Tighter regulation on such 
organisations would equally help bring down the costs 
incurred through international labour migration.
3.  Integration support. So much more could be done to 
facilitate the social and economic integration of people 
arriving in European countries from overseas. Currently 
what we see is a raft of measures designed, under the 
logic of deterrence, to incapacitate migrants upon arriv-
al. One example would be the Swiss government’s deci-
sion to seize assets from asylum seekers up to the value 
of 1,000 francs. Such an approach reduces the ability 
of new arrivals to get by and increases their depend-
ency on the state. Repealing legislation like this would 
undoubtedly enhance the potential of migrants and 
refugees to settle into their new “homes”. More pro-
actively, and as noted by Hagen-Zanker and Mallett45, 
integration packages that include language lessons and 
work skills training – tailored towards the economic 
needs of particular host countries – could potentially: 
a) ease the transition of new arrivals; b) increase their 
capacity to support themselves (as most aspire to); and 
c) help fill job gaps in European economies. Of course, 
43 K. Watkins and M. Quattri, Lost in intermediation: how excessive charges undermine the 
benefits of  remittances for Africa, Report, London, ODI, 2014.
44 J. Hagen-Zanker et al. (2014).
45 J. Hagen-Zanker and R. Mallett, Journeys to Europe: the role of  policy in migrant 
decision-making, Insights paper, London, ODI, 2016.
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there would be an initial upfront cost in delivering such 
support, but this is a short-term expense that would be 
offset by the subsequent tax revenue generated.
When it comes to the question of actually implementing any 
of the above, much will depend on the conditions of possi-
bility within any given policy environment. With migration, 
or at least certain types of migration, continuing to constitute 
an extremely politically sensitive issue in many countries, some 
policy options will simply be too difficult to push through. 
Thus, while efforts to alter public perceptions and narratives 
of migration may help stretch the conditions of possibility over 
time, in the immediate term it is important to be both strategic 
and realistic about policy selection. What is politically viable? Is 
enough of the right kind of capacity in place to ensure proper 
implementation? These are the sorts of questions that must be 
asked ahead of key policymaking decisions.
Five questions for discussion
This short chapter has described and examined recent and cur-
rent trends in African cross-border migration. Drawing on the 
latest evidence and some of the most reliable and up-to-date 
data sources, it started by showing how the contours of Africa’s 
migration flows have gradually been shifting over the past few 
decades, before moving on to an analysis of core drivers. It then 
asked what this all means for the future of policy making in 
this area, putting forward three sets of options to support the 
design of an appropriate, evidence-based and fit-for-purpose 
policy response.
To bring this chapter to a close, below are five key questions 
arising from the material presented above, which are intended 
to stimulate conversation and debate about the future of policy 
in relation to African migration.
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1.   What main migration policy options are politically and 
financially viable in the current climate? What are the 
potential trade-offs involved with the various approach-
es, including in an ethical sense?
2.  .Should there be interest in, and potential for, a collab-
orative migration agreement – in relation to circular 
migration, a humanitarian visa scheme, or temporary 
worker initiatives – between Italy and one or more par-
ticular countries or regions, with whom it is most likely 
to be implemented and what would some of the key  de-
sign considerations be?
3.   What might it take to shift the domestic political nar-
rative regarding migration in a direction that opens up 
space for more innovative policy making?
4.   What is the role of research-based evidence – relative to 
domestic politics, electioneering, cultural framings, and 
so on – in that process?
5.  Thinking about scale, at which levels of governance and 
authority – for example, central government, munici-
pal, community – exists the greatest potential for exper-
imentation and innovation with policy? Where is the 
most political possibility located, and how might that 
best be taken advantage of?
7.  Human Development, 
     Education and Mobility
Sara de Simone
Key facts 
• Africa experienced sustained economic growth in the early years 
of the new millennium. Despite a slowdown since late 2014, an av-
erage growth rate of 3.2% is expected in 2018 and 3.6% in 2019. 
Nevertheless, thirty-one African countries, including those with 
the highest growth rates, rank low in the Human Development 
Index. 
• Improving education is one of the outstanding human develop-
ment challenges that African countries face. Primary education en-
rolment increased from 59% to 79% between 1999 and 2012, but 
secondary and tertiary education enrolment remains significantly 
lower. 
• Even though unemployment in sub-Saharan countries is com-
paratively low with respect to other regions, more than two-thirds 
(68%) of the working population occupies vulnerable positions 
(self-employed workers, contributing family workers, workers with 
high levels of precariousness)1. Furthermore, a significant number 
of people remain underemployed (people employed in lower-level 
positions than they are qualified for, people forced to work reduced 
hours, or earning less than the minimum wage)2. This severely affects 
1 ILO, World Employment Social Outlook – Trends 2017, 2017.
2 A study on working conditions in West Africa estimated 67% of  the working 
population in the region to be underemployed. See: F. Roubaud and C. Torelli, 
“Employment, Unemployment, and Working Conditions in the Urban Labor 
Markets of  Sub-Saharan Africa: Main Stylized Facts”, in P. De Vreyer and F. 
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individuals’ access to income and represents a lost opportunity in 
terms of economic growth and societal improvement. 
• One out of eight Africans with a university degree lives in 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries, reducing the overall human capital of African 
emigration countries.
• Remittances to Africa increased from US$8.8 billion in 1990 
to US$69.5 billion in 2017, significantly exceeding Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) flows. Remittances are improving 
the living conditions of millions of households and individuals 
across Africa, contributing to the improvement of human develop-
ment indicators.  
Introduction 
As a concept, human development has been circulating since 
the 1990s. It first became central to policy-oriented and ac-
ademic debates, and was then adopted in development prac-
tice through the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 
launched in 2000, and subsequently with the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) agreed upon in 2015. 
Notwithstanding progress in the realisation of human de-
velopment goals and the significant economic growth rates 
achieved by many African countries, the continent still lags 
behind and suffers from large inequalities in several key dimen-
sions of human development, such as healthcare and, particu-
larly, education.
Education is a key component of human development, both 
for its intrinsic empowering potential and for its instrumental 
importance in enhancing human capital and promoting eco-
nomic growth. While African countries have achieved great re-
sults in terms of primary school enrolment rates, more efforts 
are needed to develop relevant post-basic education and training 
Roubaud, Urban Labor Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa, Washington D.C., World 
Bank. 2013.
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curricula and improve overall education quality. Despite the 
shortcomings in post-basic education, improved access to pri-
mary education and rising human development levels contrib-
uted to increased mobility within and from African societies: 
more resources and higher expectations for the future trigger a 
higher propensity to migrate.
Acknowledging the relationship between human develop-
ment and mobility is of vital importance in the process of es-
tablishing development partnerships with African countries. 
While the idea that international migrations – including of 
skilled migrants – can have an immediate impact on the eco-
nomic development of their home countries in terms of GDP 
growth is a matter of debate, there is considerable evidence that 
education and mobility can yield important improvements at 
the community, household and individual levels in terms of 
access to education, healthcare, better housing, recreational fa-
cilities, etc.3. While support for reforms addressing structural 
constraints to development – such as political instability, mis-
guided macro-economic policies, tenure insecurity, corruption 
and lack of infrastructures – remains essential, international 
partners should also acknowledge the importance of improve-
ments at the micro-level as a first step to make sure that the 
human face of development is not lost in the quest for econom-
ic growth, and that Africa’s development really results in more 
opportunities for people to choose how to live their lives. 
Human development in Africa: 
evolution and trends 
The concept of human development was disseminated via 
the first Human Development Report (HDR), published by 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 
1990. Before then, since the 1950s, development had been 
3 H. de Haas, Mobility and Human Development, Human Development Research 
Paper, UNDP, 2009.
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predominantly conceived in economic terms. With the notion 
of human development, the attention of development dis-
courses and practices shifted towards a more people-centred 
approach in which people’s wellbeing became the ultimate goal 
of development. HDR 1990 defined development as “a process 
of enlarging people’s choices”, with particular regard to the pos-
sibility of leading a long and healthy life, being educated and 
enjoying a decent standard of living, but also including political 
freedom, guaranteed human rights and self-respect4. This new 
conceptualisation of development emphasised the enlargement 
of a set of substantive freedoms upon which human capacity for 
making choices is based. 
Amartya Sen, the most prominent scholar behind the the-
orisation of human development and crucial advocate for its 
adoption by the UN, used the concept of human capabilities 
to define the set of freedoms that people need in order to lead 
lives that they have a reason to value.5 Not only are capabilities 
instrumentally important for economic progress, but they also 
have an intrinsic value: by enhancing people’s agency (versus 
their passivity in development processes), they contribute to an 
equal, efficient and sustainable development path6. 
In order to implement the concept of human development, 
the UNDP conceived the Human Development Index (HDI). 
The Index breaks down into three indicators: life expectancy; 
the average years of schooling for adults, and expected years of 
schooling for children; and per capita Gross National Income 
(GNI). The first gauges the capability of living a long and 
healthy life, the second the capability of accessing knowledge, 
and the last one the capability of having a decent standard of 
living. These indicators and their trends were subsequently 
4 UNCTAD, Human Development Report 1990, New York-Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1990.
5 A. Sen, Development as freedom, New York, Anchor Books, 1999.
6 S. Alkire, “Human Development: Definitions, Critiques and Related Concepts”, 
Background paper for the 2010 Human Development Report, OPHI working 
paper no. 36, 2010.
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quantified through the Millennium Development Goals and 
the Sustainable Development Goals as a shared guide for inter-
national efforts to promote and sustain development worldwide. 
Since 1990 Africa has made significant progress in hu-
man development, and remarkable improvements have been 
achieved in key sectors of human development such as under-5 
mortality rates, access to safe drinking water and literacy rates. 
Nevertheless, sub-Saharan Africa still lags behind any other re-
gion of the world in several of the areas mentioned, resulting 
in lower overall rankings in the Human Development Index 
(Figure 1). The 2016 Human Development Report7 estimated 
that, for sub-Saharan countries to meet SDG #1, i.e. eliminat-
ing extreme poverty, the poverty reduction rate should stand at 
10% a year between 2015 and 2030, or at 13% a year starting 
from 2018 (Figure 2).
At the same time, the significant improvements achieved 
are unevenly distributed across different social groups. The 
Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index8 shows that 
the human development ranking of sub-Saharan Africa has to 
be adjusted to -32% due to inequality in the distribution of 
capabilities, access to basic services and opportunities.9 The 
Gender Development Index10 shows that many of these inequal-
ities are gender-based. 
7 UNDP, Human Development Report 2016. Human Development for Everyone, 2017.
8 The IHDI combines countries’ average achievements in health, education and 
income with their distribution among its population, “discounting” each dimen-
sion’s average value according to its level of  inequality. The more unequal the 
country, the lower its IHDI when compared to its HDI.
9 World average loss is of  22%.
10 The Gender Development Index measures gaps in human development 
achievements (health, education and income) between women and men.
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Fig. 1 - Human development trends worldwide
Source: UNDP, Human Development Report, 2016, p. 27
Fig. 2 - Rates of progress needed to achieve SDGs 
in sub-Saharan Africa
Source UNDP, Human Development Report, 2016, p. 162
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While two out of three HDI dimensions, i.e. life expectancy 
levels and per capita income, have experienced significant pro-
gress, improving education remains particularly challenging. 
Data from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) show an average primary 
Adjusted Net Enrolment Ratio (ANER)11 increase from 59% 
to 79% between 1999 and 2012, but also warn about the un-
even distribution of this growth among sub-Saharan countries. 
In 2012, the African Learning Barometer12 found that, across 
28 African countries, some 17 million children out of approx-
imately 128 million were not attending school. In these coun-
tries, a child spends an average of 4.7 years in school, with sig-
nificant differences from country to country. For Mozambique 
the figure is 1.2 years, whereas the Seychelles reach 9.4 years. 
Comparatively, the average in East Asia and Latin America is 
of 7.2 years and 7.8 years respectively. The quality of education 
also remains an issue. In seven of the countries surveyed by the 
African Learning Barometer in 2012, about 40% of children 
attending school were not reaching the minimum standard of 
learning.
Due to short education careers and poor education quali-
ty, African pupils rarely acquire skills that go beyond liter-
acy and numeracy. This causes a dire lack of more advanced 
problem-solving and entrepreneurship skills, usually acquired 
through secondary education. The level of human capital re-
mains therefore relatively low, even though the continent is ex-
periencing a demographic transition with a growing number of 
young people entering the labour market and with decreasing 
numbers of dependent population (that is, individuals under 
14 or above 65 years of age)13. Proper investment in human 
11 ANER is the total number of  students of  the official primary school age group 
enrolled at primary education, expressed as a percentage of  the corresponding 
population. 
12 J. van Fleet, K. Watkins, and L. Greubel, African Learning Barometer, Washington 
D.C., Brookings Institution, 2012. 
13 AfDB, OECD-DAC, UNDP, ECA, African Economic Outlook: Structural 
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capital development could spur productivity and economic di-
versification. So far, however, structural constraints to devel-
opment such as political instability, macro-economic policies, 
tenure insecurity, corruption and poor infrastructures have lim-
ited the success of investments in this direction. Even though 
many African countries are spending a higher share of GNI on 
education than East and South Asia (Figure 3), secondary and 
tertiary education opportunities as well as the productivity of 
graduates from secondary and tertiary education institutions 
remains low, with most people employed in agriculture, low 
value-added jobs and the informal sector. This is possibly due 
to the lack of a conducive environment for investment and the 
creation of qualified job opportunities, a mismatch between 
skills taught and labour market demands, and the poor quality 
of the services delivered in the education but also in the heath 
sector – poor healthcare lowers people’s physical and cognitive 
development as well as adult labour productivity14.
Fig. 3 - Education spending as a share of GNI (%)
Source: OECD, African Economic Outlook, 2013
Transformation and Natural Resources, 2013.
14 D.E. Bloom and D. Canning, “Population Health and Economic Growth”, 
Working Paper no. 24, Washington D.C., World Bank, 2008; D.E. Bloom, D. 
Canning, and J. Sevilla, “The Effect of  Health on Economic Growth: A 
Production Function Approach”, World Development, vol. 32, no. 1, 2004, pp. 1-13.
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Education as an enabling capability
Two approaches to education have characterised development 
orthodoxies over the past fifty years. The first draws on human 
capital theories, based on the idea that investments in human 
capital – i.e. knowledge, habits, expertise, social and person-
ality attributes, etc. – provide the labour force with the skills 
required to foster economic growth. 
The second approach is human rights-based, and sees educa-
tion as a basic human right. This perspective became popular 
in the 1990s, when the concept of ‘development’ was broad-
ened following Sen’s approach. Sen did acknowledge the key 
instrumental value of education in supporting livelihoods and 
generating income. However, in contrast to human capital the-
ories, he considered the acquisition of knowledge and access to 
education a form of freedom-enhancing human capability that 
can be valued in and of itself. Education can provide access to 
other capabilities that make a dramatic difference in empow-
ering people by enhancing their capacity for making auton-
omous choices15. Human capital theories were thus sidelined 
and primary education as a right for all was privileged, based 
on the assumption that this would alleviate poverty through a 
redistributive effect and improve social welfare, including for 
women and other vulnerable social groups. 
The new approach was reflected in MDG #2, “Achieving 
Universal Primary Education for All”, which conceptualised 
education as a right and as a route out of poverty. Global ed-
ucation policies originating from this approach inevitably, and 
significantly, trickled down to influence national education 
policies in African low-income countries. The results in guar-
anteeing free primary education to a growing number of chil-
dren were remarkable. However, poverty rates did not decline 
as quickly as expected. Between 1990 and 2012, the percentage 
of people in sub-Saharan Africa living below the poverty line 
15 A. Sen (1999).
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(raised to US$1.90 since 2015) only decreased from 57% to 
43%.  Due to population growth, this decline did not prevent 
an increase in the total number of people living in poverty, 
which went up dramatically from 288 to 389 million over the 
same period. 
Youth unemployment also remains extremely high, averag-
ing 15% across the continent (with some countries surpassing 
30%) (Figure 4). Despite the rising rates of enrolment in sec-
ondary and tertiary education (a trend that also applies to poor-
ly-funded schools/areas), many people are unable to find jobs, 
are employed in vulnerable positions or are underemployed 
in the informal sector (Figure 5). This makes Africa the conti-
nent with the highest number of working poor, which in turn 
raises security concerns. In several cases, youth unemployment 
turned into a “ticking time bomb”, as pointed out by former 
Zambia Finance Minister, Alexander Chikwanda, and resulted 
in serious political instability and social unrest16.
Fig. 4 - Youth unemployment rate in sub-Saharan Africa  
(1991-2017)
Source: World Bank data, 2018
16 K. Ighobor “Africa’s jobless youth cast a shadow over economic growth”, 
African Renewal, 23 February 2017.
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The post-2015 debate shifted the focus back on human 
capital theories: secondary and post-basic levels of education 
and training became crucial instruments for equipping low-in-
come-country citizens with skills for participation in the “glob-
al knowledge economy”17.
Several African countries had already started elaborating on 
this. Ghana, Kenya and South Africa look at poverty reduction 
as a matter of employment creation, and therefore emphasise 
the role of skills development and higher education. South 
Africa launched the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative 
for South Africa (AsgiSA) in 2005, with the aim of halving un-
employment and poverty and accelerating employment equity 
and black economic empowerment. Other countries conceived 
and implemented similar strategies, though generally invest-
ing less than South Africa. This allowed Africa to achieve the 
highest growth in levels of higher education enrolments and 
number of graduates over the past ten years. This positive trend 
remains extremely unequal from a gender perspective, with 
only 38% of female enrolments in post-primary education in 
sub-Saharan Africa18. Students successfully completing second-
ary education are also increasingly encouraged to pursue high-
er education degrees in European and North American coun-
tries, as well as in non-traditional destinations like China and 
Malaysia, through both national and international scholarship 
programmes, which also contributes to the growing number of 
tertiary education graduates. 
17 L. Tilky and A.M. Barret, “Social justice, capabilities and the quality of  educa-
tion in low income countries”, International Journal of  Educational Development, vol. 
31, no. 1, January 2011, pp. 3-14.
18 T. McCowan, Can higher education solve Africa’s job crisis? Understanding graduate 
employability in sub-Saharan Africa, British Council, 2014.
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Fig. 5 - Unemployment, vulnerable employment and working 
poverty trends and projections in Africa (2016-2018)
Source: ILO Trends Econometric Models, November 2016
Fig. 6 - Secondary and tertiary enrolment 
in sub-Saharan Africa (thousands)
Source: T. McCowan, Can higher education solve Africa’s job crisis? Understanding 
graduate employability in sub-Saharan Africa, British Council, 2014.
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The said shift back to human capital theories is currently widely 
accepted globally. Clear evidence is the move between MDG 
#2, focusing on “Achieving Universal Primary Education”, and 
SDG #4, stressing “Quality Education”19. The latter conceives 
the development of useful skills for seeking decent work in a 
much broader sense, ranging from universal pre-primary edu-
cation to technical-vocational training. 
Fig. 7 - MDG2 and SDG2
Evidence of the impact of education on a country’s develop-
ment is still limited, with assumptions often made about its 
potential capacity to foster national economic growth20. What 
seems to be clearer is the positive impact of education on hu-
man development for individuals and communities. Despite 
19 Enrolment in primary education in developing countries has reached 91% 
(UN, “Quality education: why it matters”, 2015).
20 T. McCowan (2014). 
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the emphasis that recent global education policies placed on 
the instrumental value of education (i.e. as a tool to nurture the 
skills necessary to foster economic growth and development), 
it is important to retain a human development perspective ac-
cording to which education is an intrinsic, valuable capability 
that contributes to expanding people’s freedom of choice. 
The kind of freedom of choice fostered by human develop-
ment includes mobility choices. Mainstream notions of devel-
opment biasedly assume that people want to achieve a better 
quality of life at home, and portray migration as an indicator of 
the impossibility or failure to do so. Such partial understand-
ing of migration dynamics is the result of an exclusive focus 
on national economic growth rather than a broader perspec-
tive accounting for the individual dimension of development. 
Empirical evidence, however, points to a relationship between 
higher levels of human development and increased mobility21.
 People do not simply leave their home place as a result of 
a lack of development.22 Mobility is a more deliberate choice 
than may at first appear, and typically requires a few necessary 
pre-conditions to be in place. In particular, people must possess 
or have access to a basic set of resources, including the capa-
bility to exercise the freedom to move23. The United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that 
only 14% of the total number of African international migrants 
are fleeing natural or man-made disasters. The rest deliberately 
choose to move in search of better life opportunities. Reasons 
to move include family, work and education24.
21 H. de Haas (2009).
22 O. Bakewell, “‘Keeping Them in Their Place’: the ambivalent relationship be-
tween development and migration in Africa”. Third World Quarterly, vol. 29, no. 
7, 2008. pp. 1341-1358.
23 It can be argued, however, that the freedom of  choice is never completely real. 
De Haas (2009) suggests  speaking about degrees of  constraint that range from 
total lack of  freedom in situations of  conflict or natural disaster, to situations 
of  poor employment opportunities where migration is the best but not the only 
option to improve one’s situation. 
24 UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook 2010, Geneva, 2011. 
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Evidence also shows that increased income, income differ-
entials and associated relative deprivation, as well as improved 
access to information and education, tend to increase people’s 
capabilities and aspirations to move25. This is confirmed by the 
fact that wealthier societies tend to be more mobile than poor-
er ones. Higher income and education levels are also related 
to higher aspirations, more sophisticated capabilities and thus 
increased mobility. Skilled people’s26 migration rates appear to 
be particularly high in Africa, with one out of eight African uni-
versity graduates living in OECD countries. This has spurred 
debates about a “brain drain” depriving sending countries of 
qualified workforces, and thus negatively affecting a country’s 
service delivery capacity and development. From a state-centric 
perspective, migration would thus be a zero-sum game in which 
low-income countries lose human capital to the benefit of bet-
ter-off countries. To mitigate the negative consequences of this 
flow, the introduction of measures such as the “Bhagwati tax”27 
has been discussed as a way to partially compensate sending 
countries. 
25 H. de Haas (2009); G. Carbone, Out of  Africa. Why People Migrate, Milan, 
Ledizioni-ISPI, 2017, p. 16.
26 The OECD definition of  highly skilled people includes individuals who have 
completed tertiary education, which in most countries corresponds to a univer-
sity degree. It is, however, common to consider that nurses, IT professionals, 
schoolteachers and students are also skilled migrants. Such a notion is driven by 
market demands for a small number of  profitable skills and it excludes others, 
such as those for graduates in humanities or fine arts. Personal characteristics 
such as gender, refugee status or place of  origin also influence who is seen as 
a skilled labourer and who is not, as in A. Freitas, A. Levatino, and A. Pécoud, 
“Introduction: New Perspectives on Skilled Migration”, Diversities, vol. 14, no. 1, 
2012, pp. 1-7. 
27 The economist Jagdish Bhagwati suggested that poor countries could benefit 
from skilled emigration by taxing skilled people’s income up to 10% of  their 
revenues net of  the host country’s taxes for a maximum of  ten years. Critics of  
the Bhagwati tax argue that the sending country does not suffer any real loss, but 
only an “unrealised potential gain” that might have not been realised even if  the 
skilled person had stayed. 
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In the 1990s, together with the emergence of the idea of 
human development and consistent with a development par-
adigm that valued the role of knowledge and human capital, 
a more optimistic understanding of migration came to the 
fore. Multiple arguments rose in support of this thesis. First, 
remittances – which are often invested in education, healthcare 
and recreational facilities – are likely to have a positive impact 
on the human development indicators of origin countries as a 
whole28. Africa has been widely benefiting from an impressive 
increase in remittances, from around US$10.7 billion in 2000 
(and similar volumes for every year in the preceding decade) to 
about US$69.5 billion in 2017, amounting to three times the 
value of Official Development Assistance to low-income coun-
tries. These figures are likely to be highly underestimated, as a 
huge portion of remittance flows is thought to transit through 
informal channels. Second, since it is often relatively educated 
people who migrate, the prospect of migrating can increase the 
domestic demand for education and training in sending coun-
tries with the idea of increasing one’s human capital for a fu-
ture successful migration process. The increase in education ex-
penditures for people in the country of origin becomes possible 
also thanks to remittances from those who have already migrat-
ed. However, since only a small percentage of people in low-in-
come countries has the opportunity to migrate, this can cause 
so-called “educated unemployment”. Third, skilled migration 
can benefit the sending region through return or circular mi-
gration. Migrants who return home bring with them stronger 
skills and expertise developed through qualified employment 
in receiving countries. Circular migration can be a response 
to the labour demands of a global market by alleviating un-
employment in low-income countries, fulfilling industrialised 
countries’ short-term labour needs, increasing remittance flows 
and, at the same time, allowing the circulation of skilled and 
28 UNDP, Overcoming barriers: Human mobility and development, Human Development 
Report, 2009.
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experienced workforces. In this sense, the migration of skilled 
labour can represent a triple-win situation, with a “brain gain” 
for sending countries and receiving ones, as well as an improve-
ment of individual living conditions29.
Both these perspectives – i.e. the pessimistic view and the 
optimistic – are problematic when it comes to empirical ev-
idence. There is very scarce evidence that the alleged “brain 
drain” hampers a country’s possibility of developing rather than 
perpetuating the status quo. De Haas, for example, argued that 
qualified workers who migrate would very likely not have been 
able to use their skills in their country of origin in the absence 
of appropriate policies, adequate infrastructures and conducive 
legislative frameworks30. Their productivity can only be tapped 
in places where such conditions are met. It also appears, how-
ever, that skilled emigration may have at least some negative 
collateral effects on sending countries, including an “inverted 
technology transfer” between sending and receiving countries; 
the deterioration of certain public services such as health, ed-
ucation, research and technology; and economic and financial 
losses in terms of fiscal revenues, and so forth31. 
Migrants’ capacity to trigger national economic develop-
ment remains questionable. There seems to be relative agree-
ment on the idea that “despite their development potential, 
migrants and remittances can neither be blamed for a lack of 
development nor be expected to trigger take-off development 
in generally unattractive investment environments”32. The lack 
of structural conditions, including economic and political sta-
bility as well as infrastructures, goes beyond individual influ-
ence and has rather to do with a state’s investment capacity. 
Moreover, contrary to the mainstream migration and develop-
ment discourse, migrants do not usually transfer skills to ori-
gin countries. This is mainly due to a so-called “brain waste” 
29 A. Freitas, A. Levatino, and A. Pécoud (2012). 
30 H. de Haas (2009).
31 A. Freitas, A. Levatino, and A. Pécoud (2012).
32 H. de Haas (2009).
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or “brain abuse”, namely the employment of skilled migrants 
in un-skilled or low-skilled job positions in the host country. 
Such undervaluation is the result of discrimination in favour 
of national workers or of the non-recognition of educational 
qualifications33. This is a very common situation in the Italian 
labour market, for example, where migrants often find them-
selves underemployed or employed in the informal sector34. 
At the same time, it is demonstrated that migration improves 
living standards at household and community levels in their 
home countries through better housing, sanitation, food, cloth-
ing, electronic household appliances, as well as better access to 
education and health made possible by remittance flows and 
the circulation of new ideas and knowledge35. 
Overall, human development outcomes, understood as in-
creased capabilities for individuals living in a given area, are 
extremely heterogeneous and depend on specific circumstances. 
When people move under severe circumstances, such as wars, 
mobility will likely result in a loss of capabilities. In other sit-
uations, migrants may gain individually from their mobility 
choice but not be keen to invest in their country of origin due 
to the prevalence of unfavourable conditions, such as corrup-
tion, political or economic instability. In Somalia, for example, 
diaspora remittances significantly improved the quality of life 
of many households, but the overall lack of security and the 
essential absence of a central government offer little chances of 
a broader national development.
Evidence also suggests that micro-level positive effects are more 
frequently the result of South-North migration, even though the 
latter only represents a limited percentage of worldwide migra-
tion. South-South migration can be a way to enhance livelihood 
security through income diversification, but the welfare gains it 
33 A. Freitas, A. Levatino, and A. Pécoud (2012).
34 A. Stocchiero, Learning by Doing: Migrant transnationalism for local development 
in MIDA Italy-Ghana/Senegal programme, CesPI Working Papers Series, Rome, 
Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale, 2008.
35 H. de Haas (2009).
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generates are relatively small when compared to those associated 
with migration to Europe or other advanced economies. At the 
same time, migration to the North tends to be a more selec-
tive process, mostly benefiting the better-off segments of society. 
For this reason, it has been argued that skilled migration from 
sub-Saharan Africa can reinforce inequalities unless social net-
works within the country of destination are established through 
friends and relatives who have already migrated. These provide a 
safety net that, to some extent, reduces the cost of migration in 
terms of the efforts and resources needed to adapt in the country 
of destination. On the other hand, there are indications that 
migration can contribute to poverty reduction at a micro-level, 
as relatively small increases in remittance income can lift people 
out of poverty. This is true also for remittances deriving from 
South-South or internal migration, which are less selective and 
therefore more equally distributed in society36. 
Remittances are often directed to consumption expenses 
(such as housing, food, sanitation, clothing, electronic house-
hold appliances, healthcare and education) that, even though 
they are not directly linked to productivity, can have a multipli-
er effect, greatly enhancing people’s wellbeing and human cap-
ital. Moreover, migrants frequently establish hometown associ-
ations to promote development projects in their communities 
of origin. “Collective remittances” are very limited compared 
to individual remittances, but such initiatives have the poten-
tial of overcoming at least some of the structural obstacles to 
development, such as lack of roads and potable water distribu-
tion systems37, and enhance human development in sending 
communities. 
36 Ibid. 
37 A. Stocchiero (2008). 
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Policy options and prospects
The economic development prospects of African countries rest 
on their capacity to address broader structural constraints, in-
cluding economic and political instability. Nevertheless, a num-
ber of possible steps can help match individual with macro-lev-
el development needs by tackling current human development 
challenges in the African continent. 
(a) Improving education in sending countries 
From a human development perspective, education has an in-
trinsic value because it empowers people with critical cognitive 
capacities, much needed to lead independent lives. Over the 
last twenty years, the focus on primary education led to ex-
panding people’s basic skills and capabilities. At the same time, 
education also has an instrumental value in enhancing people’s 
capacity to access valuable job opportunities, increase their in-
come, improve household- and community-level wellbeing, 
and possibly provide the human capital needed for develop-
ment. Accordingly:
1.  Investment in post-basic education training should be in-
creased, matching the education offer with labour-market 
needs. Such post-basic education should not be limited 
to university level education: many countries in Africa 
actually face mass unemployment and underemploy-
ment among the highly skilled. Vocational training and 
technical skills development should also be encouraged. 
Expanding access to secondary education, however, is also 
likely to result in higher expectations and an increased 
mobility of individuals both within a country (from rural 
to urban areas) as well as towards wealthier countries. 
2.  For this reason, the urban bias of post-basic education pol-
icies should be addressed by paying more attention to 
policies in support of micro- or small-enterprise devel-
opment, including small farms. This would encourage 
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entrepreneurial development in rural areas, bringing 
rural business activities out of the informal economy 
and providing aspiring rural entrepreneurs with the 
necessary skills to improve management, offering via-
ble livelihood alternatives to migrating to urban areas. 
However, since urban migration is often fostered by the 
expectation of gaining access to better services, service 
provision in non-urban areas in other key sectors such 
as healthcare must also be addressed.
3.  Education quality should be improved, as it has been 
demonstrated that it can matter more than education 
quantity for economic success. Education quality does 
not only refer to curricula development, which needs 
to be context-specific and respond to particular la-
bour market needs, especially for vocational training 
and tertiary education. It must also concern the pro-
cess of imparting knowledge and learning, of transfer-
ring crosscutting skills and abilities that are necessary 
for workers to be productive. A study conducted by 
DfID (Department for International Development) in 
2014 found that the skills African graduates lack have 
more to do with personal attitudes than with techni-
cal knowledge, and include critical thinking, reliability, 
problem-solving capacity, proactivity, flexibility, leader-
ship and self-awareness. Improving teachers and lectur-
ers’ preparation, as well as the broader learning environ-
ment, may greatly contribute to enhancing these kinds 
of skills.
(b) Making migration work as a vehicle of development
Migrations have a major potential for improving human devel-
opment conditions at household and community levels, with 
possible positive effects, under the appropriate structural con-
ditions, also in terms of macro-economic growth. African gov-
ernments and their international partners must strive to make 
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sure such conditions are in place. Destination countries play 
a crucial role in creating an environment that favours positive 
returns from migrations for sending countries. Not only would 
such an environment enhance the conditions necessary for hu-
man development in the countries of origin. It would also max-
imize the benefits that skilled migrants can bring to receiving 
economies. Accordingly:
1.    Policies reducing brain waste should be promoted in hosting 
countries. Brain waste is one of the major constraints on 
migrants’ capacity to contribute to hosting economies, 
and to transferring skills back to their countries of ori-
gin. Policies should address the practical impediments 
related to the recognition of educational qualifications 
obtained in countries of origin, but also the cultural 
attitudes discriminating against immigrants based on 
their country of origin, religion or gender. Skills should 
also be recognised and enhanced in the case of vulner-
able categories such as refugees and women, avoiding 
victimising discourses.  
2.  Circular mobility options should be enhanced and encour-
aged, making sure they remain one of the options avail-
able to migrants. This could help reconcile the aspira-
tions of migrants and labour needs in host countries, 
while reducing the latter’s concerns over the social im-
plications of permanent immigration. A system of tem-
porary work permits such as the one employed among 
the member states of the Mercosur (an economic and 
political bloc comprising Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela) would also facilitate the trans-
fer of knowledge to sending countries and thus strength-
en their human capital. At the same time, however, the 
choice of circular mobility must be real, so as not to 
force people into permanent settlement for fear of be-
ing expelled from a host country. In practice, it might 
take some time before migrants acquire the necessary 
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financial, social and human capital to be able to estab-
lish a developmentally valuable relationship with their 
community of origin. Access to multiple choices would 
provide migrants with the necessary conditions to max-
imise the opportunities for mobility-related develop-
ment in origin communities. 
3.   Increased legal channels, also for lower-skilled migration 
could decrease the costs and, hence, the selectivity of 
migration, with a limited but potentially positive im-
pact on poverty reduction and redistribution in origin 
countries. Indeed, evidence shows that returns for ori-
gin communities are higher in the presence of South-
North migrations. Currently, restrictive immigration 
policies and the marginalisation of regular and irregular 
immigrants not only raise the risks and sufferings for 
migrants, but are also likely to have a negative impact 
on the poverty- and inequality-reducing potential of 
migration. 
(c) African countries with high rates of skilled 
emigration should be supported in engaging diasporas 
for development
The experiences of some Asian countries point to many creative 
solutions – including the establishment of ministries, centres 
and even virtually independent foundations – to engage their 
diasporas in coordinating migration policies and addressing mi-
grants’ demands. The search for the right institutional arrange-
ments requires a careful analysis of diasporas’ needs, wants and 
potentials, as well as a clear and transparent strategy for how 
to engage with them. Diaspora people often have little trust in 
their own government and perceive it as corrupt and ineffec-
tive. Trust needs to be built in order for policies and institu-
tional solutions to gain legitimacy and succeed in catalysing the 
development potential of migrations. 
A Vision of Africa’s Future194
Five questions for discussion
• How can stronger education systems contribute to ad-
dressing structural human development constraints?
• The mismatch between skills that are taught at post-ba-
sic education level and labour market demands is a se-
rious problem. What country-specific data are available 
or could be made available to orient more effective ed-
ucation policies?
• What kinds of measures are currently being implement-
ed to reduce the gender gap in secondary and tertiary 
education enrolment? What are the most successful ap-
proaches and how could they be strengthened?
• What are the policy options for reducing the ‘brain 
waste’ of skilled migrants in EU countries?
• How should African governments engage their diaspo-
ras for development purposes? How can international 
partners support these efforts?
8.  Conclusions and Policy Implications
       Giovanni Carbone, Tiziana Corda1 
Transforming Africa
Change has been ongoing in Africa for the better part of the 
continent’s recent past. This took a wide range of different 
forms, from demographic expansion and fast urbanization to 
economic development, from social progress to environmental 
challenges, from technological innovation to continental inte-
gration, from political change to migratory pressures. An over-
view of these changes was offered in the Report’s opening, with 
subsequent chapters going more into depth in detailing and 
examining selected dimensions of change.
Only time will tell where exactly the major and complex 
transformation processes currently underway will lead, and how 
they will shape the Africa of tomorrow. But five key features 
will most likely characterise the continent in the coming future, 
namely: an archipelago of heterogeneous growth trajectories; 
the leapfrogging of some development stages; regional integra-
tion relying primarily on sub-regional processes; the clustering 
of violent conflicts mainly around some of the continent’s inner 
areas; and rising migration pressures not just towards the out-
side, but predominantly within Africa itself.
Multi-speed growth will make Africa resemble an archipel-
ago in which areas of fast and sustained development co-exist 
with others where slower growth prevails. Differences in growth 
paths and development achievements across Africa concern not 
1 The authors would like to thank Marta Sachy for researching part of  the mate-
rials used in this chapter.
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only the trajectories of individual states, but also of regions, 
cities and towns, as well as coastal as opposed to landlocked ar-
eas. The differences behind these trajectories are due to drivers 
that are not only economic (such as oil or mineral wealth) but 
also political (including domestic stability as opposed to the 
presence of conflicts).
Technological change and connectivity in Africa have been 
showing the potential for acting as key game changers and trig-
gers of largely unanticipated leapfrogging processes. The dis-
ruption brought about by technological innovation is nowhere 
more evident and consequential than in Africa. The way mobile 
phones allowed Africans to by-pass dysfunctional landlines was 
only a starting point. Mobile money empowered them with a 
new capacity for financial transactions in the absence of phys-
ical bank infrastructures. Off-grid solar energy plants, drones, 
e-commerce and crowd data collection also have a similar po-
tential to help by-pass development bottlenecks.
Progress has been made to foster Africa’s regional integra-
tion initiatives, with some sub-regions leading and speeding 
up the process. African countries have long aimed to integrate 
economically and politically under the African Union and its 
predecessor organisation. The recent, momentous launch of the 
African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) testifies to a 
broad consensus on the goal of integration. Yet some of the 
so-called Regional Economic Communities (notably the EAC, 
ECOWAS, and SADC) are developing faster than others, and 
they are increasingly likely to gain more prominent roles than 
continent-wide arrangements.
Persisting instability across Africa will increasingly concen-
trate around the continent’s core – if with inevitable approxima-
tion and over time variations – following a T-shape clustering of 
the main conflicts in the region. With some exceptions, violent 
conflicts in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa increasingly tend 
to concentrate along a west-east arc of instability – from the 
Sahel to the Horn of Africa – as well as a central north-south 
axis (western Sudan, South Sudan, Central Africa and DRC). 
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These core areas will likely be slower to reach stability and pros-
perity, with radical jihadism having a role in a number of them. 
Besides lasting conflicts and new crises, however, African gov-
ernments also autonomously embarked in important peace in-
itiatives, as most remarkably demonstrated by the sudden and 
dramatic rapprochement between Ethiopia, under Abiy Ahmed 
Ali’s new leadership, and Eritrea. After two decades that had 
begun with open war and continued with border skirmishes 
and intense mistrust, the resumption of bilateral relations and 
the rapid attainment of a formal peace deal bode well for the 
gradual stabilisation of the complex Horn of Africa region.
Finally, growing numbers of Africans will be on the move. 
Africa’s extra-continental migration will continue to be shaped by 
demographic processes and development progress – including hu-
man development at large, as with education –, whereas intra-con-
tinental migration – representing about two-thirds of international 
mobility south of the Sahara – will be deeply affected by the in-
creasingly-divergent growth paths of countries across the region.
Italy’s priority areas in Africa
Recent years have seen unprecedented attention from Italy to-
wards Africa. A relative latecomer to realizing that change was 
taking place on the continent, Italy swiftly tried to adapt and 
adopt new measures. In late 2013, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs launched the Italy-Africa Initiative, a comprehensive 
framework within which a variety of initiatives would take 
place. In 2014, the overhaul of the country’s development aid 
system got underway with the passing of an overdue reform 
that finally established an autonomous aid agency. Meanwhile, 
after the long decline that had prevailed since the 1980s, Italy’s 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) slowly began to recov-
er, almost doubling from 0.15 % of GNI in 2004 to 0.29% in 
20172. 
2 OECD Development Assistance Committee, 2018.
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With the aim of promoting Italy’s international trade and in-
vestments – within a post-global-crisis and increasingly compet-
itive economic context – two successive Prime ministers carried 
out four trips to the region over four years (2014-2017), visit-
ing as many as ten distinct countries (Angola, Congo-Brazzaville, 
Côte  d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, 
Senegal and Tunisia). The trips and their frequency were both ex-
tra-ordinary and clearly showed the region’s increased importance 
for Italy. The number of embassies in Africa grew from 24 to 27: 
the Somali office was re-opened after twenty-three years, and new 
diplomatic missions were inaugurated in Niamey (Niger) and 
Conakry (Guinea). Italian trade agencies and institutions also 
showed renewed interest. The new ICE/Italian Trade Agency ex-
panded its presence beyond the Johannesburg office with a new 
network stretching across the region, from Maputo (Mozambique) 
to Luanda (Angola), from Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) to Brazzaville 
(Congo) and Accra (Ghana). SACE, which works partly as an 
Ex-Im Bank, launched its “Frontier Markets” programme, which 
aims at helping Italian companies identify emerging and unex-
plored markets. The programme’s first publication – a guide for 
companies – was entirely devoted to sub-Saharan markets. 
By 2016, the first ever Italy-Africa Ministerial Conference was 
convened in Rome, and the subsequent year ‘Africa’ was made 
a crosscutting theme at the G7 summit hosted in Taormina, 
Sicily. The Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs also hosted an 
additional meeting between African and G7 Think Thanks. A 
comprehensive and ambitious piece of legislation, dubbed as 
the “Africa Act”3, had also been proposed by the ruling party, 
though then mostly shelved. The bill singled out infrastructure, 
agriculture, energy and transportation as key sectors of concern, 
whereas North-Eastern Mediterranean countries (Morocco and 
Tunisia) and the Horn of Africa were identified as the main 
areas of interest for Italian businesses.
3 M. Cappellini, “Investire in Africa, pronto il piano italiano”, IlSole24Ore, 19 
September 2016.
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Meanwhile, Europe’s so-called migrant crisis, beginning in 
2015, further raised Rome’s awareness and interest towards 
Africa. A government proposal for a “Migration Compact” 
contributed to shaping the EU’s 2016 Partnership Framework 
on Migration. Meanwhile, much of the €200 million that the 
Italian government had allocated to Italy’s newly-created Africa 
Fund – originally part of the “Africa Act” – to beef up the re-
sources of the national aid agency, were swiftly re-directed to-
wards migration policies. While Tunisia and Libya were key 
fronts to try and control migration routes, Italy went deeper 
into the continent and planned to deploy a military-assistance 
mission in Niger between late 2017 and early 2018. The initia-
tive was, however, later abandoned. 
Governmental initiatives were sided by a growing number of 
non-governmental ones. New media outlets were launched in 
Italy, specializing on emerging economic opportunities in the re-
gion (notably Africa & Affari and the related InfoAfrica services). 
Prominent law firms, tertiary education institutions and interna-
tional fairs (such as those hosted by MacFrut, FederLegnoArredo, 
Marmomacc and Fiera del Levante) similarly began to eye and 
promote business relations with Africa. It had been long since the 
continent was the subject of such attention, in Italy.
Fig. 1 - Italy’s trade with Africa, 1996-2017 
Source: Istat, Coeweb
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Economic growth
A new era clearly started. Italy was able to show an unprecedent-
ed degree of leadership and political continuity in its relations 
with Africa, increasingly seen as a growing priority but also an 
opportunity – rather than a place to steer away from. A con-
sequence of such renewed interest was that economic ties be-
tween Italy and African countries expanded significantly. Italian 
trade with the continent doubled, up from an average of about 
€20 billion a year (€6.6 billion for sub-Saharan Africa) in the 
late 1990s to some €40 billion (€12.5 billion) a year in 2013-
2017, with southward exports increasing their share of the total 
value of trade4. A moderate decline after 2014 was followed 
by the rebound currently taking place (Figure 1). Investments 
were similarly on the rise. In 2016, Italy was Europe’s largest 
investor in Africa with some 20 FDI projects and investments 
reaching a total value of $4 billion (China topped the ranking 
with $36 billion, followed by the United Arab Emirates’ $11 
billion and Morocco’s $4.8 billion). 
The previous year, Rome had come out top of the worldwide 
ranking, with $7.4 billion investments ($6 billion alone for 
ENI’s Zohr natural gas field in Egypt’s Mediterranean waters), 
ahead of both the US ($6.9 billion) and China ($2.3 billion)5. 
For geographical and historical reasons, North Africa and the 
Horn have long represented privileged areas for Italian eco-
nomic activities. Yet Italian trade and investments have featured 
significantly also in countries outside these regions, from South 
Africa to Nigeria, from Ghana to Mozambique or Angola.
Africa’s recent economic dynamism thus appeared to offer 
plenty of opportunities for Italian businesses. But Italy also has 
a lot to offer to Africa. For a start, small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) played a major role in shaping Italy’s development path 
and remain the backbone of the country’s economic system. 
4 Istat, Coeweb, accessed on 28 May 2018.
5 Ernst & Young, Staying the course, 2016, p. 22.
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In this sense, Italy can boast know-how and expertise, which 
can be shared with African partners for sustaining growth on 
the continent. Similarly, the Italian experience with industri-
al districts and cooperatives may represent a suitable model to 
fulfil Africa’s development needs. From a sectorial perspective, 
in addition, the Italian success in fields such as agriculture and 
agribusiness, industrial machinery and equipment, industrial 
and transport vehicles, or construction is also a major asset. 
Italian manufacturers can provide African countries with the 
tools necessary to gradually expand and modernize agriculture, 
as well as add value to agricultural production, i.e.  small- and 
medium-sized processing plants, packaging, refrigeration tech-
nology and the likes (for which Italian manufacturers are re-
nowned world leaders).
An established Italian presence in Africa is that of giants 
ENI (in the oil and gas sector) and SaliniImpregilo (in the 
construction sector). State-controlled ENI operates primarily 
in Lybia, Egypt, Angola, Nigeria, Algeria, Congo-Brazzaville, 
Ghana and Tunisia, with important recent developments also 
in Mozambique, Kenya and South Africa. In many places, oil 
and gas operations have often been complemented by initia-
tives aimed at supporting agricultural growth, economic diver-
sification, job creation and local development. SaliniImpregilo 
is one of the world’s largest construction and civil engineering 
companies. Following the construction of the Kariba dam back 
in the 1950s (the first great dam on the Zambesi river), the 
group continued its expansion with dozens of large infrastruc-
ture projects on the continent, including the Gilgel Gibe III 
and Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam in Ethiopia, the Trans-
Gabon and the Trans-Cameroon railways. 
CMC has also been active for a long time in Africa’s con-
struction sector. It gradually expanded from Mozambique 
(where CMC Africa Austral is the country’s largest civil con-
tractor) to other twenty countries across the continent, includ-
ing South Africa, Egypt and Algeria, but also Somalia, Eritrea 
and Swaziland. The company builds roads and railways, dams 
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and irrigation systems, individual buildings and housing pro-
jects, and underground mines and tunnels.
More recent initiatives range from fisheries to legal services, 
to renewables. Over the past decade, Sicilian fisheries (Distretto 
Produttivo della Pesca, Mazara del Vallo) established cooper-
ative links with half-a-dozen African countries, from Algeria 
to Mozambique, with a focus on developing the “blue econ-
omy” through research cooperation, know-how transfer, and 
value-chain integration. A Blue Sea Land expo is also annually 
organized to bring together actors operating in the field. In the 
legal sector, BonelliErede law firm, one of Italy’s largest players, 
positioned itself as the country’s most prominent provider of 
legal services for Italian and international companies and inves-
tors targeting African markets. It established partnerships with 
a network of local law firms, opening offices in Cairo, Addis 
Ababa and – with the aim of intercepting Far East investors 
into Africa – Dubai. Assafrica & Mediterraneo of Confindustria 
(i.e. the confederation of Italian manufacturers) also supports 
companies approaching African markets, particularly in North 
Africa but also in Ethiopia and other sub-Saharan countries. 
In the telecommunications sector, Telecom Italia Sparkle – the 
international arm of Telecom Italia – established a series of local 
partnerships that boosted its continental presence. The group 
now operates in 18 distinct African countries, where it offers a 
broad range of telecommunications and IP services. In the ener-
gy sector, Enel Green Power (EGP) is another large-scale player 
that eyed Africa’s huge potential – water, wind and solar – for 
developing the renewables’ sector (some 600 million Africans 
still lack access to electricity). The group has projects in stra-
tegic locations such as South Africa (with 5 large solar plants 
and two wind farms), Morocco, Ethiopia, Senegal and Zambia. 
EGP’s CEO doubles as president of Res4Africa (Renewable 
Energy Solutions for Africa) and Res4Med (Renewable Energy 
Solutions for the Mediterranean), two parallel platforms for en-
hancing dialogue, strategic partnerships and capacity building 
among their over twenty partner countries. Ethiopia and Kenya 
are at the centre of Res4Africa’s activities, as are notions of sus-
tainability and know-how transfer.
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Peace and security
Despite the continuous alternating between achievements and 
pitfalls, Africa made substantial progress towards stabilisation 
since the early 1990s, when much of the continent was em-
broiled in a peak of widespread violence. Governance structures 
were renewed – if in a highly imperfect way – with the wide-
spread introduction of elections during the past 25 years. Yet ar-
eas of instability persist – parts of the Horn are a notable example 
– with new ones emerging in recent years. Besides, a number of 
reformed political systems found themselves on the bumpy road 
towards consolidation. Public and political polarisation around 
the term limits issue (i.e. whether incumbent presidents’ consti-
tutional term limits should be maintained or removed), placed 
a lot of strain on domestic stability in a number of countries. 
Improved governance and gradual political stabilization 
have been part of Africa’s progress over the past two decades. 
Italy played its role with occasional, yet specific, initiatives. 
This was notably the case with the mediation role played by 
the Sant’Egidio Community in conflict resolution during the 
Mozambican conflict in the 1990s, in Algeria (though with less 
success), and in the Central African Republic in 2017. Since 
2017, the Sant’Egidio Community has also run a humanitarian 
corridor pilot project for refugees from the Horn. The Italian 
government, meanwhile, has systematically supported multi-
lateral efforts undertaken by the international community to 
address conflict situations. Since 2013, a permanent naval basis 
has been established in Djibouti – called BMIS (Base Italiana 
Militare di Supporto) – where 90 Italian troops are stationed for 
logistical support to operations in the Horn, primarily anti-pi-
racy maritime operations.
In 2018, Italy committed new resources to five new/en-
larged African missions, part of the notion of an “expanded 
Mediterranean” that reaches southward as far as the Sahel and 
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the Horn of Africa6. Bilateral missions include the increase of 
training and capacity-building, coastguard support in Libya, 
and a planned initiative in Niger (the latter’s deployment, how-
ever, was put in stand-by since the Nigerien authorities expressed 
concern). These initiatives - together with the NATO mission 
in Tunisia (yet to be deployed), and the Safe Sea maritime-secu-
rity operation (now extending to Libyan territorial waters) - are 
indicative of Italy’s concerns over the control of migration and 
human trafficking routes, and over terrorist threats. The Sahel 
region and the southern Libyan border are of particular worry. 
The Italian government continues to support and participate 
in the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western 
Sahara (MINURSO), and in the European Union military 
training mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM 
RCA). Overall, Italy’s military missions in Africa were granted 
an increased operational budget (plus 7%). Troops deployed 
in Afghanistan, Iraq and Kuwait were recalled to allow for the 
enlargement of Italy’s presence in Africa. Data from the IISS 
Military Balance+ show that, in 2017, the 5,000-plus military 
personnel Rome deployed in peace and security missions (i.e. 
in Africa and beyond) amounted to significantly more than 
Germany’s 3,800 or Spain’s 1,7007. Whether this represents a 
sustainable new trend, however, will largely depend not only on 
budgetary constraints but also on the approach adopted by the 
newly-installed government (mid-2018).
Human development
Africa has historically been at the centre of Italy’s development 
assistance strategy. Italian aid went through a long period of 
decline since the 1980s, and was further reduced in 2008-2012 
as a consequence of the global financial crisis. 
6 This paragraph partly draws from A. Lapo, Italy: renewed focus on overseas deploy-
ments, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 9 April 2018.
7 Ibid.
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Fig. 2 - Italian military deployments, ongoing and planned
Source: A. Lapo (2018)
However, since 2012, aid levels increased significantly, reaching 
0.29% of the country’s GNI in 2017, and making Rome the 
sixth largest donor – among OECD-Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) members8 – with disbursements amount-
ing to $5.7 billion. Such shift in the aid budget was partly due 
to a decision to strengthen Italy’s development effort in sup-
porting poor countries. And partly – primarily – as a conse-
quence of ODA-reportable costs of hosting refugees in Italy. 
These skyrocketed from $221m in 2012 to $1.8 billion in 
2017, accounting for 31% of Italian ODA9. Funds for develop-
ment programs have also been on the rise, if less dramatically, 
and so has the budget for the newly-established Italian Agency 
for Development Cooperation (AICS), which pledged to dis-
burse $569 million in 2018. The key thematic areas targeted 
8 The data in this paragraph are mainly from: Italy. Donor profile, Donortracker.
org, 2018.
9 Ibid.
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by AICS are 1) economic development; 2) human develop-
ment; 3) environment; 4) rural development and food securi-
ty; 5) emergency and fragile states10. Italy, where the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) is headquartered, also leads 
the international agenda on agricultural development, food se-
curity and nutrition. For instance, Italy put these issues on the 
agenda during its G7 chairmanship in 2017, and at the Global 
Nutrition Summit.
Traditional development concerns have recently been re-fo-
cussing on migration issues. Italy aims at addressing the driv-
ers of African migrations while encouraging European and G7 
partners to also do so. In 2016, the government put forward 
a proposal dubbed “Migration Compact” that, by cajoling 
African states into cooperating with the EU, aimed at increasing 
the capacity to control migration. In 2017, the Italian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs reserved some €200 million of ODA to an 
“Africa fund” specifically devoted to enhancing local develop-
ment and stability in migration-transit countries11. However, 
the underlying assumption – i.e. that improving life conditions 
and opportunities in Africa will reduce the numbers of those 
willing or trying to leave their home countries by embarking 
on perilous migration journeys – has been widely questioned. 
A number of Italian civil society’s organizations also play an 
important role in supporting African development. Among 
many deserving examples, CUAMM – Medici con l’Africa 
(“Doctors with Africa”) stands out for its work (carried out 
since the 1950s) on supporting and improving the health sec-
tors of a range of African countries, including Angola, Ethiopia, 
Mozambique, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Tanzania and 
Uganda. The Istituto Zooprofilattico di Teramo specializes on 
tropical diseases and has cooperated with African countries, in 
health knowledge and technology transfer, for 25 years. SILAB 
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devised for the management of diagnostic activity. In 2017, 
the Italian Ministry of Health and the World Organization for 
Animal Health (OIE) launched the Enhancing Research for 
Africa Network (ERFAN).
In the education sector, an ambitious project was launched 
in 2010 by the Milan-based Università Cattolica del Sacro 
Cuore: Entrepreneurship4Impact (E4impact). The initiative 
reaches out to business education institutions in Africa and 
offers, in alliance with local partners in seven sub-Saharan 
countries (Kenya, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Ivory Coast, 
Senegal, Ethiopia and Rwanda), a Global MBA in Impact 
Entrepreneurship. During the programme students receive 
training and guidance for the creation and implementation of 
their business project. Prodit Engineering, which designs and 
develops education equipment and buildings, established a part-
nership with the Luanda government in 2013 for the modern-
ization of the Angolan technical and tertiary education sector, 
part of the country’s plan to diversify its economy away from 
oil. This led to the opening, in 2017, of a new Centro Integrado 
de Formação Tecnológica (Cinfotec) in Luanda. High-level cul-
tural initiatives also include the activities of Goppion S.p.a., 
an Italian company charged with the provision of museum in-
stallations at both the Biblioteca Alexandrina in Egypt and the 
Tlemcen Musée du Mechouar in Algeria. 
Finally, the Agenzia Spaziale Italiana also fruitfully cooper-
ates with African countries on scientific and technological in-
itiatives revolving around the “Luigi Broglio” Space Centre in 
Malindi (Kenya). A recently renewed bilateral agreement with 
the Kenyan Ministry of Defence, in particular, includes tech-
nical training and educational initiatives as well as plans for 
supporting the Kenyan National Space Agency, the establish-
ment of a regional centre for Earth observation, access to Earth 
observation and scientific data, and telemedicine12.
12 Cf. www.asi.it
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A wide variety of exchanges – ranging from business ventures 
to no-profit initiatives, from military assistance to cultural pro-
jects – shape the relations between Italy and the African conti-
nent, which have grown significantly over the past five-to-ten 
years.  
Policy implications
The chapters in this Report introduced and discussed a number 
of policy options, specific to each of the key areas of transfor-
mation examined, and assessed the related benefits and disad-
vantages. The following policy recommendations emerged:
• in order for population growth, in Africa, to translate 
into a “demographic dividend” in the medium and long 
term (i.e. economic growth potential), investments are 
needed in human and physical capital as well as in 
infrastructure development, in economic diversifica-
tion and value-addition, and in the creation of pro-
ductive jobs. Due to the continued weakness of pri-
vate investments and limited public revenues in African 
countries, international partners – including Italy and 
the EU – have a clear role to play in sustaining invest-
ments through external financial flows towards the 
region.
• Italy should take the lead in those sectors where it 
has already proved to be willing and able to play a 
crucial role. For example, Italy should find ways of 
translating its own economic model – characterized by 
the centrality of SMEs – into support for economic and 
social development in Africa. This is particularly true at 
a time when demographic change, economic expansion 
and regional integration put pressure on African infor-
mal businesses to adopt a more formal structure.
• external actors can support the transformation pro-
cesses currently underway in Africa by providing 
technical support or funds while evening out the 
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imbalances they create. Yet, areas such as Information 
Technology and telecommunications have benefited 
from a laissez-faire approach that encouraged bottom-up 
innovation and entrepreneurial experimentation.
• concerns over the Italian and European economy and 
security result into an implicit interest in the stabili-
ty and prosperity of southern neighbours. Evidence of 
such interest is the backing of Africa’s regional integra-
tion processes. In addition to existing facilities support-
ing the continent’s integration, the EU and its member 
states should now prioritize the implementation of 
the newly-created AfCFTA. Lessons can also be drawn 
from the European promotion of socio-economic co-
hesion, by looking at the tools and strategies adopted. 
Moreover, the EU should consider establishing an EU-
AfCFTA fund to favour better distribution of the costs 
and benefits of Africa’s regional integration. The EU 
should also keep guaranteeing its support in responding 
to requests of technical assistance for the next phases of 
the negotiations and for domestic reforms. Beyond the 
AfCFTA, Europe should support Africa’s broader inte-
gration agenda through trade and investment policies 
that help build production capacity and regional value 
chains in Africa. 
• international partners can help Africa mitigate the 
spread of violence by recognising its political nature, 
the conditions in which it takes place and the agen-
das of the actors involved. This often requires address-
ing domestic/local-level issues and the broader regional 
context simultaneously. Addressing conflicts also implies 
facing a number of trade-offs, such as the need to strike 
a balance between the primacy of national agency and 
ownership, on the one hand, and donor demands for 
accountability, transparency and results, on the other.
• the EU and its member states should acknowl-
edge that migration deterrence policies have only 
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succeeded to a very limited extent. Border control and 
strict processing procedures do have an impact on flows 
and decisions, but can hardly stop Africa-to-Europe mi-
gration and may be counter-productive, leading more 
migrants towards more dangerous and expensive routes 
without reducing their aspiration to move. Europe 
should push for safer and more legal migration chan-
nels – including schemes for circular migration, tem-
porary humanitarian visas, or employment initiatives – 
while also maximising the gains of migration processes 
(i.e. by improving the right to work, reducing the costs 
of remittance-sending, facilitating integration). There is 
also a need to think beyond migration-specific policies 
and look at broader issues such as the nature and inclu-
siveness of African states (for example, helping to build 
up social protection systems, which have been shown to 
curb emigration, or supporting economic processes of 
inclusive structural transformation). 
• the potential for migration to improve human devel-
opment conditions must be maximized. Italy and the 
EU should favour this goal through (a) policies reducing 
brain waste in hosting countries by allowing migrants to 
transfer skills back to their countries of origin; (b) mak-
ing circular mobility options available to migrants; and 
(c) increased legal channels, also for lower-skilled migra-
tion, to support the poverty – and inequality-reducing 
potential of migration.
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